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Through a heterogeneous set of contributions from film studies, psychoanaly-
sis and critical theory, including Leo Bersani and Laura Marks, Jacques Rancière
and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, the dissertation confronts spectatorship, film theory,
and their relation, on the issue of emancipation and of its discursive regulation.
Against the pedagogical forms of film theory and the authoritarian framing of the
spectator’s position that can be seen to be integral to the functioning of the cine-
matographic apparatus, this work suggests that we consider theory as an internal
aspect of film experience, rather than as its external explanation. Arguing for the
fundamental emancipation of the spectator together with the heteronomy of the
subject and the discursivity of film experience, the dissertation addresses what,
in film experience, resists being reduced within intellectual mastery, metapsycho-
logical structures, and the logic of interpretation, and rather remains radically
incommensurable with the principles of its intelligibility. Indeterminacy and a
lack in mastery are thus taken to be the constitutional ground of spectatorship as
a praxis and of the spectator as a site of tensions and dissensus. More specifically,
three basic dimensions and categories of this “wayward” ground of film experi-
ence will be examined in their correspondences and connections: contingency,
free association, and embodiment.
Acknowledgements
A work may have one author, but it is made of many people. If there is anything good
in what I have written, it goes to them.
Thanks to Saverio Zumbo for his amiability and for being there in the landscape of
Italian academia. Thanks to Michele Aaron, so many things came from her teaching.
Thanks to Jan Campbell for her thoughtful supervision and for her enthusiasm and
support. Thanks to Majid, Sahid, and Hossein and everyone at the Royale Custine for
their kindness and for taking me in. Thanks to Gilbert for the drinks and the stories.
Thanks to Flora Cruces for being there when I was no longer there. Thanks to Marina
Pensieri, Gian Siano and Antonello Mura for all they taught me about music. They
saved my life a thousand times, and counting. Thanks To Andrew Hladky for the
engaging conversations on psychoanalysis, painting, embodiment, and baking. Thanks
to Deidre Matthee for her poems, they always came at the right moment reminding
me about the pleasure of writing. Thanks to Stella Ghirlanda, the funniest and most
liberal sponsor a scholar may desire. Thanks to my father for all the sound advice I
never followed and for telling me what Battleship Potemkin truly is. Thanks to Giacomo
Conti for his unflinching friendship and twisted sense of humour. Thanks to Valentina
for suggesting that I read Pontalis, and for pointing out that there might be more
important things than film theory. For almost everything else, thanks to Nic.
Contents
Introduction. A divided passion? 6
Spectatorship as a site of conflict 15
Spectatorship as an ideological institution and as a discursive practice. . . . . . 16
The ideological unconscious. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The future of disillusion: emancipation as a knowledge effect. . . . . . . 24
Agency and heteronomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Heteronomy of the subject and masochistic spectatorship. . . . . . . . . 31
The spectator as a site of tensions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Interpellation and reflexivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Theory and implicational spectatorship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Spectatorship as a ground of disagreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Hard science, soft humans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
The film theorist and the emancipated spectator 52
Film theory as an integral element of the experience of film. . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Academic film theory as an incitation au discours. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Breaking the spell of theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
The beginnings of film theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
The child, the fatum and the infans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The spectator as an infans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Rancière’s critique of Althusser. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Film experience and the aesthetic regime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Contingency 89
Contingency and film theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Contingency and universality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Radical contingency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Contingency and the psychoanalytic subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
The flesh blanket: levels of contingency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Telling a story about watching a film. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Dissonance and the music of chance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
If only a bat hadn’t come into the story. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
The bat and the cinema. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Free association 121
Metapsychology and film theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Metapsychology and analytic experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
The mastery of concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Hysteria and “the great complex of associations”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Displacement and screen memories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Method and process of free associations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
The metapsychological spectator and the paradigm of interpretation. . . . . . . 143
Free association and film experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Embodiment and film experience 154
Ontology and the phenomenological turn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Non-objectual embodiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Discursivity of the body and incitation to discourse. . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Visibility and the visual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Embodiment and contingency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
The fantasy of pure presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
If only a fly hadn’t come into the body. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
More computing than commuting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Normative mapping of the body. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Inaccurate self-replications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Metamorphosis and anamorphosis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
On choice and the benefit of doubt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
The wayward spectator 192
Partages de l’ombre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Spectatorship as an act of illumination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Heteronomy and homoness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Afterimages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Man in the Dark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Theory as a form of forgetfulness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
It takes two (to make less than one). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Bibliography 218
Introduction. A divided passion?
The film analyst by his very activity places himself [...] outside
of the institution.
Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Film.
[Lady Ottoline Morrell to Bertrand Russell] Listen, just get through
the seminar and let’s go to the cinema.
Derek Jarman, Wittgenstein.
“How can you tell a psychoanalyst in a party crowd? When a beautiful
woman enters the room and everyone turns to look at her, he is the one who
turns away to look at everyone else.” There are versions of this joke about
sociologists and psychologists as well, but it is really the film theorist that
should figure in it: he, or she, would be that spectator who, as soon as the
film begins, turns away from the screen to stare at the other members of the
audience.
It is sometimes the case with film theorists, indeed, especially when they
deal with spectatorship, that they shift their attention from the contingencies
of their own involvement with film and from the personal significance that it
holds for them, to the visible signs of the involvement of everyone else and to
the intelligible meaning of the text. So that the desire animating the study
of film would seem to come less from the theorist’s own enjoyment of film as
a spectator, than from its fascination with the other’s visual pleasure, made
into the object of its look. Like the psychoanalyst in the joke, the film theorist
6
would seem to be somewhat removed - or to wish to remove itself - from the
power of attraction exerted by the spectacle: more than being directly engaged
in its own visual pleasure, and with the lures that fantasy and ideology have
prepared for it, the theorist would rather look at the ways others perform the
one, and bite the others. Understood in this way, the position of the theorist
would imply a movement away both from the source of pleasure and from the
theorist as the site of it. Driven by this fundamentally perverse pleasure in
looking at the other’s looking, but necessarily aiming at the sublimation of this
pleasure and bringing about the objectification of both the spectacle and the
gaze, film theory - and a theory of spectatorship in particular - would thus be
essentially, as Christian Metz put it, a divided passion.1 On the contrary, the
intention of this work is to explore the ways in which film theory, not merely
as an academic practice, but as an aspect of film experience itself, can act not
as a distribution of the space of film and an articulation of its pleasures and
significance, but rather as yet another form of their sharing.
The joke we have begun with is sexist, of course - because it wants you
to assume that the theorist is heterosexual, and because it frames both the
woman as a spectacle and the spectacle as an objectified beauty.2 In this, it
fittingly represents the sometimes no less crude objectification of spectatorship
and film, and the same normative “transparency” of the ideal spectator, that
can be recognised in academic film theory. Keeping with the sexist inflection,
we can picture the film theorist as a kind of voyeur, looking at a male hetero-
sexual spectator who is staring, in turn, at a beautiful woman on the screen.
He would look at the film only as an object of the other’s desire, at the same
time separating himself from the spectacle, and objectifying spectatorship and
film as the spectator objectifies the woman. In many ways, indeed, the straight
male conformist subject of early apparatus theory functioned as proxy of the
apparatus theorist’s own desire and of its authoritarian relation to cinema and
film. This overstatement of masculinity and visibility, as well as this apparently
inevitable “buddy relation” between the theorist and the ideal (male) spectator
that it entails, suggests in turn a disavowal of homoerotic desire and, together
1 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Film: The Imaginary Signifier (London: Macmillan,
1982), 79.
2 See Michele Aaron, Spectatorship: The Power of Looking On (London: Wallflower, 2007),
25.
7
with it, the refusal of a different regime of knowledge and pleasure. One that
would blur, at least, or bring about the collapse, of the stiff separation be-
tween subject and object, observer and observed, savant and ignorant, passive
spectator and critical subject, that is typical of pedagogical knowledge and of
a normative gaze. By shutting itself off from its own visual pleasure, indeed,
and by putting a distance between itself and what arouses it, the theorist also
removes itself from many - if not all - of the political questions that define
spectatorship.
Reified and commodified, but still unscrutable, visual pleasure is the centre
around which all actions and fantasies of cinema as a psychic and social insti-
tution gravitate. As the use of explicitly sexist vocabulary (or formally neutral,
but still implicitly sexist ideas) both in our joke and in a number of film the-
ory texts only makes more evident, within authoritarian regimes of knowledge,
power and sexuality, visual pleasure becomes itself a spectacle. Looking at the
other looking comes then to be a dominant metaphor for the economic and dis-
cursive regulation of spectatorship and for authoritarian forms of film theory as
well. We can say, then, that visual pleasure is made visible, studied, named and
controlled in many ways, through many technologies and discourses - not least,
through film theory itself, and by those films that put spectatorship “en abyme”.
If we take visual pleasure to be yet another object of a scientia sexualis, as that
fundamental dimension of film experience that institutions seek to signify, di-
rect, and produce from without, then spectatorship theory must be addressed
first of all as a Foucauldian incitation to discourse:3 an attempt to construe,
rationalise, name and control the experience of watching, and the modes of
subjectivity that come with it, in order to allow its discipline and reproduction.
Therefore, film theory would often appear to be intrinsically allied, in the forms
of its enunciation and in the kinds of relations it establishes, to the modes of
film production and consumption that it often constructs, simultaneously, as
the object of its criticism.
Within authoritarian regimes of knowledge, the spectator’s visual pleasure,
in itself escaping visibility, is forcibly reduced within the frenzy of the visible,
in itself erratic and proteiform, it is put under surveillance and normalised.
Film experience and the very embodied presence and subjective implication of
3 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la Sexualité: La Volonté de Savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976),
25.
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spectators in the scene of film is thus constructed as an object of the theorist’s
gaze. From the point of view of the apparatus, visual pleasure has to be dis-
ciplined through the same gesture by which it is aroused. From the point of a
“rational” theory of the spectator, in turn, spectatorship and its agency have
to be acknowledged and articulated through the same gesture that makes them
intelligible. In both cases this gesture entails an authoritarian articulation of
the space of film and a negation of the spectator’s fundamental emancipation.
The failure to account for the variety of existing modes of spectatorship, of
its specific agency and discursive power, that can be seen to be characteristic
of apparatus theory, can indeed be traced back to an authoritarian regime of
knowledge: to a neat split, that is, between the theorist and the spectator and
to the affirmation of an inequality in their respective ways of understanding film
experience. In this sense, apparatus theory appears to be an integral element
of the cinematic apparatus itself, as it constitutes a fundamental part of the
discursive regime by which spectatorship is articulated. At the same time, and
for the same reason, film theory can be occupied as a potential site of resis-
tance. We can see, then, how a queer feminist critique of the hetero/sexism
and paternalism of apparatus theory, and of the transparency and normativity
of the subject positions it assumes and contributes to construct, can be taken
as a first step in the critique of a more universal pedagogical and authoritarian
regime of knowledge about film and about the spectator’s experience.
If we try to move beyond its sexist frame, then, what the joke exposes is
a visual pleasure that is not made visible directly as an object of observation,
but rather mediated through the look of another. In the end, the theorist looks
away from the spectacle only to find it again through the spectator’s pleasure.
In fact, can the moving image even be apprehended as such without a détour
through the look and the body of another? Is our relation to the moving image
not first of all a form of interpersonal and contingent contact and, as it were,
the introjection of a scene of dialogue, with its passions and misunderstand-
ings? As the theorist turns to the spectator, she is in fact returned to herself:
only, no longer in the sense of an autonomous and unitary subject. Does the
subject really exist, indeed, beyond its involvement with other subjects and its
contingent encounters with the world? Beyond the objectual regime of thought
that is characteristic of intellectual mastery and its hierarchies, subjectivity may
indeed appear to be intentional, in its radical phenomenological sense: the sub-
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ject would only be found in the world, as an aspect of it, and, on the reverse,
the world would always bear with it a trace of subjective experience. As it
relates to spectatorship, this understanding would make of each contingent act
of film watching already an expression of the whole history of the spectator’s
embodied encounters with film, and with other spectators. It would make of
the very discursivity of the spectator’s position a site of pleasure and tensions,
and of subjectivity an eventually ungraspable history of interpellations, rather
than merely an intelligible instance of turning around.
The specific fascination with visual pleasure that the film theorist embod-
ies needs not be curbed, then, nor it necessarily has to take the form of an
intellectual mastery. Indeed, as the theorist renounces to the position of the
external observer, acknowledging its implication in the scene of watching, and
as spectatorship is recognised in turn its own intellectual emancipation, this
fundamental fascination with the other’s look is returned to a shared ground
of fantasy and experience - which is what keeps both spectatorship and film
theory alive. The work of the French philosopher Jacques Rancière suggests
envisaging the agency of the emancipated spectator and the activity of the film
theorist on the same plane - that is, that we consider all forms of spectatorship
and filmmaking and theories of spectatorship as “equal intelligences”4 of film
and film experience. As a matter of fact, one cannot exist without the other:
every form of spectatorship implies the performance of an aesthetic act, as well
as a more or less conscious or complex theoretical and discursive articulation,
and every theory of spectatorship is, in itself, a form of spectatorship grounded
in aesthetic and embodied experience. Not only spectatorship and theory are
inseparable, though, they are also largely indistinguishable. On one hand, with-
out the desiring involvement of the theorist - which is at the same time a form
of discursive power, and, thus, of political involvement - and without the loss
of mastery that this implies, which makes the theorist more like a spectator,
academic theory itself would be reduced to a mere profession of mastery. On
the other hand, without some kind of theory in the form of a reflexive, though
not necessarily conscious, theoretical understanding and extension of the sig-
nificance of film experience on the part of the spectator, the psychic experience
and the social performance of spectatorship would really be limited to the sce-
4 Jacques Rancière, Le Spectateur Émancipé (Paris: La Fabrique, 2008), 16.
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nario of total passivity and intellectual stultification that apparatus theory can
be accused of endorsing.
Now, the point is not to find a position for the film theorist which would
truly be external to ideological apparatuses, completely detached from the gaze,
or completely separated from her desires. It is not by taking away the gaze, nor
the ideological dimension of cinema and film, nor the fundamental perversity
of theory, then, that film theory can open itself up to more egalitarian forms of
knowledge. The point is precisely the opposite: it is to face the involvement of
the theorist and let it be played out - both in terms of the theorist’s spectatorial
pleasure, and of that particular form of pleasure which is looking at it. The
point is not to place the shared ground of spectatorship and theory outside of
the discursive dimension of film experience but rather to address, and disturb,
the knot of power, knowledge, and desire that articulates it. A move beyond
the authoritarian articulation of the space of film, then, entails not refusing to
deal with the film theorist first of all as a contingent, embodied and desiring
spectator and, conversely, with spectatorship as a discursive, theoretical and
“agent” form of film theory. From the same Greek root stem both the term
“spectator”, and “theory”: theoria would then be nothing more and nothing
less than the activity of the theoros, the spectator. In this sense, the practice
of spectatorship would in fact appear to be a praxis - a synthesis of theory and
practice that is at the same time the essential expression of the fundamental
emancipation of all spectators.
Spectatorship names not only that dimension in which aesthetic and discur-
sive visual experience and theory converge, but also that in which the subject’s
lack of mastery over itself and a form of political agency coincide, and the space
in which looking on and disciplinary observation are inextricably linked, hard
if not impossible to be distinguished. And so the question of the spectator’s
emancipation ultimately becomes how to imagine this agency and passivity to-
gether, and together with the lack of mastery and contingent embodiment of
the subject - that is, both beyond the fantasy of mastery that is fostered by
the apparatus and by authoritarian theory, and beyond the forms of mastery,
self-confession, and identitarian discipline that the subject can exert upon itself.
Spectatorship, in fact, individuates a form of otherness to oneself, which bears
its potential for emancipation and subversion not only as it troubles the existing
articulations of the space of film, but because it disturbs the very identification
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of subjectivity with self-mastery, which is what grounds all normative regula-
tions of the subject. In this respect, in order to become subversive, the gaze
and the embodied experience of the emancipated spectator and of the film the-
orist do not have to be entirely rational, nor aimed exclusively at mastery and
meaning. On the contrary, if spectatorship and theory become dissensual, it is
because their gaze wanders off its predetermined or previsible course, as their
experience avoids the meaning and rather extends the significance of film expe-
rience through its sharing and encounters and through its radical involvement
with fantasy.
In this sense, the space of spectatorship as a praxis is indicative of a lack,
and a disturbance, in its very articulation. The position of the spectator that
would refer to this, in turn, appears to be denoted by a certain “waywardness”.
Wayward is, first of all, a subject who turns around, that is, one who responds
to ideological interpellation - in doing this, however, its is also expressing a
radical, if always ambiguous, subjective agency. It is a subject that, by looking
on, also looks back upon its own contingent being and its relations with other
people. Wayward is, in turn, a subject that turns against, and, thus, by exten-
sion, an intractable subject, wilfully and perversely deviating from the norm,
but also unwittingly erratic and unpredictable. On the opposite end of the
pensive spectator, then, who is subversive in the measure of its understanding
and its control over the moving image, this restive spectator would rather find
its emancipation and express its radical dissent through uncontrolled acts of
wandering. The wayward spectator is not entirely regulated by discourse, then,
despite existing in it, it is not entirely autonomous, despite being agent and re-
sponsible, and it is at the same time fundamentally emancipated and radically
other to itself. The wayward is not the ungraspable subject: not what cannot
be grasped or mapped, but that which nevertheless disturbs the very principles
of its intelligibility. The fundamental aim of normative discourse is indeed not
to repress, but rather to give form to this waywardness: the wayward spectator,
then, is not automatically the enemy of normative discourse - it is, first of all,
its tentative object.
In this sense, the waywardness of the embodied subject and of the contingent
experience of film is never a guarantee of the subversiveness of spectatorship
nor of its status as a political practice. Is it only when the erraticness of spec-
tatorship troubles the existing articulation of the space of film, and only when
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the subject’s turning around is also a turning against its very self-sameness
and self-possession, that spectatorship and subjectivity become political. In
this sense, the wayward spectator is not a pre-discursive individual, nor simply
a bodily and cultural viewer, but rather an impalpable site of struggle. In-
deed, this quality of experience that we might call “wayward”, cannot really be
addressed, and certainly not reified, without losing its dissensual charge. As
Rancière puts it, the political is not a form of articulation or re-articulation of
the parts in a given social space (or of the space that is individuated by a given
artistic medium) but rather the expression of a dissensus that comes from a
part radically beyond the parts.5
Coherently, and inevitably, this work does not seek to explain or put the
wayward spectator into discourse, and even less to reduce it to a portable cat-
egory. Indeed, apart from the title, little points directly to this waywardness,
and the dissertation, in keeping a rather associative and fragmentary nature
tries to respect, through its heterogeneity, the very heteronomy of the subject
it is arguing for. Still, some structure has been given. The first chapter will
address spectatorship as a site of tensions and conflicts - between police and
emancipation, discursive discipline and contingency, agency and passivity, au-
tonomy and heteronomy, film theory and the experience of film - at the same
time foregrounding the centrality of spectatorship in defining the epistemology
and the political scope of film theory as a practice. Assuming the fundamental
equality of the intelligence and the experience of film that is performed by all
subjects involved with the medium, the second chapter will suggest that we
rethink film theory as an internal aspect of film experience rather than as its
external explanation. More specifically, it will highlight the disciplinary role of
a pedagogical theory of spectatorship in the functioning of the cinematographic
apparatus from the standpoint of the writings of Jacques Rancière. The next
chapter will then address the concept of contingency, which underscores the
discursive power of both spectatorship and theory, at the same time grounding
them in the materiality of film and film experience and setting their limits.
The fourth chapter is dedicated to psychoanalysis: it will address the role of
psychoanalytic metapsychology and the logic of interpretation in the construc-
tion of the normative subject of the apparatus in psychoanalytic film theory,
5 Jacques Rancière, La Mésentente: Philosophie et Politique (Paris: Galilée, 1995), 31.
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and discuss free association and free floating attention as part of an alternative,
non-authoritarian, understanding of the relation between psychoanalysis, film
experience, and film theory. The fifth chapter will deal with phenomenological
film theory, seen both as an attempt to break free from the normativity and the
disembodiment of authoritarian film theories, and as a more bodily and non-
objectual form of film epistemology. The particular relation of embodiment,
contingency and the heteronomy of subjectivity will be addressed through a
reading of David Cronenberg’s film The Fly. Finally, the last chapter will dis-
cuss spectatorship as a form of being in the world and will argue, using Paul
Auster’s novel Man in the Dark as an example, for taking the dimension of
embodied and forgetful memory as the fundamental ground of the spectator’s
emancipation and of its contingent encounters with film, beyond their inscrip-
tion within the regime of representation and their authoritarian regulation.
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Spectatorship as a site of conflict
The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation
between people that is mediated by images.
Guy Debord, La Société du Spectacle.
Spectatorship is a wide-ranging concept. In its broadness, it encompasses
heterogeneous media, various kinds of relations that spectators entertain with
them in dissimilar contexts, and different methodological approaches to their
study. Its theoretical function is less to map this heterogeneity - to articulate
a description of all possible scenarios of spectatorship - than to provide a syn-
thesis, to tie together different aspects of film experience, and of the discourses
that define it, at a specific point: the spectator. In this way, spectatorship ab-
stracts, systematises, and provides a name to the dynamic of forces that shapes
the ways we experience film and informs its social significance - forces that,
however, in their materiality and complexity, and because of their involvement
with fantasy, tend to defy rational grasp. Spectatorship, in fact, is also some-
thing else than a word and a theoretical construct, for it points back to the
psychic state we are in when we are watching a spectacle - a spectacle which
exists not only as it is projected, or displayed, on a screen, but within a scene
made of our desires and pleasures. As such, spectatorship is always a personal
experience, hard to translate into language and, thus, it is largely incommunica-
ble: it encompasses the emotions, the fantasies, and the associations that come
from our encounter with particular films, as well as the accrual of feelings that
marks our involvement with cinema and with the very act of watching. And yet,
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spectatorship is always also an interpersonal experience: one that only exists
insofar as it is shared with other people and as it extends beyond the moment
of the film’s projection; one that, in turn, is necessarily affected by the way it
is put into words, that is structured by the discourses and institutions in which
it is embedded, and that acquires meaning through the kinds of relations that
it fosters.
Spectatorship as an ideological institution and as a discursive prac-
tice.
In its most restricted sense, film spectatorship can be defined as the relation
between viewer and film: the experience that a viewer has of a film and her
understanding of this experience. A theory of spectatorship would then be a
systematic study of the relations between viewers and films, of the possible
modes of film experiencing, as well as of the discourses that are employed to
make sense of film experience itself.
If the relation between viewer and film is at times reduced to the physi-
ological, cognitive, and psychological mechanisms of audio-visual perception,
it is nevertheless characteristic of the concept of spectatorship that it be ad-
dressed as something stretching beyond what is proper of those mechanisms,
and framed instead as a discursive practice and a form of ideological institu-
tion. As Judith Mayne argued, spectatorship “denotes a preoccupation with
the various ways in which responses to film are constructed by the institutions
of cinema and with the contexts - psychic as well as cultural - that give those
responses particular meanings.”6 As such, she concludes, “spectatorship is not
just the relationship that occurs (3) between the viewer and the screen, but
also and especially how that relationship lives on once the spectator leaves the
theatre.”7 In other words, the scope of spectatorship relates to the significance
of the experience of film as it is lived by viewers during and after the moment
of the film’s projection, as well as to the context of discursive practices and
institutions that situate this experience. Spectatorship would then be the site
in which these two dimensions of film experiencing - its embodiment and its
discursivity - come together and become inseparable.
6 Judith Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 32.
7 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 2-3.
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We can say, then, that at the origin of contemporary theories of spectator-
ship is an extension of its scope, from the description of the physiological and
psychic mechanisms of perception, to the study of the social dynamics that are
seen to inform them. From this perspective, no such thing as mere film per-
ception - prior to its discursive, political and ideological, construction - can be
imagined. Perception itself, in fact, much like the cinematic subject, is taken
to be a function of the broader dynamics that regulate spectatorship as a so-
cial phenomenon and, more specifically, film as a signifying practice.8 As a
consequence, film perception becomes not simply a physiological and cognitive
process, but a material and discursive activity, understood as a convergence of
semiotic meaning, social value, and personal significance.
What in many ways was the first and most influential, and what has now
become the paradigmatic theory of spectatorship - conceived in the early 1970s
at the crossroads of critical theory, Lacanian psychoanalysis and semiology -
addressed spectatorship in terms of subject positioning: it made sense of spec-
tatorship, that is, through a particular metapsychological and ideological char-
acterisation of the position of the spectator. A position that was inscribed
within, and informed by what Jean-Louis Baudry famously called, adapting
Louis Althusser’s concept of appareil idéologique,9 the basic cinematographic
apparatus. Spectatorship emerged as a concept and as a specific area of study,
then, in the context of a rethinking of cinema as an ideological institution, at-
tending to the reproduction of social relations of production, and of film as an
ideological object, whose textuality and meaning were to be analysed through
the instruments of textual analysis, the critique of ideology, and psychoanalytic
interpretation. From the ontology of the image and the quest for cinema’s for-
mal and aesthetic specificity in relation to the other arts, then, film theory’s
main task became in this perspective the theorisation of the ideological power
of film as a medium. The spectator was individuated in turn as the ideological
object of film, interpellated and positioned by the technological and narrative
structures of the film text. As Baudry put it, the ideological function of the
basic cinematic apparatus was, like artificial perspective, expressed primarily
8 Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984), 37.
9 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy
and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 144.
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in the construction of the subject as the illusory centre and unitary instance of
perception.10 The imaginary unity of the subject, further linked to the Lacanian
account of the mirror stage, provided in this way a model for the fundamental
misrecognition through which the ideological effects of cinema were explained.
By this, apparatus theory gave (and can still be used to give) a powerful inter-
pretation of film as a consumerist product and of spectatorship as a conformist
practice: it is, though, as it is often noted, less equipped to account for the
diversity of spectators and for their agency and emancipation.
The very interest of film studies in ideological state apparatuses was, in
some respects, a consequence of the Frankfurt School’s main claim and cor-
nerstone of critical theory: that the relationships of domination in capitalist
society could not be explained as a function of coercion alone. Critical theory
attempted to give reasons for the subject’s active implication in the function-
ing and in the re-creation of the institutions that oppressed it. Cinema, in
this regard, provided the perfect model of a cultural apparatus, one that oper-
ated almost exclusively by means of ideology: it was indeed an institution that
did not help to reproduce the existing social conditions through intimidation
and repression, but rather enforced its ideological potential by capitalizing on
the audience fantasies. When Slavoj Žižek, discussing the Marxist notion of
commodity fetishism, addresses the fantasmatic character of the commodity,
film appears again to be the perfect example.11 As Žižek reminds us, Karl
Marx had a complex and almost paradoxical understanding of the commodity:
hardly the no-nonsense category that it may appear to be, a commodity would
rather be “a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theo-
logical niceties.”12 In this sense, commodities would not be defined entirely, nor
essentially, by their use value. On the contrary, Žižek comments, their value
ultimately rests on the ideological fantasy that not only dictates our relation
to them, but that informs their very material reality.13 In other words, there
10 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus,” Film
Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1974-1975): 46.
11 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 27-28. Also
see Cornel West and Slavoj Žižek, Talk at Princeton University, 5 May (2005):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBvASueefk4.
12 Karl Marx (1995-1996 / 1867) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. I. Moscow:
Progress Publishers, p. 46.
13 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 30.
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would be no reality to the commodity beyond the ideological fantasy illuminat-
ing it as such. In this sense, we can see how film functions at the same time as
a commodity and as an instrument of ideology and, in turn, we could say that
every commodity is fundamentally like a film, acquiring value in function of its
fantasmatic power. The dimension in which the spectator’s emancipation and
its subjection to ideological institutions is fought, in the end, is at the same
time a material one - having to do with social realities and actual relations of
production - and an ideological, fantasmatic one - having to do, as Althusser
wrote, with the subject’s representation of imaginary relationships.14 In Žižek’s
view, however, the confluence of these two dimensions is a radical and insur-
mountable one: there would be no real social conditions, we could say, beyond
the ideological fantasies that frame them in terms of their reality, of their sit-
uatedness, and of their politics. On the contrary, it is precisely by affirming
the possibility of a discrimination between real and imaginary conditions that
Althusser, as we will see, attempted to impose the autonomy and the authority
of theory, that 1970s film theory eventually took as its own model.
As opposed to sociological approaches to the study of spectatorship, whose
aim is to systematise viewer responses, Althusserian film theory was more con-
cerned with the spectator as that imaginary position implied by the text and
informed by the basic cinematic apparatus, than with the viewers materially
present at the film’s projection. In this sense, Judith Mayne can write that the
distinction of the cinematic subject from the viewer has been the fundamental
insight of 1970s film theory.15 To put it differently, we can say that the main
accomplishment of this period of film theory has been precisely that of making
cinematographic experiencing conceivable in terms of spectatorship: to under-
stand the viewer as a spectator, at the same time foregrounding the political
and ideological dimensions of film watching and film theory. Now, this key idea
of a split between the spectator as a film goer and the spectator as the subject
of film can be taken in two directions. On one side, it constitutes a (strate-
gic) negation of the more situated and embodied agency that viewers always
have in their relation to film. This negation spurred what is probably the most
consistent and widely shared line of criticism against apparatus theory: that
14 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 162.
15 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 33.
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it cannot account for the “real” spectator - that is, for the degrees of freedom
and for the contingency of spectatorship in all its possible manifestations. On
the other, it must be taken as the recognition of a struggle that is internal to
the very agency of the spectator, inseparable from its discursive understanding
and from a psychoanalytic view of subjectivity and desire. This is, conversely,
the main reason why, despite the essentially valid criticism, apparatus theory
proved to be somewhat inescapable and has never been completely discarded -
unless, that is, at the same time one is ready to abandon, or at least drastically
downplay, the psychic and ideological dimensions of cinema as such, and, with
them, the cultural and political relevance of spectatorship both as a category
and as a cultural practice.
The cinematic subject of apparatus theory was constructed according to
practices and discourses - on spectatorship itself, and, more generally, on per-
ception and subjectivity - that clearly had a longer history, and a broader scope,
than those of cinema, psychoanalysis, and film theory on their own. Baudry’s
reference to Renaissance perspective in his description of the normative mech-
anisms that regulate cinematic perception and attend to the formation of the
cinematic subject, in a way, was an attempt to place film studies within this
tradition, at the same time that it constituted an implicit attack on the ratio-
nalist subject of Enlightenment and against the deceptive neutrality of optical
technologies.16 And yet, if the history of film spectatorship, as a practice, can
be retroactively made to coincide with the birth of cinema - and if the historical
development of the discourses and institutions that frame spectatorship dates
back to ancient theatre and to the first philosophical discussions on subjectiv-
ity and political action - as a theoretical concept, spectatorship has a shorter
history and a tighter focus.
One could say that spectatorship, in its current conception, was born at the
moment in which cinema, from being a social technology among others, was also
becoming a technology of the social. Meaning that cinema was seen not only
to advance particular ideological positions within a given society, but, precisely
through the dimension of spectatorship, also to inform the ways in which the
social space itself was conceived. Simplifying, one could locate in Guy Debord’s
La Société du Spectacle the moment in which this shift became apparent to a
16 Baudry, “Ideological Effects,” 40.
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sector of French intellectuals and film theorists.17 From then on, spectatorship
was foregrounded both as a necessarily political dimension and as a key element
in the network of power, knowledge and sexuality that structured the idea of
society in the West. It is in this sense that the French philosopher Jacques
Rancière explores the spectator at the same time as the subject of theatre and
film and as the subject of democratic politics.
If, in more traditional film criticism, film was taken as reflection of a given
social reality,18 from the more dynamic, dialectical, perspective offered by crit-
ical theory, cinema was studied instead as an active part of the historical, and
psychic, forces that concurred to shape the social reality in which it existed. As
such, apparatus theory configured itself more (at least, more than other aca-
demic theories of film) as an active intervention in the contemporary aesthetics
of cinema, in the politics of spectatorship, and, ultimately, in politics as such,
than as a reconstruction of the medium’s historical, aesthetic, or technical speci-
ficities. An ahistorical gesture which, since then, has often been criticised, but
that should not be seen per se as the cause of the theory’s authoritarian framing
of spectatorship: if the spectator’s emancipation was foreclosed from the scope
of apparatus theory, in the end, it was not because of the discursive nature
that the theory recognised in film experience, but rather due to the pedagogical
regime of understanding of the relation between discourse and experience that
was characteristic of both cinematic institutions and academic practice.
In any case, the concept of spectatorship calls for an essentially political
definition. Political both at the more abstract level of our understanding of
power relations, of the account that can be given of them, in which spectator-
ship is articulated as an ideological institution; and at the more material level
of dialogue, subjective encounters and contingent social struggles, that gives
theories of spectatorship their flesh. The relation between these two aspects of
the political dimension of spectatorship is an important question in film studies.
More concretely, their connection has been one of the objectives of those spec-
tatorship theorists who accompanied their academic activity with more direct
forms of political engagement. The realities of the struggles they were involved
in, or at least, that they supported - from class struggle and the opposition to
17 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 5.
18 Ibid., 32.
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authority, to feminist and queer movements, from the fight for racial equality
to the resistance against colonialism - were, and still are, an essential part of
spectatorship theories, without which a significant dimension of their meaning
would be lost.
The ideological unconscious. The understanding of film as a social and
political phenomenon, on one hand, and, on the other, a practice of theory that
was at the same time meant to bring about political emancipation, were the
premises for the elaboration (for the necessity) of a comprehensive theory of
spectatorship. One that, as we have seen, linked cinematic modes of produc-
tion and a semiological understanding of film signification to the dimensions of
ideology and fantasy. Or, one should rather say dimension, in the singular, for
it was indeed characteristic of 1970s film theory to conflate these two domains:
apparatus theory found a precise correspondence - in Metz’s wording, a “dual
kinship” - between the libidinal economy of the spectator’s metapsychology and
the political economy of cinematographic production.19 This was not just a way
of addressing cinema’s evident affinity with imagination and of providing a so-
phisticated account of the psychology of film experience, but also, we will argue,
a way of establishing the authority of film theory and, more generally, to fur-
ther the alliance of Althusserianism and semiology. By folding Freud’s psychic
apparatus over Althusser’s ideological apparatus, in fact, by reading the former
largely as an internalisation of the latter’s structures, film theorists took hold of
the psyche in socio-political, semiological, terms (a bold move, whose mishaps
and implications are far from being dead). This idea of internalisation was an-
other trait that film studies had inherited from critical theory. As Horkheimer
had written in 1937,
“the whole psychic apparatus of members of a class society, inso-
far as they do not belong to the nucleus of privileged people, serves
in large measure only to interiorize or at least to rationalize and
supplement physical coercion.” 20
19 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Film, 8.
20 Max Horkheimer, “Authority and the Family,” in Critical theory: Selected Essays (New
York: Continuum, 2003), 56.
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Note, by the way, the exemption of the psyche of the “privileged” from social de-
termination, as it is a first index of apparatus theory’s tendentially paternalistic
positions: psyche and ideology, at least insofar as they were made into objects of
critical analysis, were definitely posited as features of the passive masses. The
Althusserian notion of interpellation, and thus the notion of cinematic identifi-
cation, originated precisely from the theoretical move that combined social and
psychic repression - that joined what subjects did not know about the mecha-
nisms of oppression and what, on the ground of psychic repression, they could
not know about their own history and desire. Film theory in this way addressed
the lack of mastery of spectators coming from their binding, but not directly
repressive, fascination with mainstream cinema, as it reflected their relation to
the manufacture of consent and normative discourse in the context of capitalist
society, and of Western liberal democracies in a more specific way. At the same
time, this lack of mastery was not represented in terms of mere deception (ide-
ology as a lie), but rather as a deception which satisfied and, more importantly,
articulated, the spectator’s own desires (ideology, precisely, as a construction of
a subject position).
Characteristic of this passage through psychoanalysis, then, was to put the
ideological dimension of film spectatorship beyond the grasp of the spectator ’s
conscious agency,21 at the same time that it granted the theorist authority
over it. The general assumption was, of course, that the ideological impact
of cinematic institutions was greater, when its effects were not consciously ac-
knowledged by viewers.22 This appears now to be a matter-of-fact postulate,
but it actually relies on a specific - paternalistic, pedagogical or more generi-
cally authoritarian - understanding of the relation between knowledge and the
unconscious and between the subject of theory and the spectator. The lack
of awareness of the spectator implied the film theorist’s critical attention and
to the former’s lack of mastery, necessarily corresponded the pretence of mas-
tery of the latter. The fantasy of mastery is not synonym with knowledge or
agency, then, but it rather names an authoritarian regime of understanding of
knowledge and agency.
21 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 28.
22 Baudry, “Ideological Effects,” 40-41.
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By superimposing film’s ideological effect with the lack of conscious aware-
ness of the spectator, apparatus theory not only made the dimension of the
unconscious more intelligible, as we will see, it also negated its specific agency.
Beyond the realisation that apparatus theory was never able to account for the
many possible forms of the spectator’s agency and emancipation lies, I think,
not the employment of psychoanalytic theory as such, but rather its reduction
to a mere metapsychology, together with apparatus theory’s reliance on the
logic and the mastery of interpretation. Not the universality of the subject of
film that film theory individuated, but rather the transparency of its universal
spectator to issues of contingency (gender, race, class, but also the diversions
of the unconscious and the radical heteronomy of the subject). Not the discur-
sivity film experience, finally, but rather the exclusion of the spectator’s agency
and fundamental emancipation from its scope. All of which can be seen as
functions of the theory’s authoritarian stance.
The future of disillusion: emancipation as a knowledge effect. Both
spectatorial agency and the authority of the critical theorist were generally
imagined as an act of disentanglement from the apparatus, involving a demys-
tification of the discourses that informed it and a shattering of the positions
it defined. Yet, quite paradoxically, this act could only be performed from a
position that was in fact already external to the apparatus itself. While the the-
ory’s emancipatory goals presupposed that political subjects could assume this
position, the spectator, by definition, could not: its emancipation was either
bound to come from an external agency, or to be realized in self-effacement. In
any case, either through an increased activity or through critical distance, the
position of the spectator had to be attacked, removed, or relinquished. More
specifically, the possibility of the spectator’s emancipation from the apparatus
was predicated on a “knowledge effect,”23 external and opposed to that of ideol-
ogy. A knowledge that, in the end, could not but be symbolised and possessed,
if only in fantasy, by the apparatus theorist. The knowledge effect, indeed,
no less than the ideological one, presupposes and supports an authoritarian
regime of knowledge that was equally necessary to affirm the independence of
theory and the insistence of ideology, and a specific set of relations of power
23 Baudry, “Ideological Effects,” 41.
24
between the passive spectator and the critical subject that ultimately rests on
their inequality.
In his work, Rancière puts forward a stark critique of this kind of logic,
which, for him, takes the form of an intellectual imposture (in fact, we could
say, it is the quintessential imposture of the intellectual, both as a persona and as
a regime of knowledge). In the following passage of The Emancipated Spectator ,
Rancière presents his views of the meta-political regime,24 that we can take at
the same time as a negative comment on the so called post-theoretical turn
(in all of its forms) and as a critique of the standard Althusserian theory of
ideology:
“Forty years ago critical science made us laugh at the imbeciles
who took images for realities and let themselves be seduced by their
hidden messages. In the interim, the imbeciles’ have been educated
in the art of recognizing the reality behind appearances and the
messages concealed in images. And now, naturally enough, recycled
critical science makes us smile at the imbeciles who still think such
things as concealed messages in images and a reality distinct from
appearances exist. The machine can work in this way until the end
of time, capitalizing on the impotence of the critique that unveils
the impotence of the imbecile. [...] To escape the circle is to start
from different presuppositions, assumptions that are certainly un-
reasonable from the perspective of our oligarchic societies and the
the so-called critical logic that is its double. Thus, it would be as-
sumed that the incapable are capable; that there is no hidden secret
of the machine that keeps them trapped in their place.”25
From this point of view, both the ideological regime that enforces (or, which is to
say the same, assumes) the spectator’s passivity, and the regime that announces
(or, which is to say the same, appropriates) the spectator’s activity equally con-
stitute a form of abrutissement, of stultification, because they equally subtract
to the subject its fundamental agency and emancipation. What both facets
of this meta-political regime affirm, in fact, is the spectator’s inequality: its
24 The regime of ideology and of its interminable demystification, see Rancière, La Mésen-
tente, 123.
25 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (London, New York: Verso, 2009), 48.
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incapacity when confronted with cinematic discourses and institutions (“film
language” and film production, film theory and the academia), and its infe-
riority toward their representatives (emblematically, the film director and the
intellectual). If there is any possibility of emancipation, on the contrary, it is
only in the possibility that the subject has to affirm it by itself. Not only spec-
tators already have their own forms of agency and understanding, and do not
need to receive them from the outside, Rancière argues, but, more fundamen-
tally, one should regard the very dualistic oppositions of knowing and seeing,
reality and appearance, activity and passivity, that underscore this authoritar-
ian understanding of spectatorship as “incarnated allegories of inequality.”26
Let me try to make this point less clear, by addressing the problem of
ideology and knowledge from another angle. When Žižek, in order to explain
the work of ideology, returns to Marx’s dictum - “they don’t know it, but
they’re doing it” - he asks himself where is ideology expressed: at the level
of knowledge, or at that of action?27 In other words, is ideology neutralised
as its effects become conscious and is emancipation then really an effect of
knowledge? Or is ideology active at the level of practice and reality, embedded,
as it were, in things themselves? The point, Žižek writes arguing for the second
option, is not that people have a false representation of their social reality, as
Althusser presumed, but that, even as they know that their relation to reality
is imaginary, they still act as if what they imagine were real.28 Our knowledge
of things “as they really are,” is much less effective than the ideological fantasy
that animates them. One could say that capital “K” knowledge itself - the
knowledge that is supposed to be the knowledge of things as they actually are
- only becomes effective insofar as it fulfils the obscene ideological fantasy that
sustains it: that is, a fantasy of intellectual mastery. The irony is, then, that
the Althusserian knowledge effect becomes effective only insofar as it works
as an ideology. In the end, from Žižek’s perspective, the formula to describe
the workings of ideology becomes one that necessarily traverses (cynicism), or
simply bypasses (disavowal), the dimension of knowledge: je sais bien, mais
26 Rancière, Le Spectateur Émancipé, 18. Translation mine. Gregory Elliott translates this
expression as “embodied allegories of inequality.” See Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated
Spectator (London: Verso, 2009), 12.
27 Žižek, The Sublime Object, 27.
28 Ibid., 28.
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quand même, as Octave Mannoni put it,29 or, in other words, “they know that
they’re doing it, but they are doing it all the same.”30 Telling “them” what
they are really doing, as the Althusserian theorist would try to do, does not
sabotage the ideological machine. On the contrary - as Rancière confirms from
a completely different standpoint - it drives it on.
Agency and heteronomy. All in all, rational knowledge can be seen to have
little impact on the domain of ideology, as little as it has rein on the work of
the drives. Like in Freud’s metaphor of the horse and the rider, through which
he sought to explain the relation of the ego to the id, often the rational subject
(the theorist, as much as the spectator) has to boldly go where the irrational
sends it:
“The ego’s relation to the id might be compared with that of a
rider to his horse. The horse supplies the locomotive energy, while
the rider has the privilege of deciding on the goal and of guiding
the powerful animal’s movement. But only too often there arises
between the ego and the id the not precisely ideal situation of the
rider being obliged to guide the horse along the path by which it
itself wants to go.”31
The ego “guides” the id where the id wants to go: the id needs to use the
experiential and psychic structures of the ego in order to relate to reality, and
at the same time the ego, “only too often,” has to pretend, precisely in order to
perform its function, that it has a power of choice. There is no easy separation
between the ego and the id, in this sense, and no direct equation between
the rider and the rational subject, for the ego is not the self. Nevertheless, the
metaphor implies the existence of two separate agents and suggests two different
kinds of agency beyond the agency of the rational subject. On one hand, we
see a kind of agency that consists in acknowledging and giving in to its very
lack. The rider says: “since I am going where the horse wants, I might as well
go that way.” It is not, as it might seem, a cynical, or a desperate, choice of
29 Octave Mannoni, Clefs pour l’Imaginaire: Ou, l’Autre Scène (Paris: Seuil, 1985), 12.
30 See Žižek, The Sublime Object, 30.
31 Sigmund Freud, “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” in Freud: Complete
Works, ed. Ivan Smith (2000 [1933]), 4685.
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not choosing (“the horse is going where it wants, there is nothing I can do”)
nor a disavowal of the horse’s agency (“it’s me, not the horse, who wants to
go that way”), but rather a choice that at the same time recognises not being
entirely the product of free will. While the first two “choices” still entail the
idea that there is a subject distinct from the horse, and an agency distinct from
a position of passivity, the last does not make these distinctions. “Since I am
going where the horse wants,” the psychoanalytic subject says, “I might as well
be the horse.” On the other hand, we see how the horse, from being a mere
repository of energy, suddenly manifests an independent agency. Or, better,
we see how an agency makes itself manifest where none was supposed to exist.
Despite psychoanalysis’ constant effort to reduce it to intelligibility and thus
to make it more tractable, the agency of the horse remains incommensurable
to that of the rider: not because the rider is more intelligent than the horse,
but because intelligence is a human category. What Freud is describing, then,
is the emergence of an incommensurable agency that troubles the scene of its
rational articulation.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, then, the agency of the subject is not
entirely a matter of rationality and free will, and it is not a matter of autonomy.
The idea of autonomous agency, in fact, implies that agency is active and whole
(that it expresses itself through action and that it completely encompasses the
scope of an action), and that the subject is capable of making an informed and
uncoerced decision. What the psychoanalytic dimension of the unconscious and
of the id suggest, instead, is that no action is completely unconditioned, and
that our knowledge of our own motives is fundamentally and irremediably com-
promised. In this sense the psychoanalytic subject is a heteronomous subject:
its agency comes from where the subject is not.
Indeed, the place of this agency cannot be clearly located “inside” or “out-
side” the subject, for it actually traverses the subject and makes it other to
itself. Heteronomy is as much intra-psychic as it is interpersonal, then, and it is
as much a psychic category as it is a discursive one: in fact, it brings these very
domains together and prevents them from being clearly distinguished and ar-
ticulated. As the metaphor of the horse and the rider makes clear, heteronomy
does not mean here the subjection to an external power or to a recognisable law.
Heteronomy does not individuate a scenario of mastery, either, and as much as
it troubles the articulation of the subject’s mastery over itself, it troubles the
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idea of its subjection to the agency of an identifiable other or of self-willed and
intelligible institutions. Heteronomy does not mean the existence of an external
and rational agency, more powerful than the subject and thus able to control
it, nor does it mean that the horse is this agency, in the sense that unconscious
agency would be a double of the will of the subject and thus individuate the
fundamental dimension of the subject’s freedom from social constraints. To put
it in Lacanian terms, heteronomy is not a lack of mastery, but a lack in mastery:
as much as there is no autonomous subject, there is no big Other pulling the
strings of the horse, and no big Horse as well.
So, as much as the idea of heteronomy suggests that we are never entirely
“free” from discursive and ideological power, it suggests that we are not free only
in the measure that we are not influenced by external causes. To equate freedom
with autonomy and subjectivity with free will is characteristic, on the contrary,
of the position of a subject who identifies its subjectivity with a mastery over
the self. Both the idea of an unconditioned subject and that of a completely
determined one, in fact, would correspond to an essentially authoritarian fantasy
of mastery. The idea of free will, in particular, fundamentally entails the idea
of intellectual mastery: the idea that causes are intelligible, that causation is
essentially, or at least largely, controllable, and thus that the subject can come
to master itself and the world through the exercise of its reason. At the same
time, however, precisely by assuming that there is no heteronomy to the subject
- that there is no lack in the mastery of the self - the idea of autonomy also
assumes that the subject can be entirely mastered by someone else. In other
words, at the same time that it makes the subject the master of an objectified
world, the fantasy of mastery necessarily entails the possibility of making other
subjects into objects, and thus, of making an object of the subject itself. Rather
than assuming a radical lack in subjectivity, then, the subject of free will is
eventually identified within a regime that is defined by a lack of mastery - one
that can be inflicted and repaired.
Faced with the anxiety that the heteronomy of subjectivity can provoke,
then, both the performance of authority and that of self-discipline become
somewhat pleasurable, and both positions of domination and positions of utter
passivity become eventually self-absolutory. The autonomous subject, indeed,
is one that is judged in terms of what it does, and its responsibility begins
and ends with its full responsibility over its actions. An ethics that rests on
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the idea of free will is thus tendentially unable to account for a vaster domain
of responsibility, one that cannot be reduced to the accountability of human
actions. On the contrary, the heteronomous subject is never entirely active nor
passive, never entirely responsible for its actions, nor completely irresponsible
from the unwilled consequences of its being in the world. In other words, the
psychoanalytic subject is not autonomous, unitary, rational and self-sufficient,
but at the same time it is still agent and responsible - agent of an agency that
is radically incommensurable to its rational articulation, and thus responsible
for something more than its actions.
The idea of ethics that depends on free will in fact reduces the much vaster
domain of responsibility of the subject to a particular regime of its visibility -
that of the accountability of its deeds. In this regime, what escapes accountabil-
ity - not just in the sense of a crime that is recognised as such but not pursued,
but more importantly in the sense of a wrong whose nature is such that it is
not, or cannot be, accounted for by the law - also escapes responsibility. To put
it simply: stealing an apple is an accountable deed, while being part of a social
system in which people die of starvation is not. The particular configuration of
power that defines the autonomous subject, then, also corresponds to a particu-
lar regime of the regulation of social injustice: not just the regime that punishes
the apple thief but not the exploiter, but also and above all the regime that
has the power to interpret social categories - the regime that only sees theft in
shoplifting, and exploitation in starving masses, the regime which defines that
the “proper” response to starvation is stealing apples and not, say, apple com-
puters. This regime, in the end, is the one that defends property over equality
and emancipation, and that values equality and emancipation only insofar as
they are construed as something that can be owned.
One could say, in fact, that autonomy and the idea of free will are radically
anti-egalitarian. Free will is indeed only the freedom and the will of those who
have the means to enjoy the former and the power to define the latter. In
this sense, the agency of the horse, whose emergence we have recognised in
Freud’s metaphor, appears to take the shape of political dissensus. It is an
agency of “something” that was not supposed to have an agency. An agency
that is incommensurable to the intelligible rationality of the masterful subject
and that disturbs the subjective and the political space that was articulated
in terms of this rationality. By manifesting itself as an agency, what appeared
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to be the mere “locomotive energy” of the horse disrupts the autonomy of the
subject and the understanding of agency and responsibility that was defined
in terms of it. In other words, by manifesting itself as a logos, what appeared
to be the pure passivity of the subject disrupts the existing regime of agency
and responsibility, together with its particular distribution of the parts.32 The
heteronomy of the subject could thus be seen in some respects to correspond to
the Rancièrian conception of political subjectivation.
Heteronomy of the subject and masochistic spectatorship. The spec-
tator is the epitome of the subject who is not accountable for what happens in
front of her, while still being responsible toward what she sees. If an authori-
tarian regime of understanding identifies the passivity of the spectator with its
want of awareness and emancipation - assuming, as Rancière put it, that the
more the spectator contemplates, the less she is33 - one should instead reverse
the logic and assume that the spectator’s “passive” looking on in fact constitutes
a particular form of agency and individuates a specific dimension of political
responsibility. In her Spectatorship: The Power of Looking On, Michele Aaron
suggests that we recognize an agency in the passivity of the apparatic spectator,
and that we link this specific form of spectatorial agency with spectatorship’s
ethical dimension. While, we could say, sadism entails the questionable abil-
ity to relate to reality (and in particular to the reality of the other’s pain) as
we relate to a spectacle, film spectatorship, Aaron argues, presents instead a
masochistic character.34 Defining masochism as a pleasure in unpleasure, as an
agent desire played out through passivity,35 and as a state of expectation of
impending pain, real or imaginary,36 Aaron reinterprets the whole economy of
pleasure that sustains the cinematographic apparatus, at the same time mov-
ing beyond apparatus theory’s disingenuous binarism of activity and passivity,
sexuality and gender, and confronting the spectator with the responsibility that
comes with its desiring agency and fundamental emancipation. Spectatorship
32 Rancière, La Mésentente, 33-34.
33 Rancière, Le Spectateur Émancipé, 12.




can then be seen to be arranged through a masochistic contract37 in which the
spectator agrees to relinquish its activity in exchange for the film’s proficient
domination of its fantasy and its embodied experience. Spectatorship’s lack of
agency is thus exposed as some kind of performance: the position of the specta-
tor only signifies a lack of agency, it only shows the visible traits of physical and
mental passivity - silence, stillness, diminished “watchfulness” - but, in fact, its
act of looking on loses nothing of its discursive power and ethical responsibility.
In this way, spectatorship’s ideological dimension becomes not merely a mat-
ter of the institutional manufacture of consent, but, jointly, of its spectatorial
disavowal.38
“Consent,” Aaron argues, “is the disavowed but crucial element” in the
fulfilment of the fantasy of being mastered that defines a masochist model of
spectatorship, as well as that of becoming the master that can be seen to charac-
terise the classic apparatic model.39 In both cases we are dealing with a fantasy
of mastery - with an articulation of the space of film in terms of positions of
activity and passivity that implies a contract, a mise en scène and, poten-
tially, a conservative narrative resolution. As much as the idea of mastery that
structures the apparatus entails a narrative in which this mastery is acquired,
indeed, the imaginary scene of masochistic domination can be transformed in a
scenario of mastery, and thus be coopted for conservative ends. As apparatus
theory saw it, to the film spectator is offered the illusion of autonomy, and what
it gets instead is an absolute passivity to cinema’s ideological effect. But, as
Aaron notes, the mechanism can also be seen to work the other way around:
to the spectator are offered moments of pleasurable passivity - “conservative
masochistic episodes”40 - that arouse the mobility of the subject’s desire but
never really disturb the subject’s sense of unity, in fact revamping its fantasy of
mastery. Masochistic spectatorship, like the Freudian fort/da game that Aaron
discusses,41 could then be seen to frame a fundamental anxiety in terms of a
game of absence and presence, dispossession and mastery, that eventually re-







world. In the end, the controlled collapse of activity and passivity that individ-
uates the masochistic regime of apparatic spectatorship, precisely as it involves
a superficial relinquishing of the subject’s activity, and a brief and temporary
surrendering of the subject’s autonomy, can be seen as a way to cope with and
make sense of the more shattering, profound, and persistent lack of cohesion
and independence that is the subject’s heteronomy.
The idea of an autonomous subject is intimately connected with the con-
struction of imaginary positions of activity/passivity. In this sense, autonomy
seems to be an intrinsically oppositional concept, for it presupposes a distinction
and a conflict between the subject and the law, while, in fact, it is a hegemonic
concept, for it articulates subjectivity in terms of the subject’s subjection to
the law. This is precisely how the position of the subject within the apparatus
is established. Similarly, in the measure that masochism is taken as an artic-
ulation of positions of activity and passivity, rather than the collapse of this
articulation within the very idea of agency, it remains conservative. A theory
of spectatorship that sees the spectator masses as conservative masochists, in
particular, would represent the ultimate form of their abrutissement, of their
stultification: “not only are they being done,” the theorist would say, “they
must surely like it.” On the contrary, it is by recognising an agency in the
passivity of the spectator (not merely a form of “activity” in the spectator’s
relinquishing of it), that is, by exposing the constitutive ambivalence of agency
and desire themselves and foregrounding the responsibility and fundamental
emancipation of spectatorship, that the masochistic pleasure of the spectator
can lead us beyond its conservative framing. As Aaron argues, it is only by
going beyond a substantially hegemonic and redemptive understanding of the
passivity of masochism, and rather taking it as a pleasure in its own right,42
that it can escape the dimension of mastery and thus afford a more ethical
relation with the moving image.
Other than separating agency from activity and mastery, as Aaron sug-
gests, we should perhaps also separate agency from the idea of autonomy. The
masochist spectator might sign a contract relinquishing its autonomous agency,
but it does not really possess that agency - not entirely, that is - to begin with.
In this sense, the gesture of relinquishing activity already constitutes a strategy
42 Ibid., 56-57.
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of disavowal - at the same time of the subject’s lack of mastery and of its re-
sponsibility. In the measure that they address the construction of the subject,
then, the cinematographic apparatus and its theory become a means to frame
heteronomy and discursivity through an imaginary scenario of (sexual) subjec-
tion and (intellectual) mastery. Thereby not only relieving the subject from the
anxiety that its heteronomy may cause, but also making the spectator’s lack
of mastery into an object of discipline. - Other than framing spectatorship in
terms of the subject’s lack of mastery, one can, on the reverse, also interpret
the heteronomy and lack of agency of the subject in terms of spectatorship. In
other words, whenever a dissensual form emerges in the space of our subjectiv-
ity, or in the social space that we inhabit, we are offered the imaginary choice of
assuming the relatively safe position of the spectator and, by that, of avoiding
facing our full responsibility.
In this way, through its contractual, and thus intrinsically consensual, na-
ture, the masochistic regime of spectatorship regulates the subject’s lack of
control and accountability, thus keeping both the sadism of the subject and the
destructiveness of the world somewhat at bay. The ethical problem of film spec-
tatorship becomes indeed in this perspective the role played by spectatorship in
framing sadistic relations and the other’s real physical pain.43 In other words,
the articulation of domination and passivity that underlies both the fantasy of
intellectual mastery and the more embodied scenario of conservative masochism
represents the ambivalence of desire and the heteronomy of subjectivity, it gives
it a shape and allows us to address and overcome, to frame and tame, the fact
that we are affected and made by others, that we are mortal bodies, that we
are inevitably and violently occupying the place of an other, and that we are
always necessarily bound in culture and language.44 In this sense, the emanci-
pation of the spectator corresponds to the heteronomy of the subject and, as
such, it exists significantly beyond the spectator’s autonomous agency. What I
call heteronomy of the subject names the fact that, as much as agency cannot
be reduced to activity, emancipation cannot be reduced to an autonomous and
43 Ibid., 111-112, 121.
44 And it does so also by putting a further, Platonic, distance between theory as an aspect
of spectatorship and theory as an academic discourse, between the idea of masochism and
the lived experience of masochism as a form of sexual relationship (a distance that the
recent glamourisation of BDSM in mainstream culture can only accentuate).
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intelligible agency as well.
The fact that one cannot distinguish between the dimension of agency and
that of ideology and discursive power can be addressed more clearly, perhaps, in
Foucauldian terms. Foucault’s ideas on power, indeed, can be used to place the
dynamics of ideology and emancipation beyond its reduction to a knowledge
effect, at the same time addressing the pervasiveness and decentralization of
discursive power45 and the hegemonic appropriation of spectatorial agency on
the part of cinematic institutions. Power not being primarily an instance of re-
pression, but a living expression of social technologies and discursive practices,
in a more Foucauldian perspective we are not allowed, eventually, to distinguish
clearly where ideology ends and free will begins, so to speak, nor to tell real-
ity and fantasy unambiguously apart. This would mean, first of all, that the
agency of spectatorship is not external to ideological institutions, but is rather
itself discursive. A Foucauldian notion of power can then make more evident
also that the issue of film ideology is not just one of conscious, and rational,
demystification, but, more fundamentally, one of the politics of pleasure and
desire. The whole issue of ideological determination is, in fact, largely a mise
en discours of the discursivity and heteronomy of subjectivity - its reduction
to the principles of its intelligibility within an authoritarian regime of knowl-
edge. In other words, it already implies and performs an ideological rendition of
the dimension of ideological fantasy, by framing the heteronomy of the subject
through a scenario of mastery.
What can an agency beyond the fantasy of mastery be, then? It would be, on
one hand, the recognition of the extent of one’s responsibility, of the discursivity
and heteronomy of our subjectivity, and of a radical lack in the autonomy of
our choices - which is not really an absence of choice, but something in-between
free will and discursive determination, something that the categories of activity
and passivity, freedom and unfreedom, already frame in an authoritarian way.
On the other, it would be the dissensual emergence of agency from where it was
not supposed to exist. In this sense, political agency can never be “owned”, nor
appropriated by an external subject or institution, for it is rather a dimension
that traverses embodied subjects and the social space, disturbing their identity
and its articulation. In this sense, it is only within the dimension of ideology (of
45 De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t, 85-86.
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discourse and desire, pleasure and signification, as they are inseparably linked
together) - and only due to its discursivity and heteronomy that the agency of
the emancipated spectator can exist. So that, eventually, the problem of film
ideology (that is the discursivity and the ethical nature of film spectatorship)
should not be seen to end with the spectator’s agency, but rather to begin with
it.
The spectator as a site of tensions.
Film theory - as a specific part of film studies - foregrounds the spectator as
the dynamic point of convergence of seemingly opposed dimensions: the per-
sonal and the political, the signifier and the signified, passivity and agency,
fantasy and reality. Many a theory of film capitalises on one of the terms of
these dichotomies that characterise spectatorship, trying to rescue one from the
hegemony of the other, or attempting to reach some kind of simplistic “inte-
gration”,46 thereby unwittingly confirming the dualistic split that keeps them
separated and opposed. It is rather more interesting to address these various
couples in that they produce hybrid categories, concepts or situations in which
the two terms become not only inseparable, but radically indistinguishable,
at the same time maintaining their conflictual relation. Film spectatorship
is, in this sense, a liminal and conflictual space. One that articulates social
struggles that are larger than its proper field, one that is traversed by psychic
conflicts that are more radical than that of the cinematic subject, one that
is always reflexive and bent upon itself. Hailing and identification, ideology,
fantasy, meaning-making itself and signification, in the end, all the categories
that define spectatorship address, through the filmic experience, the subject’s
problematic relation to itself.
Judith Mayne, with reference to Linda Gordon, defines spectatorship pre-
cisely as a conflict, and the spectator as the site of a “tension.”47 She opposes,
more precisely, “the cinematic subject and the film viewer so as better to situate
the spectator as a viewer who is and is not the cinematic subject, and a subject
who is and is not a film viewer.”48 We could then define spectatorship as the




relation between physically present viewers, on the one hand, and the subject
of film as an ideological position and as an abstract construction of film theory,
on the other. And yet, we cannot forget that the individual viewer is itself a
subject - subjected in turn not only to the cinematic apparatus, but to a plural-
ity of ideological institutions and to a more encompassing discursive regulation
(in this respect, the cinematic subject could appear to be even more “free” than
the viewer). “While I think it crucial to acknowledge that real people do exist
outside of the categories of theory,” Mayne writes, “it is equally crucial to ac-
knowledge that those real people are always the function of my or my culture’s
notion of what a real person is.”49 The viewer is not thinkable in itself, but can
only be addressed, in the end, from the standpoint of a theory of spectatorship
and, more broadly, of a certain understanding of human subjectivity.
Still, one should keep in mind that the very relation between the person and
the subject is not something that falls outside of the domain of ideology: on
the contrary, it is its fundamental field of operation. As such, the agency of
the viewer cannot be regarded as a simple and evident solution to the problem
of film ideology, as we have said: the constitution and the ideological mapping
of this agency corresponds indeed to the scope of the mechanism of ideological
interpellation. To put it simply, ideological institutions should not be regarded
as repressive institutions that operate in the field of discourse: for their speci-
ficity rests instead in the way in which they appear to enforce the spectator’s
agency at the same time that they are in fact policing it and normalizing it. It
is proper of ideological institutions not only to want to lock the subject within
their power, but to make it believe that its subjection nevertheless coincides
with an expression of autonomous agency:
Taking spectatorship as a site of conflict allows to understand the subject
of the apparatus in a more meaningful way - that is, first of all, to understand
how the account of film experience that apparatus theory provides can relate
to different subjects in contingent historical and cultural contexts. If one can
talk of a female gaze, or of black spectatorship, for instance, it is because a
certain situatedness and specificity are seen to characterise the viewer, while
at the same time its position is seen to be individuated by the same unchang-
49 Ibid.
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ing and quasi-transcendental characteristics of the apparatus.50 The subject
of apparatus theory, on one hand, functions as an abstract theoretical concept
and as a potentially universal position implied by cinematic institutions and
by the film text. On the other hand, it refers each time to a specific, situated,
experience lived by a real subject. These two dimensions cannot, and should
not, be unproblematically separated. “Despite the insistence on real viewers’
as distinct from the subject’,” Mayne argues, “the place of the spectator’ in
film studies is not easily or readily defined as either’ a real person or’ a posi-
tion, a construction.”51 Rather than confirming this split between a discursive
subject and a real person, thus disregarding both the spectator’s embodied ex-
perience and the ideological and fantasmatic discursivity of its encounter with
film, it is much more productive to address spectatorship itself as the site of
struggle between these two dimensions. In this way, Mayne’s systematisation of
spectatorship allows to go beyond the authoritarian split that defines both the
apparatus and its theory, at the same time avoiding relinquishing the political
tensions that make spectatorship meaningful as a concept and significant as a
practice.
“The bureaucratic/symbolic Institution not only reduces the sub-
ject to its mouthpiece, but also wants the subject to disavow the fact
that he is merely its mouthpiece and to (pretend) to act as an au-
tonomous agent [...]”52
The agency of the spectator is, in fact, still of a discursive and ideological nature
(or at least it is the main object of ideological and discursive hegemony). At the
same time that it constructs the spectator’s position as passive, for instance,
50 One of the main lines of development and criticism of the paradigmatic definition of
spectatorship has been that of rescuing the position of the spectator from its monologic
definition in terms of the Althusserian subject of ideology, and rather address it as a site
of multiple theoretical approaches, and a broader set of epistemological perspectives. In
this way we can imagine both several apparatuses - aural (Kaja Silverman), tactile (Laura
U. Marks) - working at once, as well as alternative conceptions of the basic cinematic
apparatus, without necessarily relinquishing its status as a universal structure. Insofar
as this multiplication reduces the authority of theory, leaving the political and discursive
scope of spectatorship intact, this proliferation of theories can be seen to be a form of
theoretical emancipation.
51 Ibid., 36.
52 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London:
Verso, 2008), 306.
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the apparatus encourages the spectator to assume this position as if it were
the expression of a masochist choice. The spectator knows, unconsciously, that
she is signing a masochist contract, even if she is not necessarily aware of it:
telling the spectator - or the institution, that knows as much and as little as
the spectator - would not necessarily alter the situation. For, as we have seen,
they know very well what they are doing, and they are still doing it.
This is, I believe, the potential pitfall of reception studies and, in a different
way, but with similar consequences, of some strands of phenomenological and
feminist film theory as well: that they may still endorse a split between agency
and discursive determination, between the subject of ideology and the “real”
subject. While, on the contrary, it is only because there is no individual beyond
the discursivity and heteronomy of the subject that resistance to normative
discourses is possible in the first place. In this sense, as we have claimed, the
problem of film ideology does not end with the spectator’s agency, but rather
begins with it. The solution to the problem of the spectator’s agency is not even
to be found, as Žižek can be taken to suggest, in a multiplication of historically
and culturally contingent spectatorships: for, with that, we risk losing track of
spectatorship as the expression of a central and irresoluble conflict, which is in
turn also the ground of the struggle for universality and equality. In fact, it is
always in a struggle to affirm a universality beyond a regime that compromises
it (sexism, racism, colonialism, capitalism, and so on), and, more generally, in
the struggle for the realisation of the equality of all subjects, that the politics of
spectatorship can be seen to take place. From the point of view of the practice
of film theory, then, the problem becomes how to elaborate a theory of the
discursive spectator that is nevertheless closer to the embodied viewer, without
negating the subject’s heteronomy.
Much like, as we said, the scope of spectatorship cannot be limited to the
relation between viewer and film, but it addresses this relation as it is informed
and played out in a broader social and discursive field, the tension that an-
imates spectatorship cannot refer exclusively to the constitutive elements of
the cinematic apparatus but also, more fundamentally, to the very definition
of human subjectivity that underlies them. In other words, quite obviously,
what Mayne calls the cinematic subject cannot be discussed exclusively in cin-
ematic terms, but its analysis must include those discourses that effect subject
formation before and beyond it. It cannot be explained just in relation to cin-
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ematic technology, but must refer to social and psychic subject formation as
such. Feminist film theory is an example of a theoretical practice in which a
more wide-ranging configuration of power - gender construction - is deployed as
a specific instance within the cinematic apparatus, and can therefore be mobi-
lized as a potential site of resistance, not only in relation to cinematic practices,
but, through them, back to social life as such. If it is true that spectatorship
names a fundamental conflict, then, it is also true that it constitutes a spe-
cific instance of another, more universal one: that which is determined by the
discursive construction and normative definition of human subjects in general.
If, as Étienne Balibar argues, it is the citizen that makes the man53 (the
political subject that makes the human as such), and not the reverse, as it is
usually taken for granted, then spectatorship must be foregrounded as one of
the crucial dimensions in which the symbolic and political space that we inhabit
takes shape. Spectatorship would be one of the significant moments in which
we face normative injunctions about what is meant to be human, a site in which
we perform our relation to inhumanity and its representations, a position from
which we engage with existing relations and potentially imagine new ones, a
scene in which, finally, we are, or we are not, moved by fantasy and desire
beyond the familiarity of our “self”. What makes spectatorship effective both
as a conservative and a subversive force is indeed its constitutional reflexiveness
and its evocation of heteronomy, the fact that it addresses a form of power and
agency that is marked by the subject’s otherness to itself.
Interpellation and reflexivity. Describing spectatorship as a tension is,
indeed, also a way to expose how it is essentially structured by a reflexive
dynamic. If it is clearly true that spectatorship “represents an understanding
reached between the spectator and culture,”54 it is also true that it represents
the troubling coming to terms of the subject with itself.
There are many ways in which this reflexivity is made apparent in film the-
ory, and many directions in which it can lead: interpellation, fantasy, visual
pleasure, all imply a reflexive relation of the spectator to itself - one that does
not necessarily derive from, or imply, an act of conscious and rational reflection.
53 Étienne Balibar, “Is a Philosophy of Human Civic Rights Possible? New Reflections on
Equaliberty,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 2-3 (2004): 320-321.
54 Aaron, Spectatorship, 88.
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First of all, as it is well known, reflexivity is discussed in the classic account
of cinematic identification in terms of the Lacanian mirror misrecognition, in
connection with the Althusserian notion of interpellation. For Baudry, the func-
tion of this element of reflexivity is that of (re-)creating an imaginary unity of
the subject toward the division and lack which are instead part of the symbolic
order.55 Far from naming an essential similarity, a rationality, or a form of
mimesis, then, this idea of reflexivity entails in fact a particular relation be-
tween two incommensurables domains: on one hand, the imaginary unity of the
monologic subject (sujet unaire), and, on the other, what Julia Kristeva calls
the subject in process.56 As Christian Metz put it, there would be a certain
degree of similarity in between the most basic form of psychic identification (the
primary identification of the child with the mother),57 and the primary form of
cinematic identification, that of the spectator identifying with itself as a pure
act of perception, as wakefulness and alertness, and thus, as a transcendental
subject.58 Every film then, not just those that offer visible representations of
film spectatorship, would entail a fundamental mise en abyme of the spectator
(it could be argued that this mise en abyme is nothing but the gaze). At the
same time, the subject would be confronted with its status as a construct. There
would be something intrinsically uncanny to spectatorship, individuated by the
uncertainty that characterizes it as to whether one is subject or object, agent
or acted, seeing or seen, and animated by a radical indeterminacy between the
living and the lifeless that might be inherent to the cinematic medium.59
While not exactly a relation to oneself (for there is no subject prior to in-
terpellation), ideological interpellation is still a reflexive operation in that it
involves an element - a ghost - of autonomous agency. Judith Butler writes,
commenting the classic Althusserian scenario of interpellation (in which some-
one walking in the street responds to the call of a policeman by turning around,
thereby identifying itself as the addressee of the law):
“The one who turns around in response to the call does not
55 Baudry, “Ideological Effects”, 45.
56 Julia Kristeva, Polylogue (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 55, 62.
57 Metz, Psychoanalysis and Film, 45.
58 Ibid., 49.
59 See Freud, “The Uncanny,” in Freud: Complete Works, ed. Ivan Smith (2000 [1919]),
3680.
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respond to a demand to turn around. The turning around is an act
that is, as it were, conditioned both by the voice’ of the law and
by the responsiveness of the one hailed by the law. [...] The turn
toward the law is thus a turn against oneself, a turning back on
oneself that constitutes the movement of conscience.”60
Reflexivity is thus an inseparable moment and aspect of interpellation.61 In
turn, it sets the ground for ideological misrecognition: “therein lies the ideo-
logical act of recognition in which I recognize myself as always-already’ that
as which I am interpellated,” Žižek develops following Butler’s argument, “in
recognizing myself as X, I freely assume/choose the fact that I always-already
was X.”62 Thus we see how “submission and mastery take place simultaneously,”
and how, in turn, “this paradoxical simultaneity constitutes the ambivalence of
subjection.”63 Understood in this way, the reflexivity of spectatorship would
name at once the spectator’s independence and its subjection - it would be a
turning back and a turning toward,64 a wayward gaze. One could say, with
Jacques Rancière, that spectatorship potentially locates an act of political sub-
jectivation65 at the same time that it constitutes the response to an ideological
address. The spectator would then be the site of tension between ideological
misrecognition (méconnaissance, unawareness) and political dissensus (mésen-
tente, disagreement) - the two forces that inform cinematic experience and the
sharing of the sensible that is individuated by it, as well as the political regime
of film theory.
Spectatorship is reflexive, however, also in another, more tangible, sense:
because, in its extended scope, it implies a performative understanding of the
experience of film watching, and a reflexive appropriation of its mechanisms:
remembering the film, talking about it, reenacting some of its scenes, dreaming
it, and so on, they all involve a relation of the spectator with its history of
encounters with other people and other films. Subversive reading of a main-
60 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1997), 107.
61 Ibid.,115.
62 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 15.
63 Butler, Psychic Life, 116.
64 Ibid.
65 Rancière, La Mésentente, 59.
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stream film, for instance, presupposes a truly theoretical look at the way a
text is constructed, and constitutes an operative understanding of the forces
and techniques that inform the psychology of spectatorship and the ideologi-
cal dynamics of the medium. Through reading, and, in a more prominent way,
through the use of a text beyond the range of interpretations that the text itself
foresaw and coded, spectators engage not only with the text, but, through it,
with themselves as spectators and with social discourses on spectatorship and
subjectivity. Thus, they transform their position by transforming the object of
their look, or by shifting their viewpoint in relation to it. All these practices
entail a form of mastery, for sure, but they do not necessarily entail a fantasy of
mastery, in the sense that they at the same time acknowledge its limits and its
radical lack: they potentially correspond to a different regime of mastery than
that which is sustained by ideological interpellation. In a sense, the primary po-
litical action of spectatorship is precisely to shift from one regime to the other.
A shift that involves, among other things, a change in our understanding of the
relation between spectatorship and theory. In the end, a practice like reading
against the grain should be taken not only as a typical expression of specta-
torial agency and political resistance, but as the founding act of spectatorship
as a praxis - that is, as a practice that is at the same time inseparable from
theoretical understanding.
Theory and implicational spectatorship. On the reverse as well, then,
we could say that film theory cannot be separated from its ground in the prac-
tice of spectatorship. This requires, first of all, a confrontation of theory with
its own political and discursive implications. Mayne, indeed, understands the
involvement of the theorist in terms of accounting for her desire and for her
position within ideology. More specifically, she writes:
“Theories of everything involve projection and desire as all dis-
courses do, and the failure to examine those mechanisms leads to a
notion of subjectivity with no possibility of contradiction or signifi-
cant variation from the norm.”66
An authoritarian theory, then, no differently than a normative apparatus, pro-
duces a captive, submissive, subject: ideology, Mayne claims, enters the very
66 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 45.
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ways in which researchers construct the audiences they write about.67 Not just
“totalitarian” theories of everything, however, but the everyday practice of the-
ory as such must be seen to have discursive effects - effects that, while never
being neutral, are also never a priori aligned with domination or subversion.
The discursivity of theory, in turn, would be one of the reasons why theorists
often avoid acknowledging their own “investment in the process of spectator-
ship analysis”68 - and, by the same token, the main reason why this acknowl-
edgement becomes necessary. One of the most structural and hopefully long
lasting contribution of feminist, Marxist, and psychoanalytic film studies has
been precisely their constant awareness of film theory as a political and discur-
sive practice. This has led to foreground the reflexivity of theory itself, to an
attention to its vocabulary and phrasing, and, above all, to acknowledge the
political ramifications of its principles and the status of theory as an institution
among other institutions. Film theory becomes in this sense a reflection on the
very process of theorising, on theory’s falterings and its pretence of mastery,
as well as on the material conditions of production of theoretical texts and the
kinds of relations that they entail and promote.
As it names the reflexivity of spectatorship, the dimension of theory can
then be seen to be integral to film experience, and thus to constitute both a
strategy of reading and a way to increase and extend, or curb, the pleasures and
unpleasures of cinema. Yuka Kanno briefly discusses a kind of spectatorship
which she calls “implicational” precisely in the sense that it refers to an agency
and a desiring involvement which are located at the level of the historical and
subjective contingency of the film spectator - which, in her case, also happens to
correspond to the film theorist and to her personal self. “By implication,” she
writes, “I want to address the historicity of the present viewer, whose specificity
is no less important than that of the [...] text.”69 By losing its pretence of
political and subjective neutrality, theory is foregrounded at the same time as a
form of power relation, and as the site of an embodied and contingent encounter
with film. In the end, the point is to subtract the practice of theory from its
pedagogical understanding, to take theory as an interaction and a conflict which
67 Ibid., 101.
68 Ibid., 102.
69 Yuka Kanno, “Implicational Spectatorship: Hara Setsuko and the Queer Joke,”
Mechademia 6 (2011): 288.
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is not available exclusively to the rational subject or the professional academic,
to recognise the essentially theoretical components of everyday film experiencing
and the potential for pleasure and transformation that comes with them. With
the same gesture, then, the definition of spectatorship as a space of conflict maps
both the reality of social performances of spectatorship and the landscape of
its theoretical elaboration - in many ways bringing these two aspects together.
Spectatorship as a ground of disagreement.
Different ways in which the relationship between viewers and films is imagined
and analysed, of course, result in different theories of spectatorship, but also
in altogether different theories of film. As Aaron writes, “spectatorship repre-
sents a site of conflict between methodologies.”70 The issues that spectatorship
raises within film theory, however, are not only methodological: they are, fun-
damentally, epistemological and, ultimately, political. They are epistemological
because different models of spectatorship construct in different ways the very
objects of film theory and what can be known about them. The object of a the-
ory - Julia Kristeva wrote about linguistics - logically precedes the theory and
is defined by a specific and implicit representation of the speaking subject:71
Kristeva called the relationship of the subject of theory to its object dispositif
épistémologique (epistemological apparatus).72 In this sense we can say that the
cinematographic apparatus is also, and above all, an epistemological apparatus
- a regime of understanding of spectatorship - and that, as such, it includes
film theory itself. Spectatorship presents issues of a political nature, then, for
theory partakes in the ideological dimension of film spectatorship and in its sig-
nificance as a social phenomenon by confirming or contesting given assumptions
on human subjects and by supporting one or another form of social relations.
We find issues of a specifically methodological nature, finally, as alternative
conceptions of spectatorship individuate in a various ways the position and the
practices of the theoretical writer, both in relation to her objects of study and
to spectators as her fellow human beings. In all these senses, theories of film
are less explanations of the realities of spectatorship and filmmaking than they
70 Aaron, Spectatorship, 1.
71 Kristeva, Polylogue, 287.
72 Ibid., 287-288.
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are regimes of their representation.
Theories, essentially, disagree on the kinds of subjects that they assume, on
the understanding of the processes that they describe them by, and on the roles
that they assign to them. That is to say, I believe, that they ultimately disagree
on their own political scope as discursive practices addressing subjectivity and
human relations. One could argue that it is the political dimension of a theory,
its ethical ground, that acts or should act as a pragmatic criterion for the
justification, or the comparison, of different theories: other than theories of
what, theorists should then ask themselves whose theories they are articulating.
In the case of film studies, spectatorship is obviously the sphere in which the
conceptions of subjectivity and human relations that underlie not just cinematic
experience but also any given theory of film appear more clearly. This is how
spectatorship becomes a fundamental element in the definition of the scope of
film theory as such.
Spectatorship can therefore be taken to provide that “ground of disagree-
ment” that Warren Buckland sought for in the effort of establishing a dialogue
among the multiplicity of schools and methodologies in film studies.73 But while
this space can be imagined to be a rational one, a neutral field of articulation
of academic discussion, I would argue on the contrary that it is one that, not
unlike spectatorship itself, is always already traversed by conflict and charged
of political significance. On one hand, as we have seen, theories of spectator-
ship necessarily take part in the politics of subjectivities, of bodies, and of their
representation - so that the operations of theory, beginning from the very coor-
dinates by which they define their objects, can never be neutral. On the other
hand, the very process of establishing a common theoretical ground is not a
neutral one as well. One could say that, if spectatorship constitutes the space
of difference to which existing theories of film can be related, no theory of film
will conceive this difference in the same way. Difference in itself, as Žižek often
reminds us, is indeed a controversial concept, always already framed in antag-
onistic ways.74 So that, in the end, the ground of disagreement comes already
sown with its seeds.
73 Warren Buckland, Cognitive Semiotics of Film (West Nyack, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 4.
74 Ben Wright and Slavoj Žižek, Manufacturing Reality: Slavoj Žižek and the Reality of the
Virtual (Ben Wright Film Productions, 2004). DVD.
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Different epistemologies of film constitute different regimes of representa-
tion: alternative ways, that is, in which their very object is posited. In the
case of spectatorship, then, disagreement is not limited to the particular ideas
through which the concept is discussed, but to those that inform it in the first
place. A phenomenological perspective, for instance, will posit film experience
in terms of the intentionality of perception, foregrounding the spectator as an
embodied subject and a bodily presence. A Marxist, Althusserian, perspective
will define spectators in terms of their relation to film as a commodity and
to cinema as an ideological institution. A feminist and queer perspective will
highlight the way the representations of gender and sexuality and the modal-
ities of film experiencing reflect and enforce normative discourses on human
subjects. A psychoanalytic perspective will address the dynamics of desire and
the unconscious as they interact with the experience of film, and question the
rational mastery and unity of the subject. Linguistic and semiological per-
spectives will tend to isolate the subject’s rational capacities of encoding and
decoding as they are involved in the understanding of the film’s meaning, and
so on and so forth. These are not simply different ways of talking about the
same thing, but regimes of representation that result in altogether different
and incommensurable objects of enquiry. In the combination of elements from
these disparate perspectives, indeed, a certain blurriness cannot be avoided. To
make matters even more complicated, perceived differences between a perspec-
tive and another, and perceived differences between their variously informed
objects, are not symmetrical: what distinguishes the psychoanalytic spectator
from the cognitive one, for example, will be different from the point of view of
psychoanalytic film theory and from the point of view of cognitive theory.
Now, one might wish to reduce all these differences to a single epistemology
of film or, at least, to a common measure. And, while I believe that theory’s
political scope in some ways may constitute this common measure, at the same
time I think that a drastic reduction of this heterogeneity can only serve au-
thoritarian regimes of knowledge. In the end, dialogue between theories can
take place only because no theory is ever a pure and unitary expression of any
given principle, and because it is always already trying to map its relation to
other, distant or even incommensurable, conceptions of its objects. Most of the-
oretical work is made in this (meta-theoretical and inter-disciplinary) field - a
field where disagreement is grown, so to speak, and at the same time hegemony
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inevitably attempted. We could then say that a multiplicity of methodologi-
cal approaches and the very heterogeneity of the objects of theory, rather than
being an obstacle to theoretical exchange, are actually what makes it possible
(though, of course, never easy).
Jacques Rancière refers to the heterogeneity that, in many forms, can be
seen to characterise film experience and the discourses that are made about it,
with what he calls the écarts (the gaps, or the intervals) of cinema.75 A gap
between image and word, first of all, as well as an internal inconsistency that
can be found in both language and the moving image. One that, in turn, can
be seen to translate the irreducible heterogeneity of human relations and the
uncertainties of non-authoritarian forms of knowledge. For Rancière, then, this
incommensurability becomes the defining element of the space of film.76 As a
consequence, we are encouraged to see in the heterogeneity and multiplicity of
academic theory - in its “indisciplinarity,”77 as Rancière calls it, rather than
inter-disciplinarity - a ward against the pedagogical regime. All separation of
disciplines essentially entails, indeed, a division between those who are qualified
to make certain statements and those who are not, a separation of disciplines
which is yet another form of the authoritarian split between “those who do the
science and those who are regarded as its objects.”78
Through a kind of theoretical anarchism,79 one should instead strive to re-
spect the diversity and the fluidity of the relations that take place in the every-
day practice of spectatorship, filmmaking, and film writing. Politics, Rancière
writes, takes first of all the form of a conflict over the existence of a common
scene, and over the existence and the attributes of those who are deemed to
be present in it.80 The heterogeneity of the space of film is thus meant to be
the equal ground (but still a ground of conflict) which is shared by all subjects
involved with film - filmmakers, spectators, critics and academics - beyond a
hierarchic articulation of their relations. An articulation that, most of the time,
75 Jacques Rancière, Les Écarts du Cinéma (Paris: La Fabrique, 2011), 12.
76 Jacques Rancière, Le Destin des Images (Paris: La Fabrique, 2003), 14.
77 Jacques Rancière, “Jacques Rancière and Indisciplinarity: An Interview” , Art & Research,
unpaged (2007): http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v2n1/jrinterview.html.
78 Ibid.
79 See Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 2010), 1-5.
80 Rancière, La Mésentente, 49.
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serves the goals of those institutions that attempt to regulate film experience,
and knowledge in general, as objects of production and consumption.
Hard science, soft humans. Spectatorship can thus be seen to determine
the scope of film theory and inform its political dimension. That is to say,
first of all, that a theory of spectatorship constitutes an unavoidable aspect of
film theory: that there can be no film theory without an explicit, or implicit,
theory of the spectator. In turn, a theory of spectatorship cannot be considered
independently from the conception of the subject that underlies it - which, of
course, includes, again explicitly or implicitly, a model of the intersubjective
and social relations that define the subject. So that there can be no theory
of spectatorship, and no theory of film, that is not actually grounded in a
theory of the subject and of the ways subjects live together. There is no film
theory, then, that is not an expression of a particular set of social relationships
and that does not give support, willingly or unwittingly, to a specific set of
discursive practices. In other words, a theory of film assumes its position as
an historically and socially contingent discourse first and foremost through the
understanding of subjectivity it employs and fosters and through the model of
spectatorship that it implies and constructs.
Film theories that study film as an objective reality independent from the
human beings that experience it, then, or that address it from the standpoint
of a neutral and transcendental subject, are not really devoid of a theory of
spectatorship: they are actually implying an understanding of spectatorship
that allows them to dismiss spectatorship itself as neutral or irrelevant to the
practice of film theory and to the definition of its object. In a similar way, then,
theories of film that consider a discussion of the subject inessential to the study
of film or to the practice of film theory, must actually be seen to adopt and foster
a particular view of the subject and of society at large. Film theory can claim
little neutrality toward the contingent politics and aesthetics of filmmaking and
spectatorship, then, and alsotoward the dynamics of its very practice. Indeed,
it is not neutral in respect to the ways film is made and understood; it is not
neutral in respect to the dimension of ideology; it is not neutral in respect to the
understanding of knowledge and subjectivity that it implies and to the kind of
social relations that it configures in academic practice; it is not neutral, finally,
in respect to the individual film theorist, her contingent thoughts and desires.
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This is one of the main lines of criticism that Robert B. Ray moves against
a certain tendency in film studies, and which we could easily understand as an
expression of a pedagogical regime of knowledge:
“[...] while Grand Theory is criticized for its obsession with an ir-
rational and unconscious subject that cannot account for its actions,
Bordwell promotes a rational agent’ theory of mental functioning,
which is in fact the subject of good theory recognizing itself in the
object it wants to examine. The concept of the rational agent func-
tions tautologically here as a projection where the ideal scientific
subject seeks the contours of its own image in the model of mind it
wishes to construct or to discover. In a perspective that strives to be
free of ideological positioning and to assert an epistemology that is
value-neutral, the introductions to Post-Theory nonetheless express
the longing for a different world modelled on an idealized vision of
scientific research: a community of researchers united by common
epistemological standards who are striving for a universalizable and
truthful picture of their object.”81
What Robert Ray is describing is a scenario in which the political, institutional
and, arguably, also the sexual innervations of film theory are being subtracted
from reflection, in favour of a methodology inspired by the hard sciences (seen
through the lenses of analytic philosophy) and responding grosso modo to the
label of a post-theoretical or empirical turn. Doing away with psychoanalysis,
more specifically, “may lead”, as Mayne writes, “to more attractive and less
pessimistic models of how the cinema works, but such models may well elide
questions of sexuality and the unconscious in the name of deceptively neutral
(and neutered) and rational notions of representation.”82 D. N. Rodowick writes,
confirming Ray’s positions, that:
“Confusing theory’ with Theory, often lost in these debates is
the acknowledgement that judgements advanced - in history, criti-
cism, or philosophy - in the absence of qualitative assessments of our
81 Robert B. Ray, How a Film Theory Got Lost and Other Mysteries in Cultural Studies
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 97.
82 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 76.
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epistemological commitments are ill-advised. To want to relinquish
theory is more than a debate over epistemological standards; it is
a retreat from reflection on the ethical stances behind our styles of
knowing.”83
A post-theoretical turn, then, is also a movement away from the tensions of spec-
tatorship, from the deadlocks of ideology, pleasure and desire, in the attempt to
produce an apparatus of theoretical writing as seamless as the cinematic one.84
To counter this, Ray proposes to follow the flight of the signifier and revel in its
unpredictability:85 a Feyerabendian “stake”, that this work attempts to follow
with its focus on contingency and free association as sites and instruments of
the subject’s heteronomy and of its emancipation.
83 D. N. Rodowick, “An Elegy for Theory,” October 122 (2007): 92.
84 Ray, How a Film Theory Got Lost, 41.
85 Ibid., 55.
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The film theorist and the emancipated spectator
if you can believe the actions and speech of the
characters
you might even believe that the popcorn you chew also
has a meaning of
sorts.
Charles Bukowski, The Last Night of the Earth Poems.
We don’t take anyone seriously, not even ourselves. Because
whoever takes themselves seriously has stopped with the thought
that their truth should be the truth for everyone and forever. And,
sooner or later, they dedicate their force not so that their truth
will be born, grow, be fruitful and die (because no earthly truth
is absolute and eternal) rather they use it to kill everything that
doesn’t agree with this truth.
Subcomandante Marcos, I Shit on All the Revolutionary Van-
guards of this Planet.
Film theory as an integral element of the experience of film.
Academic film theory is generally treated as a necessary condition for the ex-
istence of a theoretical dimension of film as such. As if viewers could not, or
did not, reflect independently on their experience as spectators. As if they did
not perform concretely, in every act of film experiencing and in all the activities
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that originate from it, more or less systematic views on their being spectators,
on their experience of specific films and, more generally, of their understanding
of film as a medium and as a signifying practice. As if, in other words, a theo-
retical component was not intrinsic to film viewing, and, on the other hand, as
if the contingent and material aspects and of spectatorship and the embodied
dimension of film experience did not influence the very activity of the film the-
orist. On the contrary, a living, operative, ground of film theory must be taken
to exist, one which is performed in the act of viewing and concretely informs it,
and that reaches out beyond the moment of the film’s projection, toward both
the configuration of the social space that the experience of film constitutes (film
as a shared space and as a particular distribution of the sensible) and the one
that it addresses (cinema as an instance of, and a reflection on, social discourses
and institutions at large).
In a way, the very field of discourses and practices which is individuated by
the concept of spectatorship implicitly assigns to spectators a theoretical agency.
“The study of spectatorship involves an engagement with modes of seeing and
telling, hearing and listening,” Judith Mayne writes, “not only in terms of
how films are structured, but in terms of how audiences imagine themselves.”86
More radically, if the field of spectatorship is the gap between flesh and bone
viewers and the spectator as the abstract and fantasmatic subject of a discursive
apparatus, and if the function of a study of spectatorship is to bridge that gap,87
then viewers themselves must be seen, in their concrete everyday experience of
film, as the first agents of a theory of film. In other words, film theory should
not be seen as an external explanation of the social and textual dynamics of
film, but as something integral to them.
Watching a film - no less than writing or talking about it, and no less than
directing one or taking part in its realization - one necessarily performs a spe-
cific understanding of film experience, that is at the same time unique to the
particular viewer and to the contingent conditions of viewing, and refers to
their universal subject (the spectator). In other words, spectatorship is shaped
by the tension between the absolutely subjective and contingent conditions of
viewing and their experiential and discursive systematisation. If, throughout
86 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 32.
87 Aaron, Spectatorship, 2.
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the dissertation, I will argue for the significance of contingency and for the ne-
cessity to include it in our lived-experience and understanding of the medium
(or, rather, not to exclude it from them), a certain degree of systematic artic-
ulation is nevertheless inevitable and necessary. In order to watch a film as
a film, in fact, spectators need to put into action some kind of abstract, and
more or less systematic, understanding of what a film is, and of what kind of
relation they have to it. As we have seen, this action is reflexive - in the sense
that it is an action that, in some respects, takes itself as an object - even if it
is not necessarily reflective - in the sense of consciously elaborating a reflection
on itself and on its own reflexivity. So, while this reflexivity can be made to
correspond to spectatorship’s theoretical aspect, this aspect is not entirely a
function of rational reflection or a matter of the possession or the acquisition of
knowledge: the spectator’s theoretical agency begins with its very involvement
and its implication with the film.
More broadly, the everyday activity of spectatorship implies a performance
and a reconfiguration of what is pleasurable in the scene of film, and of what is
intelligible of the spectator’s relation to it as an aesthetic object and to cinema
as a means of sharing and organising social space. Spectatorship, as a concept
and as a field of enquiry, names then what Jacques Rancière calls a partage du
sensible (distribution of the sensible)88 - that is, it individuates at the same time
a shared space and a particular distribution and regulation of this space. As
a practice and a performance, in turn, spectatorship necessarily occupies this
shared space and potentially reconfigures its distribution. In this sense, film
watching would be an aesthetic act,89 capable of bringing about new modes of
feeling and understanding and new forms of political subjectivity.90
Precisely as it constitutes an act of redistribution and reimagination of the
kinds of relations that define a specific film or that characterise the medium in
general, then, spectatorship must also be seen as a theoretical act, bearing its
88 Rancière defines partage du sensible as a system of perceptible features that manifest at
once the existence of a common space, the partitions into which it is articulated, and how
bodies and subjects are assigned to them; this distribution determines in turn the ways
in which what is common can be shared and who actually takes part in the sharing. See
Jacques Rancière, Le Partage du Sensible: Esthétique et Politique (Paris: Fabrique, 2000),
12.
89 See Ibid., 13.
90 See Ibid., 7.
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own modes of experiencing, its own forms of articulation and enunciation, its
own epistemologies and its own methods. The reproduction or redistribution of
the power relations that inform the space of film is something that spectators
and filmmakers materially do, and that academic theorists only in a second in-
stance, and yet not less materially, address. Film theory proper (a film theory
text or a theoretical discussion) would then exist in continuity with a more per-
vasive theoretical dimension of spectatorship, which is in fact inseparable from
film experiencing as such. The formulation of a theory of spectatorship would
then appear as a particular form of spectatorship, different in its methods and
scopes from that which is performed in everyday filmgoing, but fundamentally
equal in terms of its embodiment and of its contingent immersion in discourse.
In this perspective, the elaboration of a theory of spectatorship should not be
taken as an interpretation or an explanation of film experience, but rather as a
particular field in which the agency of the spectator can extend itself.
So, on one hand, there can be no spectatorship without the performance
of some kind of theoretical, reflexive and symbolic agency from the part of the
spectator, the mastery of which the spectator must not necessarily receive from
an external source. And, on the other hand, there can be no theory separated
from the experience of film: both in the sense that the spectator and the film
theorist share the same space - that they are parts of the same articulation of
the sensible and subjected to the same institutions and discourses - and in the
sense that, in that space, they are equal - that they have an equal intelligence of
the filmic experience and that, even as their activities respond to two different
regimes of knowledge, the agency of one is not predicated on the authority
of the other. There is no separation between the spectator’s performance of
its understanding of film, and the theorist’s reflection on it, and no hierarchy
should be inscribed in the relation between these two forms of experience. In
other words, there is a material, contingent, side to professional film theory
and a theoretical side to the experience of film which are inextricably bound
together: this mixed ground would be the basis for a more egalitarian conception
of film theory, it would suggest taking spectatorship as the common measure of
the filmic space, and thus to ground our understanding of film on the spectator’s
fundamental emancipation. In this sense, theory should not be seen as an act
that can bring about the emancipation of spectators, but rather as an act of
emancipation which is brought about by spectators themselves, never entirely
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separable from film experiencing.
Academic theory, from this perspective, cannot be addressed as a restricted
practice. It should not be seen merely as the expression of the epistemic au-
thority, or of the creative fantasy, of the professional theorist. It should not be
taken as a prerogative - and, even less, a property - of the learned. In fact, if
theory is to be taken as a reconfiguration of relations of power, knowledge and
desire, in the context of a broader net of relations - if it is, in other words, a
regime of representation internal to the field that it describes - it must not be
individuated as the practice of a specific subject, for it actually names a form
of relation between all subjects. It cannot take power and ideology as objects
distinct from itself, for they are its constitutive dimension. Finally, it cannot
limit its scope to the reduction of the world to the principles of its intelligibility,
for, as we will see, that would mean a negation of its politics.
Refusing the distinction between observation and theory that informed Pop-
perian scientific epistemology, Paul Feyerabend wrote:
Learning does not go from observation to theory but always in-
volves both elements. Experience arises together with theoretical
assumptions not before them, and an experience without theory is
just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experi-
ence [...].”91
Here we can see what is, more generally, characteristic of pedagogical and au-
thoritarian regimes of knowledge: a clear-cut line of separation between knowl-
edge and experience and, in particular, between the sharing of experience and
the possession of knowledge. On the contrary, a non-authoritarian regime of
knowledge admits no clear line of demarcation between academic theory and the
kind of theory that is integral to everyday experience, between the object that
theory attempts to define and theory itself as an object, between the scientist
and its subject. From this point of view, the spectator would name precisely
that subject for which experience and theory are not separated, that agent for
which looking on, the reflexivity of looking (looking as simultaneously looking
and being-looked-at), and the understanding of this experience are found to-
gether: theoria, as its etymology suggests, would be the activity of spectators
and, in turn, the defining feature of the space of film.
91 Feyerabend, Against Method, 151.
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Academic film theory as an incitation au discours. The living, truly
empirical, ground of film theory which is expressed by the spectator’s experi-
ence, and its political significance, should not be subordinated to the academic
discourse that addresses it. Compared with the broader dimension of film the-
ory that we are discussing, then, the systematic articulations of academic film
theory must be seen to perform, first and foremost, a mise en discours92 - that is,
a more comprehensive mapping of the discursive dimension of film experience.
As it necessarily extends the discursive power of spectatorship and filmmaking,
indeed, academic film theory at the same time almost inevitably constitutes a
policing of the spectator’s fundamental emancipation. In other words, a first
and often primary consequence of the practice of academic film theory is that
we reach a further, more exhaustive, distribution of that space of sharing that
spectatorship and film experience open up.
The essential form that this mise en discours of spectatorship assumes is
that of a discursive hegemony.93 In a radical sense, the function of theory
is to reduce to intelligibility precisely what, about spectatorship, cannot be
reduced to it - its contingency, its embodiment, and the heteronomy of the
subject that it expresses. More concretely, we can see that the idea a theory
has of the knowledge of the theorist is used to frame the representation that it
makes of the spectator’s lack of knowledge - in this sense, as well, performing a
discursive hegemony. Similarly, the lack of agency of the spectator is understood
in terms of the kind of agency that the theorist presumes to possess. Every
work on film theory constructs as its object not just the visible, intelligible,
or measurable phenomena of spectatorship (more precisely, the experience of
film in terms of its visibility, intelligibility, and measurability), but, implicitly,
also the theoretical agency that is proper of the spectator. Theory sets out not
only to chart all possible ideological subject positions, not only those specific
ideologies that inform the basic mechanisms of consensual film signification,
but, more fundamentally, exerts its control over the spectator through a mise
92 Foucault, Histoire de la Sexualité, 20.
93 I take discursive hegemony to be the inscription into the order of discourse of the very
opposition between discourse and what lies beyond it. See Slavoj Žižek, The Fright of
Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory (London: British Film
Institute, 2001), 32.
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en discours of the spectator’s emancipation from them.94
In this respect, apparatus theory provides a perfect example. At the same
time that it described interpellation and misrecognition as a function of bour-
geois ideology, it was entertaining and imposing a specific idea of how spectators
were meant to break free from those mechanisms: as a matter of fact, it took
the study and the supervision of the dynamics of emancipation to be its defining
function. Consider, by way of example, what Jean-Paul Fargier called the “de-
cisive rule” concerning the relation between knowledge and film signification, in
an article that first appeared in Cinéthique in 1969 and that was then reprinted
on Screen two years later: “in the cinema,” he wrote, “the communication of
knowledge is attendant upon the production of knowledge about the cinema.”95
What he meant, more precisely, was that the possibility that cinema could act
as a vector for the communication of positive knowledge (that is, scientific and
historical-materialist notions) was predicated on cinema’s production of knowl-
edge about itself, its capacity “to show the material facts of its physical and
social existence.”96 It was a given, though, that the capacity to recognise the
factuality of both social phenomena and their knowledge was a prerogative of
theory. Since ideology and the knowledge produced by the scientific application
of theory were for Fargier, as for Althusser, polarly opposite, he must be seen
here to deny any possibility of a politically significant exchange between ordi-
nary spectators: no sharing of knowledge through cinema, and no knowledge of
film experience, was possible beyond its theory. Apparatus theory was at the
same time and in equal measure the theory of cinema as an ideological appara-
tus, and the theory of theory as the only means of emancipation: the nature of
cinema is ideological, Fargier argued, and the only way in which it can “break
out is via theoretical practice.”97
Spectators must then claim their emancipation from two concurrent pow-
94 This mise en discours takes as its first object the theorist itself, its own experience as a
spectator and the experience of its own emancipation. In its authoritarian forms, from
being an aspect of experiencing, theory becomes instead a kind of self-disciplinary obser-
vation.
95 The original text is all in block capitals. Jean-Paul Fargier, “Parenthesis or Indirect Route:
An Attempt at Theoretical Definition of the Relationship Between Cinema and Politics,”




ers, that of consensual ideology and that of a pedagogical critique of ideology,
and from both the cinematic apparatus with its institutions from and the in-
stitutions of a pedagogical regime of knowledge. From this point of view, then,
little changes if the discursive control that academic theory exercises over the
spectator is meant to confirm or subvert existing subject positions: for it is in
the measure that it capitalizes on the spectator’s incapacity for independent
emancipation that it becomes authoritarian.
In fact, the kind of emancipation that can be reached through the recourse
to an external authority cannot but reproduce the need for emancipation, in a
cycle that is based on the affirmation of intellectual inequality and of a hier-
archy of intelligences - what Rancière called, in Le Maître Ignorant, a logic of
explication.98 To accept that we need to be explained what we need to learn in
order to emancipate ourselves is already a way of relinquishing our emancipa-
tion. Academic film theory, then, with its pretence to explain spectatorship for
what it really is and with its hegemony over its dynamics, could in this sense
not only seem pointless,99 but outrightly malicious. Together with the discur-
sive framing of spectatorship that is done by the apparatus, and its more or less
normative representation that can be given by specific films, then, a pedagogi-
cal film theory would function as a police of the spectator’s agency. As long as
it construes itself as an objectified and proprietary form of knowledge and as
something external to the dimension of spectatorship, film theory becomes the
first and fundamental form of the spectator’s abrutissement - of its objectifica-
tion and stultification. The proliferation of academic discourse becomes thus in
many ways complementary to the ideological power of the apparatus.100
The logic of explication prompts a proliferation of discourses on emanci-
pation which have precisely the function of preventing the fundamental eman-
cipation of the subject to express itself more independently. This is not a
prerogative of academic film theory, of course: it also corresponds to a strategy
of the apparatus (reaching out to fulfil the expectations of its target groups and
98 Jacques Rancière, Le Maître Ignorant (Paris: Frayard, 1987), 12.
99 Jacques Rancière, “Jacques Rancière and Indisciplinarity: An Interview,” Art & Research
(2007): http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v2n1/jrinterview.html.
100 We can see this, perhaps, in what is now one of the defining discourses of the academic
institution: despite the fact that the expression suggests a repressive threat, the “publish
or perish” imperative is indeed connatural to a Foucauldian incitation au discours. See
Foucault, Histoire de la Sexualité, 26-27.
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involve them in its dynamics and evolution), as well as to a form and an un-
derstanding of “engaged” filmmaking. For instance, the politics and aesthetics
of enunciation that came with apparatus theory - the idea that a film should
expose its ideological nature and shatter the cinematic dispositif in order to
produce a critical spectator - may appear to be, in this perspective, a kind
of meta-political filmmaking as well as, in some respects at least, an instance
of a pedagogical framing of the spectator’s emancipation. More markedly, the
recent emphasis on media interactivity can be seen to effect an even broader
mapping and a tighter discipline of the spectator’s agency.
To put it bluntly, in order to have emancipated spectators we do not need a
“better” cinema, new “technologies” of agency, nor more of a theory of film that,
in fact, requires the spectator’s passivity and presupposes its lack of awareness.
The fact that spectators might not posses much quantifiable knowledge about
film, or that their awareness of, or interest in, cinema’s political dimension might
be lacking, is still not a warrant for an authoritarian theory of film. On one
hand, quite clearly, the assumption of the spectator’s intellectual emancipation
does not automatically make of spectatorship a political practice - let alone
one that would be essentially progressive or subversive - nor does it dispense
spectatorship from political struggle. On the other, it is not through a mise en
discours of the spectators’ emancipation that we can expect this struggle to be
created and maintained.
In the effort to rethink the concept beyond this ideological deadlock, Ran-
cière argues that emancipation is less a matter of a conflict between established
parts,101 less the articulation of what was previously under- or mis-represented,
than the constitutional effect of a radical and irresoluble conflict. The political
dimension comes into being, Rancière writes, not when the distribution of the
parts that characterizes a given society is rearticulated, but as it is troubled by
a part of those that have no part (a part de sans-part), by the manifestation of
something that is incommensurable with the very principles that regulate that
distribution.102 This dimension ceases to exist, on the contrary, when this gap
(écart) is brought back within the intelligible articulations of the social space.
As it reduces incommensurability to an articulation of parts, the mise en dis-
101 Rancière, La Mésentente, 64.
102 Ibid., 40.
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cours that characterises disciplinary institutions, especially if what is reduced
into discourse is the subject’s agency, must then be seen as a primary form of
oppression, a negation of the very political dimension of equality and eman-
cipation. The action of authoritarian theory (abstracting from the empirical
contingent ground of the phenomenal world the principles of its functioning
and thus reducing the world to the principles of its intelligibility) would then
mimic the fundamental action of police: by articulating our understanding of
the world in terms of objectified knowledge, theory would inevitably end up
serving social control.
Breaking the spell of theory. The specific problem of the film theorist
becomes then how to envision its academic practice beyond an authoritarian
regime of knowledge that would cut her off from her own experience as specta-
tor, from the fundamental ground of equality that she shares with other human
beings, and from the paradoxes that animate the political dimension. So, rather
than establishing the authority of the film theorist on its being external to the
mechanisms of spectatorship that it describes, one should ground the effective-
ness of its activity in its very involvement as a spectator, in its capacity to let go
of the mastery of concepts and rather make use of the self-shattering potentials
that the space of film affords. More generally, rather than establishing the func-
tion of film theory as its ability to make cinema and spectatorship intelligible,
one should rather take it as a hospitable space - not unlike the space of specta-
torship - for something radically incommensurable to the existing distribution
of knowledge to appear.
We should therefore assume that no break exists between the practice of
spectatorship and the practice of academic theory, and that the forms of the
latter necessarily come as the extension of the ungraspable forces of the for-
mer. Even before they are framed as sociological or critical objects of enquiry,
indeed, the film theorist necessarily partakes in those communal forms of film
experience that spectatorship names - and that is because she is herself, first
and foremost, a viewer and a spectator. It is, then, in the material contingencies
of the academic practice of theory, in the equality of its form of knowledge, in
the theorist’s involvement with film experience, and, finally, through her prox-
imity to the emotive, sensual sources of spectatorship’s theoretical dimension,
that the potential for a non-authoritarian film theory can be found. Writing
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on film, then, would be just one more way of engaging with it, a strategy of
viewing among others, one in which something unexpected and unintelligible
can potentially appear. Academic film theory would be yet another discourse
on film and another form of visual pleasure with no privileged relation to its
object, no intrinsically superior access to truth, or to subversiveness, than that
of everyday filmgoing. In turn, any form of spectatorship would bear with it
not only the power to confirm or reconfigure the space of film, but also what
can be understood and said about it - it would not only have discursive power,
but a theoretical power as well. Beyond their authoritarian articulation, spec-
tatorship and theory become then one practice and a single dimension, one that
is open to the emergence of the incommensurable.
One of the forces that, equally in everyday spectatorship and in everyday
academic practice, are able, so to speak, to break the spell of theory - to mock
its pretence of mastery and restitute it to the unexpected and the contingent
play of encounters that characterises lived-experience - is pleasure. As much
as it cannot establish a clear separation between ideology and the forms of
knowledge that are characteristic of it, indeed, theory can claim no distance
from its pleasures. In pleasure, I am not saying anything particularly new here,
we can find an agency that goes beyond the illusion of mastery of the subject:
rather than taking it as a sign of a lack of awareness, as apparatus theory
tendentially did, or as something that necessarily corresponds to conformism
and consensus, the spectator’s pleasure should be seen to constitute a specific
form of critique and to be the drive sustaining its successive articulations. If
theory can reinforce visual pleasure, visual pleasure surely drives theory on
(together, quite clearly, with a pleasure in reading, and sometimes a perverse
preference for philosophical texts). The reading of film theory can indeed make
certain films more palatable (or can help to make the films we already like
more respectable) by extending the context of their understanding, and thus
opening them up for more, and potentially more pleasurable, meanings. Almost
anything does the trick. There is something of cinephilia, then, in the joys and
pains of theory, of bibliophilia, claustrophilia: any “philia”, any pleasure and
any perversion (including that for “neutral” empiricism), actually reinforces,
or at least extends, the domain of theory, to the point that we may begin to
doubt where one ends and the other begins. We might say that all theories
partake in the eclecticism of the amateurs and in the polymorphism of infantile
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sexual theories. From this perspective, even the driest classifications of film
codes may be seen to acquire an uncanny obscene character. Is the disembodied
space of authoritarian theory, and of an authoritarian theory of spectatorship in
particular, not something like an anatomical theatre, then, a panoptical device
surrounding a human body reduced, in death, to what can be made intelligible
about it? As soon as we take theory as a practice, instead, we begin to see in
it the same living and ungraspable tensions that animate the politics and the
aesthetics of spectatorship and film.
On the side of the viewer, as well, the possibility of extending meaning, of
prolonging one’s immersion in the film, and, most characteristically, of reading
against the grain, must be taken as a kind of theoretical activity which is driven
by pleasure. What is considered oppositional reading - and which is probably
better described as an aesthetic use - is indeed meant to contrast the naturalness
of consensus and the transparency of subjectivity. It is an expression of dissent,
an arguing for one’s own voice and one’s own meaning that does not necessarily
need to be self-consciously theoretical, nor to muster a high degree of discursive
mastery, in order to achieve significant subversive or critical effects. Its force, in
fact, lies primarily in desire, not in awareness and technique: the spectator does
not need to have a theory behind it, nor in its hands, to unsettle the established
distribution of the sensible. It is, if ever, by her contingent presence as a looking,
speaking and desiring being, that this disturbance will take place. Indeed, if
most of the focus has been put onto “rational” oppositional reading, of the kind
that pitches the spectator’s critical awareness against the normative and hidden
structures of the apparatus, there is also another set of normative structures
that the experience of spectatorship potentially transcends and transgresses, by
other means than reason: those that inform the viewer itself as a person with
an identity, those that make up the imaginary continuity of the subject before
it identifies with the cinematic one, the desires and pleasures by which he or she
is looking for a unitary point of identification in the first place. Film experience
would then offer not just moments of imaginary union, but of self-shattering as
well,103 it would be one of the myriad of encounters that make up subjectivity
as a dynamic without centre. A self-shattering that, I believe, relates to the
subject’s heteronomy - that is, to its fundamental emancipation from itself .
103 Leo Bersani, Baudelaire and Freud (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1977), 46.
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As Rancière confirms from a different perspective, it is only from the position
that normative discourses inform or hegemonise that it is possible to advance
a politics of identity, and, furthermore, it is only from that position that we
are able to distinguish unambiguously between, so to speak, movements of the
subject toward or away from itself, between passive and active forms of agency,
between, political subjectivation and ideological misrecognition (though they
can clearly be separated in principle, the two are not always unambiguously
recognisable in their concrete, contingent, instances). Against the knowledge
of the rational and conscious subject, we should rather listen to the wisdom of
the id: we really exist only in the measure that we are not entirely “ourselves”.
In other words, the possibility of subjectivation would rest ultimately on an
unresolved tension between an “it” and an “I”. In relation to the experience of
film, the spectator would be the name of that tension.
If the spectator’s intellectual emancipation takes shape through the state-
ment and the recognition of its equal intelligence of film, then the theorist’s
emancipation must be sought for in a return to, or rather a constant connec-
tion with, this emerging dimension of the spectator’s desire and the subject’s
heteronomy. A dimension which would not be the origin of theory - the idea of
origin, as Jean-Bertrand Pontalis argued, is essentially nostalgic, and eventually
presupposes a teleology, of which theory all too easily can come to occupy the
vertex - but its ever present beginning.104 In writing, and in theoretical writing
in particular, one is never finished and one must constantly begin again: the
theoretical parole is the contrary of the authority of theory - that absolute voice
that objectifies every experience and identifies every object infallibly and once
and for all, that masterful gesture that links the essence to the name. An intel-
ligence that never falters is indeed one that lives in fear of its stupidity, and one
that would therefore need to stultify others. A speech that never wavers would
ignore, as Pontalis wrote, that which actually nourishes it and brings it into
being: the unconscious, which is a time not reduced to measure, and a voice of
that which was not supposed to speak.105
104 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Avant (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), 18.
105 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Fenêtres (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 29.
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The beginnings of film theory.
Film theory is born in the curious, but never innocent, look that children cast
upon the medium as they are discovering it, it is in the everyday performance of
viewing, in its pleasures, as spectators and the people working with the medium
continuously engage with film and with each other. As children, we are told
and shown in many ways, by many people on and off screen, what the medium
and our relation to it are supposed to be. The first form that film theory
takes, in this sense, is again that of the police: a mapping of the sensible that
assigns each subject to a part, each aspect of the experience of film to a position
defined by regimes of discursive power. We come to understand film through a
layout of the seeable, the sayable, the imaginable, which is at once repressive
and somewhat necessary, or at least inescapable. And yet, learning what the
medium is, is first of all learning what it is and what it means to other people: at
the same time that we encounter the discourses that code cinema in the cultural
symbolic, we find those discourses and codes as the people around them relate
to them and embody them. If the subject is born into language, this language
is only accessible to the subject in the form of a parole. The discursivity of the
subject - that is, the coexistence of the discursive construction of the subject
and the subjective contingency of this construction - marks from the outset the
dimension of our embodied experience of film.
We are educated to film, and our relation to it is explained to us as we learn
to assume those positions that identify the medium in the social space, and
ourselves within it. At the same time, however, we discover the experience of
film more independently. We never perfectly cope with the emotions we, and
other people we know, attach to film, we never entirely adapt to the consensual
language games that define its place in the places we inhabit. These contin-
gent, but still discursive, forms of experiencing that set the foundations of our
continuously evolving engagement with film are not apprehended as a datum,
but are rather formed gradually as we share them with the people that we meet
through the medium. So that even as we are explained what film is, we are still
able to discover it, as it were, for what it is not, or not yet, and by other means
than those which we are given. In this sense, the contingency of our history as
spectators corresponds to the heteronomy of our subjectivity. By interacting
with others and by mastering a certain set of notions, discourses, and modes
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of experiencing film we are already changing them as well as confirming them
in some of their respects (the discursivity of spectatorship in this sense corre-
sponds to a dimension of discursive power). As we understand the regimes of
filmic representation, as well as the regime that represents film as a social and
imaginary activity, we are inevitably subjected to them: we are identified as
spectators. At the same time, however, we put ourselves beyond this identity:
both through the contingencies and idiosyncrasies of the subjective encounters
that make up our personal history as spectators, and through our own use of
the film as a scene of pleasure and signification. So that our relation to film
is, from the very beginning, both an embodied and a theoretical one, at the
same time embedded in discourse and emerging through contingent dialogue
and encounters.
However, when we enter the distribution of the sensible that defines film, it is
not enough that we arrive to possess an independent and personal understanding
of it: we are asked proof of an understanding and of an experience which must
be valid for others. A child in front of the screen seems to be engaged with the
film, but does she know what it means? Is she watching? Does she really see?
Our apprenticeship of moving images takes first of all the form of a discipline
and is subjected to the logic of explication: we are not supposed to know what
film is until we are able to explain what it is, or, more generally, to display the
proper reactions.106 And, since we are supposed to need an explanation in the
first place, by responding to it, we are bound to accept implicitly that we will
need other explanations in the future (to make sense of any new situation, as
well as to make sense of the very explanations that we receive).107 The origin of
authoritarian film theory can be found precisely in the gesture that establishes
the child as an incapable: not as someone who merely lacks the experience that
it needs to understand the world the way it is collectively and contingently
constructed, but as someone who is yet to acquire the potential to understand
it the way it is. Without a recognition of the equality of intelligences - and first
of all of the equality of intelligences of the child and the adult, and of the equal
106 Sometimes, one has the impression that, as a social phenomenon, spectatorship is nothing
but the ensemble of these coded and proper reactions, a masquerade - and it surely is one,
as an object of authoritarian film theory. If it really were, however, nothing new would
ever come from it. Even as the codes are constantly and accurately reproduced, in the
very contingency of their performance something is bound to escape them.
107 See Rancière, Le Maître Ignorant, 12.
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value of their different perspectives on the world - the cycles of the pedagogical
regime will find no end. Within this regime, spontaneous and independent
knowledge - what Rancière calls learning, rather than comprehension108 - is
almost entirely discounted. In this way, the universal subject of film experience
is turned in the transcendental subject of film theory: the former, an expression
of the equality of all intelligences in relation to film; the other, that position of
ignorance that the film theorist needs to sustain its authority. Indeed, as we have
written, the passivity of the spectator is doubly coded: first by the structure of
the cinematographic apparatus and then by the pedagogical assumptions of its
theory.
It is never just in the autonomous and rational judgement of the subject,
however (an avatar of the unitary subject and a representative of the mastery
of theory), but in the recognition of the contingency and heteronomy of our
experience and subjectivity, that something beyond the logic of explication can
be found. In other words, the fundamental emancipation of the subject does not
correspond to its acquisition of a form of mastery (this is precisely the lure by
which both the cinematographic apparatus and the pedagogical regime function
in the first place), but rather to a radical lack in all forms of mastery.
The child, the fatum and the infans. Taken as that empty dimension
in which the equality of intelligences of all subjects having to do with film is
expressed, spectatorship can be seen as the part de sans-part that constantly
traverses the existing distribution of the social and aesthetic space of film. This
part of those that do not have one, we have begun to address it by imagining a
child in front of a screen: and yet it does not correspond to childhood, literally,
but rather finds a similarity with what the French psychoanalyst Jean-Bertrand
Pontalis called the infans. If childhood is, indeed, clearly a part of the social
space - a category, an ideal and even a commodity - the infans names that
experience of radical alterity that comes from our everyday encounters with
language and the unconscious, one that begins with but in no way ends with
our childhood. Every language and every experience is, at first and at its core,
a foreign one,109 and no logos can exist without the struggle by which we make
108 Ibid., 13.
109 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, l’Amour des Commencements (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 30.
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it, day by day and always precariously, our own.
Film theory, in the general sense we are discussing, addresses that knot of
discourses, actions and emotions that make it so that the lights on the screen
become recognisable to the subject as moving images, and, more fundamentally,
the moment in which the sounds that the child produces at some point are
recognised to be a voice saying something about those images. We become
spectators by acquiring and by being recognised this voice: on one hand, we
are mastering the medium, and thus we are being mastered by it; on the other,
we are assuming our equality to the other people that relate to it, arguing our
position in a performance of a spectatorial logos110 which is never clearly our
own, in the sense that it always informed discursively, but that, by the very fact
of our subjective contingency and heteronomy, already constitutes a potential
for dissent.
In-fans - the child, the one who does not speak - would then name not really
a space outside of language, but that silence which supports the emergence of
the voice.111 That which is no part of language and which, during the course of
our life, at the same time wants no part in it and drives it on. Language exists,
Pontalis wrote, only when it is inhabited by what it is not.112 More generally,
he believed, the power of an art lies in the fact that it can face what negates
it,113 what remains incommensurable to it. In a similar way, theory becomes
effective only as it can engage with what escapes it and, more specifically, what
escapes its fantasy of mastery. So, the child speaks from a space that cannot
be measured and says “I, too, am a speaking being” - by this giving a positive
expression of the fundamental equality of all speaking beings. And yet, this
equality is not a given, and is never the simple realisation of a human essence:
the most banal of utterances, in this perspective, already has the full magnitude
of a political act.
As the child becomes into language, a part beyond the parts of the subject,
as it were, shuts up in dissent, resisting against the saturation of the sensible
that is brought about by discourse, trying to escape from the mastery that
concepts allow for, and that they cannot fail to impose. The state of the infans
110 Rancière, Mésentente, 44.
111 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, En Marge des Nuits (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), 74.
112 Pontalis, l’Amour des Commencements, 29-30.
113 Ibid., 53.
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is not that of aphasia,114 but precisely the site of the appearance of silence. It
is not opposed to language as such, but only to its authoritarian power. Much
like the voice must become able to argue for itself in order to be distinguished
from sound, silence must tell itself apart from the incapacity to speak. The
infans is, in this sense, a creature of dissensus: it would be that thing in us
which would rather not speak. For both Rancière and Pontalis a fundamental
dissent animates language, without which language would be very little, and
say nothing at all. A language without possible misunderstanding, Pontalis
wrote, would not be able to sustain a single signification115 - without dissensus,
no possibility of political subjectivation.
We can say that a political dimension exists when, in the sharing that lan-
guage allows, we learn not to oust its radical otherness and the struggles that
inform it. Language can never be a direct access to the thing, Pontalis wrote,
but it would be nothing more than a code were it not driven by and moving
toward what it is not.116 Similarly, the subject would be nothing more than a
spokesperson (not a speaking being) were it not driven by and moving towards
what the subject is not: here we find, perhaps, the politics and the aesthetics of
the unconscious - part de sans-part of our psychic being. The unconscious, for
Pontalis, corresponds in fact to the silence of the infans, part of that which has
no part in language nor consciousness. The characteristic domain of experience
individuated by the unconscious, in fact, would not be one before or beyond
meaning - one that would thus be comfortably intelligible in articulation with
it - but a rupture, the continuous emergence of an incommensurable within
language and the speaking being themselves. In this sense psychoanalysis is, or
should be, for Pontalis, hospitable to everything that migrates, to everything
that does not have a proper place.117
If the infans’s telling silence is first of all meant as a sign of dissensus and
emancipation, Pontalis appropriately called fatum the subject of a speech which
is never its own:118 I don’t speak, but rather I am spoken (fatum sum). In a
114 Ibid.
115 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Après Freud (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 121.
116 Le langage “ne serait rien de plus qu’un code s’il n’était porté par et emporté vers ce qu’il
n’est pas.” Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, La Force d’Attraction (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), 99.
Translation mine.
117 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 72.
118 Ibid., 30.
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similar sense, Rancière referred to the Platonic use of the term aisthesis to
address the language of the subaltern, the language of a subject who is able
to speak, but to whom is nevertheless negated the ability to make its own
meaning.119 To return to the cinema, then, the spectator of Althusserian film
theory was assigned the position of the spoken, of the subject who is merely
able to read what the flow of images manifests to it. Redefined with Judith
Mayne, on the other hand, the spectator would be the tension between these
two figures: one hand, the spokesperson, the fatum, the subject of ideology; on
the other, the speaking being, who is also an infans and, thus, the Rancièrian
subject of dissensus and political subjectivation. In psychoanalysis, one should
perhaps remind it, the speaking subject is not the conscious subject:120 precisely
because of this lack in its agency, however, it is also a subject who can never
be entirely spoken by an external and intelligible agency.
And yet, the infans is continuously talked about, interpreted, and tentatively
put into discourse:121 its cries and motions are constantly heeded, investigated,
and made significant by others, quelled and thus deprived of some of their dis-
sensual charge. The infans, after all, is treated like a child. And so successful
and pervasive this pedagogy of subjectivity is, that one might finally lose the
ability to hear the infans and to let it speak. One might indeed lose touch with
the incommensurable and with its own subjective heteronomy, and it would be
precisely the function of psychoanalysis to reawake ourselves to it. Analysis,
for Pontalis, aims to make fatum silent, and let the infans speak:122 fatum here
corresponds not really to the repressed, nor to the traumatic, but, on the con-
trary, to identity and the self, it is that which has been put into discourse and
which is subjected to the mastery of language and to the subject’s own fantasy
of mastery over itself. The silence of the infans and the diversions of the uncon-
scious would provide, on the contrary, those migrant elements, that disturbance
within the sphere of language and the senses that prevents the self-sameness of
the unitary subject and thus allows the expression of its voice. For the struggle
into language of the infans that accompanies us all is fundamentally an act (an
art) of emancipation: in this way, as we will see, psychoanalysis can be seen
119 Rancière, La Mésentente, 38.
120 Pontalis, Après Freud, 49.
121 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 31.
122 Ibid., 32.
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to address the domain of the political that Rancière defines, rather than acting
merely as a technology of subjectivity, a metapsychology of the irrational, a
teleology of the sexual, and a police of the irrepresentable.
In Derek Jarman’s film Caravaggio123 there is a scene in which Jerusalem,
Caravaggio’s foundling and mute, lifelong companion, cries out at his friend’s
deathbed with all the strength of his passion. He cannot cry with his voice,
however, for he has none. So instead he blows into a whistle. In the film we
can see him do that, desperately and with all his breath, but we cannot hear
any sound. The film has doubled his silence, and by this it has made that
silence, like the silence of the infans, so much louder. This scene evokes the
strange, synaesthetic, impressions of hearing a phantasmal sound - a visual and
narrative cue evokes a sound that is not actually there - and of seeing silence
- we see the signs of blowing on the whistle, and through them we see a lack
of sound. So that we actually have a sound, deprived of its aural dimension,
and we perceive this lack through the image. This scene can be taken as a
representation of the silence of the infans: not the trauma of a silenced subject,
but the passion of a speaking silence. In a similar way, the subject’s speaks
through the spectator’s aesthetic illumination of the film as the viewer remains
silent. We can take this incommensurable and significant sound, perhaps, as
the first sign of the spectator’s fundamental emancipation.
The spectator as an infans. After this digression, through which we tied
together Pontalis’ approach to unconscious experience and some of Rancière’s
ideas on political subjectivation, we can say that the cinematographic situa-
tion, rather than infantilizing the spectator as apparatus theory assumed, first
of allputs it in the position of the infans. To be sure, this possibility to go
beyond ourselves and to spectate, as it were, our own otherness to ourselves in
its contingent emergence, is not exclusive to film spectatorship. On the con-
trary, as Christopher Bollas argues, it is a general characteristic of unconscious
experience and of our ordinary, everyday, encounters with the world.124
In the scene of spectatorship and theory that authoritarian film theories
construct, on the contrary, the spectator is imagined not just to be silent, but
123 Derek Jarman, Caravaggio (British Film Institute, 1986). 35mm.
124 Christopher Bollas, Free Association (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2002), 5.
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to be lacking a proper voice. This authoritarian logic is predicated on an iden-
tification of passivity with a lack of agency: since the spectator lets the film
speak, then it cannot have a voice and, thus, it must be spoken. Limited to the
moment of projection, then, encaged by the dominance of the agency of technol-
ogy over the receptivity of subjectivity, the relationship between the viewer and
the screen may very well represent a dimension of radical conflict (of alienation
and self-dispossession), but hardly one of dissensus. If the ideological appara-
tus clearly influences spectatorship’s discursive power, an authoritarian theory
of film can be seen to negate its independent political dimension. From this
perspective, the silence of the metapsychological spectator does not correspond
to an empty universal position that can be occupied by any contingent being
whatsoever and re-signified, but rather becomes a sign of emptiness which in-
evitably erases everything that escapes the mastery of concepts: contingency,
fundamental emancipation, and the diversions of the unconscious.
At what point, and on what conditions, the sounds of the spectator’s voice
are recognised as a discourse on the image? When, and how, wavering patterns
of light become a moving image? What makes us and unmakes us as spectators
and as human subjects? These are the questions to which the film theorist,
the child, and the emancipated spectator continually return to. Perhaps, they
return to them precisely to prevent them from being answered. One could say
that the film theorist, inasmuch as it is a spectator and an emancipated subject,
is the one who keeps cherishing film as an unknown object, as a manifestation
of an incommensurable, as a site of otherness. The one who cannot let go the
fascination with the very process of weaving and unweaving of the texture of
film experience and of the process of its signification and re-signification. The
one who constantly returns - a détour, actually - to the trouble of beginnings.
In the end, the film theorist would be the one who, before the moving images,
can never stop being lost. In its essence, a non-authoritarian film theory would
not aim to an ontology of the moving image or the filmic experience, then, but
rather to preserve its paradoxes.
Knowledge always comes from desiring the unknown: which is either a de-
sire to erase it, or a desiring relationship with our own ignorance. The theorist
is, in this sense, not only an emancipated spectator but an ignorant viewer
- not in the sense of one that lacks someone else’s knowledge, but, precisely,
of one that is engaged with the necessarily faltering beginnings of one’s own.
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Knowledge should be seen less as a form of mastery, than as a pleasurable form
of sharing of our experiences. Interpretation (psychoanalytic interpretation in
an enhanced way) and objectified knowledge would then be something like the
end-pleasure of film theory - they would enjoy their object only in the measure
that they are able to kill that pleasure and dominate it. So, on one hand we
will have the end of film theory, the climax of its progression to annex every
possible experience to the symbolised, to the sayable, to the seen, all of which
is inevitably predicated on a depoliticization of spectatorship (as we have sug-
gested, politics only exists in the continuous emergence of an incommensurable
within the consensual distribution of the sensible, which is a movement opposite
to its mise en discours). On the other, we will have a film theory that mocks
its own mastery and “flirts” with its own ignorance.125
This will bring us to discuss theory and spectatorship in relation to what
Rancière calls aesthetic regime of art and, in turn, with contingency and free
association. But, first, it is perhaps the case to dwell on an aspect of Rancière’s
work that, while being clearly one of the cornerstones of the concept of the
emancipated spectator (together with Les Nuits de Prolétaires126 and his work
on Jacotot), is not immediately linked with film: his early critique of Althusser’s
theory of knowledge in La Leçon d’Althusser . This will allow us in turn to
address more specifically the relationship between, on one hand, film theory and
normative discourses on film, and, on the other, the spectator as an aesthetic
subject.
Rancière’s critique of Althusser.
By presenting Althusserianism as a practice127 - that is, by foregrounding the
politics of Althusser’s thought in relation to their historical and institutional
context, rather than addressing his ideas about politics from a purely theoretical
standpoint - Rancière was actually touching a central argument in Althusser’s
theory of ideas: the separate and privileged status that he assigned to theory.
When Althusser affirmed the independence of theory from contingent political
125 See Adam Phillips, On Flirtation (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1994).
126 Jacques Rancière, The Nights of Labour (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
127 Jacques Rancière, La Leçon d’Althusser (Paris: Fabrique, 2011 [1974]), 8.
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practice, Rancière conceded,128 he was doing it first of all to separate the laws of
theoretical truth from the entrenched logic of party politics that characterised
the French Communist Party.129 At the same time, however, Althusser’s posi-
tions entailed a split between theory, as a specialised field and an elitist practice,
and any emanation of political rationality coming from the actions of the base:
for him, there was no possibility of finding solutions to political problems by
systematising what was emerging from concrete struggles.130 What had to be
done, instead, was to return to the sources of Marxist thought and to the im-
plicit dialectic of the great revolutionary moments.131 Althusser’s was a double
return to theory, then: first as a focus on theoretical texts, and then as a theoret-
ical reassessment of their founding principles. A task that he made to coincide
in essence with the essence of political action: “politics would be philosophy in
act.”132 Theory was thus made to be the sole possible guarantee of the “scien-
tificity” - the rationality, and thus the effectiveness - of politics as such.133 This
idea of the necessity and independence of theory, tendentially expressed as a
critique of false knowledge, by May 1968 evolved into a stark affirmation of the
separateness and superiority of theory over the forms of knowledge that could
have been elaborated at one with political practice. “False ideas come from so-
cial practice,” Rancière thus summarized Althusser’s position, and so, “science
can only be established from a point outside of the illusion of practice:”134 a
mutual exclusion of theory and experience that we have already encountered as
a feature of authoritarian regimes of knowledge.
Althusser’s conception of ideology as a system of representations that au-
tomatically subjected individuals to the dominant order, Rancière continued,
sustained the idea of a radical cultural revolution at the same time that it was
used to condemn the student revolts - depicted as a movement of petty bour-
128 Ibid., 67.
129 Ibid., 68.
130 Rancière names the miners strike in 1948, the student strikes in 1963 and the revolts
of May 1968, the Algerian War of Independence, and, of course, the Chinese cultural
revolution in the “near” background. Ibid., 71.
131 Ibid., 64.
132 Ibid., 67.
133 Jacques Rancière, “Sur la Théorie de l’Idéologie: Politique d’Althusser,” in La Leçon
d’Althusser (Paris: Fabrique, 2011 [1969]), 240.
134 Rancière, Leçon, 96.
74
geois, unwitting victims of an ideology of which they had to be made aware.135
The irony is, of course, that the function of ideology - to reproduce the existing
conditions of production - was precisely the function that the students of May
were accusing the university of performing. These two faces of theory - one as
an instrument of emancipation, the other, as a support of the authority of aca-
demics and intellectuals against the danger of overthrowing the institutions to
which they belonged - can be recognised in Althusserian film theory as well.136
On one side, we have the presupposition of the passivity of spectators and of
their incapacity for autonomous emancipation. On the other, the project of an
avant-garde cinema that, by exposing the secrets of the machine that impris-
oned them, was imagined to liberate spectators from the particular ideology
that informed the cinematographic apparatus. Both these ideas in fact presup-
posed the incapacity of spectators to grasp the dynamics of film ideology and
film signification independently, and postulated that emancipatory knowledge -
either in the form of a critical discourse on film or in that of engaged experimen-
tal filmmaking - was something from which the spectator was constitutionally
cut off. According to apparatus theory, the less the spectator knows - the less
the experience of spectatorship is intelligible to it - the stronger is the appa-
ratus’s ideological effect. And yet, in relation to the authority of theory, the
stronger is the ideological determination, the more intelligible the experience of
the spectator becomes for the theorist. In fact, the incapacity of the spectator
is a requisite not just for the ideological effect, but, first of all, for the mastery
and the authority of theory. In this sense, as we have seen, we should consider
apparatus theory to be an essential part of the apparatus it described.
Other than appropriating the Althusserian idea of cinema as an ideological
state apparatus, then, 1970s film theory had first of all assimilated his point on
the necessity of a critical and scientific discourse about film. At the same time,
film theory set out to establish the principles of film ideology and to construct
135 Ibid., 9.
136 In addressing the authoritarian aspects of “Althusserian” film theory, or apparatus theory,
I am making a wide, if quite consensual, generalisation. Still, I think that three combined
assumptions can be taken to define, in this generic sense, an Althusserian theory of film,
especially in relation to issues of theoretical authority: the negation of the spectator’s
emancipation; the idea that film signification rests essentially in the creation of an illusory
impression of reality which corresponds in turn to a specific ideological worldview; and a
particular connection between ideology and psychoanalytic metapsychology.
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itself as a critique of the ideological nature of the medium - the underlying
assumption was, of course, that the ideological dynamics of cinema were deter-
mined by the very psychological and technological features of the medium.137
If cinema was “ideology talking to itself,”138 the political action of the critical
theorist was then to disturb this monologue with its own voice: its purpose was
to show and explain film signification in its relation to the ideological regime
from a position of knowledge external to the apparatus. Film theory’s regime
of understanding cinema as a medium had to assume its ideological nature as
much as it capitalised on the theorist’s critical distance from it.
On the contrary, Rancière argued, the relationship between objective knowl-
edge and ideology can never be one of rupture or separation, for it is rather
always one of articulation.139 There is no separating scientific knowledge from
discourse: it is only in an ideological - and, specifically, bourgeois - conception
of scientific knowledge, in fact, as Rancière claimed, that knowledge becomes
thinkable as distinct object.140 Film theory became then essentially a critique
of false knowledge: not really in the sense of a demystification of the false con-
tents of bourgeois films, but rather as an elucidation of the ideological form of
cinematic representation itself (through this, film criticism was in fact becoming
film theory). The terrain of film ideology, indeed, was not seen to rest primarily
in the content of the film, but rather in the process of its enunciation, and less
in the narrative and storytelling than in the very ontology of moving images.
“Narrative,” Stephen Heath wrote, “gives the meaning that the photographic
image shows real.”141 In this way, Althusserian film theory tendentially identi-
fied the ideological nature of film with the longstanding issue of the impression
of reality, materialised in the tropes of classical continuity and in the metapsy-
chology of the apparatus, and imagined a different form of filmmaking in the
subversion of both. “The impression of reality,” Christopher Williams wrote in
137 Abraham Geil, “The Spectator Without Qualities,” in Rancière and Film, Paul Bowman,
ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 68.
138 Jean-Luc Comolli and Paul Narboni, “Cinema/ldeology/Criticism,” Screen 12, no. 1
(1971): 30.
139 Rancière, “Sur la Théorie de l’Idéologie,” 236.
140 Ibid.
141 Stephen Heath, “Film and System: Terms of Analysis,” Screen 16, no. 2 (1975): 108.
Note the verb “to show” that is also used to convey the idea of the function of theory.
Also see: Comolli and Narboni, “Cinema/ldeology/Criticism,” 34.
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the same year, “spawns two processes in the spectator: recognition, and then
mystification. The task of political cinema, and of cinema criticism, is to de-
stroy those processes.”142 At the same time, however, this kind of film theory
came to be based on the fundamental incapacity of spectators to address, and
eventually “destroy”, these processes independently and in their own ways. In
this sense, Althusserian film theory is less to be criticised for its “formalism”143 -
that is, for describing spectatorship as an abstract subject position rather than
as the practice of a culturally and historically situated real viewer - than for its
intellectual paternalism.
In a 1969 text that preceded his La Leçon d’Althusser , Rancière charac-
terised Althusser’s theory of ideology, on one side, in terms of its assumption
that ideology is a pervasive structure, a general principle of social cohesion
which binds individuals to their role; on the other, and it is here I believe
that we find the strongest expression of the theory’s authoritarian regime, of
its clear-cut separation of ideology from objective knowledge.144 Indeed, if the
first definition of ideology can be explained in terms of more or less contingent
configurations of discursive power, enveloping the subject but also always open
to transformation, its second understanding frames this dimension of power in
terms of a transcendental binary logic that in fact forecloses the subject’s eman-
cipation. The study of film was particularly receptive to this logic: “Truths”’
Paul Narboni and Jean-Luc Comolli wrote, arguing against the no less author-
itarian positions of Fargier on Cinéthique from the pages of the Cahiers du
Cinéma, “never came to be known theoretically’ through a film: known, yes;
theoretically, no. Cinéthique,” they added, “misuses language in many ways.
An over-hasty marriage between theory’ and cinema’ goes side by side with an
equally unwise divorce between cinema’ and ideology’.”145
Such emphasis on truth and demystification, such as that we find in Al-
thusser and Althusserian film theory, could not but have resolved in a police of
words,146 both in the form of internecine struggles over the correct understand-
142 Christopher Williams, “Politics and Production: Some Pointers Through the Work of
Jean-Luc Godard,” Screen 12, no. 4 (1971): 21-22.
143 Geil, “The Spectator Without Qualities,” 73.
144 Rancière, “Sur la Théorie de l’Idéologie,” 216.
145 It is less important here to give the details of the discussion than to acknowledge its vo-
cabulary and grasp its tones. Comolli and Narboni, “Cinema/ldeology/Criticism,” 33-34.
146 Rancière, Leçon d’Althusser , 127.
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ing and practice of theory, and in the constitution of a technical vocabulary - at
times rigorous, at times, as it was noted, merely confusing. The polemic between
the Cahiers and Cinéthique to which we have hinted above, assumed indeed the
form of a quarrel between true versus false science, between mere exhibition of
militantism and actual revolutionary action. The allegations were, coherently,
those of not having understood correctly, of making a mystifying rather than an
actually theoretical use of theoretical concepts: “pseudo-scientific rigour quickly
takes the place (and masks the absence) of genuine theoretical rigour,” Narboni
and Comolli criticize their colleagues, noting incidentally that “(the word the-
ory itself has a high frequency ratio in the text but is still never formulated
theoretically).”147 They are in fact, accusing the other of having the same kind
of inability they imputed to spectators, only translated from the domain of film
experience to that of professional criticism. In both cases, they were doubting
the other’s ability to comprehend: “the Cinéthique team may have read their
Althusser, but they have not digested him, and their use of his terminology is
sometimes unscientific to the point of fantasy.”148 Thus, the Althusserian split
between ideology and science reinscribes itself within the science which is needed
to separate science from ideology: Althusserian film critics are haunted by the
very logic of knowledge and false appearances that they set themselves out to
combat within the cinema. This logic returns over and over, every time a final
ontological, epistemological, or methodological arbitration is invoked, whenever
theoretical concepts become the “unobservable” explanation of observable phe-
nomena. In his recent rational reconstruction of film theory, Warren Buckland
quotes Mario Bunge, providing a very apt formulation of this kind of stand-
point: “if we want to explain experience we must rise above it by analysing it
in nonexperiential terms.”149 Terms that, as they are subtracted from merging
with the ordinary of aesthetic experience, put themselves, and the people who
use them, to the task of an endless and arid scrutiny. In the end, Althusserian
critique did not offer a weapon to change the world, but only a recipe for its
147 Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean Narboni, “Cinema/Ideology/Criticism (2),” Screen 12, no.
2 (1971): 147.
148 Ibid., 148.
149 Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Science: From Problem to Theory (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1998), 453. Quoted in Warren Buckland, Film Theory: Rational
Reconstructions. (London: Routledge, 2008), 17.
78
interpretation - and for the necessity of its perpetual interpretation.150 The
pedagogical regime indeed aims at keeping alive that power that it attempts to
dethrone,151 for, as we have seen, it is in that power that its authority ultimately
resides.
So, we can say that the mechanisms of ideology to which Althusser’s theory
provided a critique and the mechanisms that informed the kind of critical prac-
tice that he sustained, have largely the same nature. They both presuppose,
as Rancière also argued, that domination is a mechanism of dissimulation that
prevents those that are subject to it from knowing its functioning, they both
exert their power through the claim that the dominated are dominated because
they ignore the laws of domination.152 This reductive understanding, Rancière
continues, has as its first effect to endow the subjects who are supposed to
understand these laws with the exalting task of supplying the dominated with
their knowledge: theorists can thus present themselves as the heroic agents of
the emancipation of those subjects whose independent agency they at the same
time negate. Here Theory’s discourse of emancipation ends up supporting the
authoritarian relations of the pedagogical regime. As Rancière will later argue,
it is the master who needs the incapable in order to sustain its authority, not
the reverse: by distinguishing between mere apprehension and comprehension,
by establishing an inequality and a hierarchy of intelligences, it is the explana-
tory master who constructs the incapable as one.153 Framed in this way, the
dominated are subjected to a double regime: that of the forces of domina-
tion, and that of the authoritarian appropriation of their autonomous means of
emancipation by the agents of institutional critique.
This double regime would in the end be characteristic of a form of bourgeois
materialism. If both pre-Marxist and Marxist, dialectical, materialism hold that
subjects are products of their social circumstances, and that new subjectivities
are products of mutated social circumstances, Rancière wrote, only Marxism
maintains that are those who are subjected to given social conditions, and not
those who organise them, who actually have the means to change them.154 This
150 Rancière, La Leçon d’Althusser , 72.
151 Ibid., 103.
152 Ibid., 12.
153 Rancière, Le Maître Ignorant, 15.
154 Rancière, Leçon, 30.
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prompted a distinction, in more practical terms, between the forms of power
that are determined in the organisation of the forces of production from the part
of the ideologues, and those that come from the appropriation of the means of
production by the workers.155 And, in the case of cinema: between the demys-
tification of the mechanisms of film ideology from the part of film theorists and
filmmakers, versus the forms of agency of emancipated spectators. In this sense,
Rancière claimed, Althusserian theory specifically fails to be Marxist:156 in the
measure that it configures itself as an institution whose reason to exist is the
supervision and the promotion of those forces and conditions that theory itself
establishes to be necessary for revolutionary change, theory becomes instead
authoritarian.157 As long as social relations and the historical process are held
to be knowable only through the mediation of the scholars, Rancière continued,
the power of the masses is just the power of those masses that the scholars
have instructed.158 In a similar way we can say that, as long as the power and
agency of spectators is reduced to that which is framed and mobilized by ex-
ternal agents - the critic, the ideologue, the engaged filmmaker, a specific social
group or an interactive technology - this power comes to negate the spectator’s
fundamental emancipation.
By means of Althusser’s theory of knowledge, a technical division of labour
is introduced in the organisation of class struggle, one that ends up justifying a
regime of knowledge which is characteristic, Rancière said, of bourgeois philan-
thropy: on one hand, those who produce ideas, on the other, those who consume
them.159 On one hand, the Althusserian idea according to which masses need
the science of the intellectuals, on the other, that which was emerging from the
events of May ’68: that what masses needed was rather their revolt.160 Un-
surprisingly, both the 1963 student strikes and the upheavals of May five years
later, were negatively interpreted by Althusser, who saw them as an attack









ticle on ideological state apparatuses, that acquired such a central importance
in 1970s film theory, had been in fact a way of putting into theory (and thus
somewhat control) what the student revolts had already spontaneously mani-
fested and contested.162 In the measure that it maintained that the oppressed
needed to be assisted in order to achieve their emancipation, Althusserianism
configured itself as a philosophy of order,163 and, more specifically, as a reversal
in the service of order of the discourses of emancipation and subversion: a form
of education, in the most detrimental sense, and of Foucauldian discipline. Al-
thusser’s understanding of political power, articulated as it was on the coupling
of an anonymous subject of theory and its abstract object, eventually failed to
take power effects into consideration.164
All in all, Rancière contends, Althusser remained within a metaphysical con-
ception of ideology (which went, as we will see, hand in hand with his reduction
of psychoanalysis to a metapsychology), according to which ideological power
is a matter of distorted vision and, on the other side, that scientific truth and
political practice are a matter of its rectification and of a demystification of
the image. For him, words - and, by extension, concepts, images and texts -
were not elements of discursive practices articulated onto other social practices,
as in a Foucauldian perspective, but representations of existing conditions.165
On the contrary, Rancière declared, “class struggle in the domain of ideology
remains unthinkable as long as we keep with a theory of ideology as a theory of
illusion, imprisoned in the three terms of subject, illusion and truth.”166 With
Althusserian film theory, in particular, we move into a field in which these three
elements can be hypostasized in the very nature of the medium, appearing to
be “ingrown” in the contingent reality of spectators, rather than embodied by
them: if it is always possible to argue for the capacity of emancipation of the
workers and the vocal masses, the very category of spectators was all too easily








Film experience and the aesthetic regime. From the perspective of Ran-
cière’s critique of Althusser, then, the question of the spectator’s emancipation
becomes not how to go beyond the illusion embedded in the images, but how
to go beyond the illusion of the passivity and incapacity by which the position
of the spectator is defined. The way to counter this illusion is, for Rancière, to
begin from an apparently unreasonable assumption: that all forms of the expe-
rience and understanding of film are an equal expression of the same intelligence
and fundamental emancipation.167 Spectatorship becomes in this perspective
something more than a position, and something more than a set of practices:
it can be taken as that dimension through which the space of film becomes a
space of sharing, rather than merely as a part in a distribution of roles within
this space. In this sense, spectatorship would be less the politics of a part of
spectators, less the articulation of different positions and modalities of film ex-
periencing, than the empty dimension that makes the distribution of the parts
possible in the first place. If we take Rancière’s definition of politics - that
is, not a form of distribution of power, but the struggle to bring a common
scene into existence - spectatorship would then name both the ground and the
aim of a politics of film. This, of course, does not erase the import of specific
struggles for the redistribution of power within the space of film, it rather de-
fines the dimension of spectatorship as the specific scope of a non-authoritarian
struggle for equality. Spectatorship would be more than a practice, then, but
rather an aesthetic regime of understanding cinema as an art and as a social
phenomenon, one that exists precisely in the faltering of its hierarchical and
intelligible articulations.
For Rancière, the aesthetic defines a third form of the effectiveness of art:
neither the one that rests in the communication of a message, nor the one that
consists of a purely pre-discursive mimesis, but one that exists first of all as a
contingent and embodied encounter with the film and in the extension of its
potential for signification.
“Cinema is an art in that it is a world, in that its shots and
167 I chose to address in this work the spectator’s emancipation mostly in relation to the
practice of professional theory, rather than in relation to the classic counterpart of the
spectatorial agency - “dominant” cinema - precisely to foreground how it does not corre-
spond just to the spectator’s potential for subversive reading, but, more fundamentally,
to its capacity to define what counts as a subversive reading.
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effects, disappearing in the instant of projection, have to be carried
on, transformed by the memories and the words that make cinema
exist as a shared world well beyond the material reality of its pro-
jections.”168
In other words, cinema can be thought of as an art primarily in relation to the
ungraspable and embodied dimension of film spectatorship. From this perspec-
tive, film experience becomes something radically different than an intelligible
relation between a viewer and the images on the screen, it cannot be reduced to
an object of discursive mapping, and rather exists as expression of an aesthetic
space and of a political tension.
For Rancière, the aesthetic regime is at the same time a specific historical
configuration of practices and ideas about art, emerging in the late Nineteenth
Century,169 and the regime of understanding of art and artistic experience that
made it possible.170 In the aesthetic regime, the distinction between thought
and aesthetic experience, between the work and its experience, between the
ordinary of life and the extraordinary of art, is reduced, bridged, if not outrightly
abolished.
“First, the autonomy staged by the aesthetic regime of art is not
that of the work of art but of a mode of experience. Second the aes-
thetic experience’ is one of heterogeneity, such that, for the subject
of that experience, it is also the dismissal of a certain autonomy.
Third, the object of that experience is aesthetic’, insofar as it is not,
or at least not only, art.”171
The aesthetic is not a property of the film, we can say, but rather a form of
spectatorship: one that involves the subject’s heteronomy and foregrounds -
in the reflexivity of its performance - the very problematicity of the distinc-
tion between art and non-art, the essentially political tension between aesthetic
168 “Le cinéma est un art pour autant qu’il est un monde, que ces plans et effets qui s’évanouis-
sent dans l’instant de la projection ont besoin d’être prolongés, transformés par le souvenir
et la parole qui font consister le cinéma comme un monde partagé bien au-delà de la réalité
materielle de ses projections.” Rancière, Écarts du Cinéma, 13. Translation mine.
169 Jacques Rancière, L’Inconscient Ésthétique (Paris: Galilée, 2000), 12-14.
170 Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis (Paris: Galilée, 2011), 11.
171 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London: Bloomsbury, 2010),
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experience and its representation. Aesthetic experience also corresponds to a
tendency and a potential that everyone has for moments of contemplative drift-
ing,172 of a Schillerian play drive,173 which, as we will see, can be connected
with the psychoanalytic idea of free association.
In this way, the aesthetic can be seen to become an expression of the un-
derlying equality of all beings and also of the dissensus that is at the source of
language and signification. An equality and a dissensus that, specifically in re-
lation to cinema, assume the form of a work of de-figuration, of a reading which
is always already a reading against the material grain of the image and, as it
were, always already the composition of a film with the elements of another.174
According to Rancière, cinema has a peculiar relation with the aesthetic
regime: apparently its embodiment, with its utterly passive, impassible, and
indifferent recording instrument and its boundless potential for hearing and
expressing the mute speech of things, cinema was however quickly transformed
in the most faithful guardian of the old art of stories and representations.175 We
will return on the relationship of cinema with the aesthetic regime in the next
chapter. Here, to conclude, I would like to contrast the freedom of interpretation
which is granted to the spectator in a semiological description of film experience,
with the aesthetic and dissensual dimension of spectatorship.
For, indeed, it is not that authoritarian theories of film entirely negate the
ability of spectators to read a film in an autonomous way: it is, mainly, that
they frame this capacity as a reflection of the apparatus or the text and, more
generally, as a function of the intelligibility of the spectator’s experience. Um-
berto Eco formulated this principle in a clear way in relation to the reader of
the literary text: there should be a distinction, he claimed, between the “free
use” of a text and its “reading”, which is essential to the epistemology and
the method of semiology.176 While interpretation rests in the mapping that
the text makes of the possible meanings that an ideal reader can find in it,
free use names instead a reinvention of the text that transports it beyond its
172 Rancière, Le Spectateur Émancipé, 68.
173 Rancière, Dissensus, 116.
174 Jacques Rancière, La Fable Cinématographique (Paris: Galilée, 2001), 9.
175 Ibid.
176 Umberto Eco (2010/1979) Lector in Fabula: La Cooperazione Interpretativa nei Testi
Narrativi. Milano: Bompiani, p. 59.
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foreseeable meaning - in fact producing a novel text, and thus transforming the
experience of the reader into something radically incommensurable to reading.
In his very choice of the term “use”, Eco is putting this kind of activity beyond
the “proper” use of a book - which is reading it, and nothing more. Use is not
necessarily ignored by semiology - it can even be valued by semioticians like Eco
that are also writers - but is never articulated together with the epistemology
of language codes and with the logic of textual interpretation. If the reader
that makes use of a text can clearly be mapped (mapped out, in fact), it is
clear that the text that is produced by this use, remains unintelligible through
the hermeneutic instruments of semiology, until is it is given other form than
that of the reader’s embodied experience. For example, we can understand use
through fan fiction, but the embodied and creative involvement of the reader or
of the spectator with a book or a film that naturally preceded it, is not per se
observable. Use is not an “object” that semiology can study, then, but rather
a dimension of this “object” that remains incommensurable to objectification.
By the distinction that Eco proposes, a certain order is brought in the
empire of signs: the reader and, in our case, the spectator, is granted a certain,
intelligible, intelligence, and a graspable agency, over the text. But to the open
text still does not correspond an emancipated reader - precisely because its
agency as a reader is made into a recognisable part and a manageable principle
of textuality. Through the mise en discours of free use that semiology necessarily
attempts, through the very articulation between reading and use that it effects,
the meaning of the text becomes available to the semiotician as a more complete
object, but the experience of reading and signification remains always a step
beyond its grasp.
Also from a political point of view, spectatorship points to something else
than the tangible representations of the spectator’s emancipation. Both in re-
spect to semiology and in respect to ideology - to put it bluntly - the exclusion
of use is the exclusion of dissensus. The agency of the spectator should not
be seen exclusively as a strategy of “reading”, in other words, but rather as
the emergence within film experience of something ungraspable for both the
spectators and the technologies of its normative regulation, something radically
incommensurable to the principles of its understanding. As we will see, it is in
this sense that “personal”, idiosyncratic, readings of films can be seen to ac-
quire, precisely through their utter contingency, a certain universal theoretical
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value. Consensus, on the contrary, corresponds to the harmony and intelligibil-
ity of a worldview which is entirely constructed on the mastery of interpretation
and explication, and that proceeds from the the principles of intelligibility de-
fined within dominant discourses to embodied experience and the contingent
phenomenal world, rather than the other way around.
Without taking into account something incommensurable to the instruments
and the mind-frames of linguistic theory and ideological articulation, the ten-
sion animating spectatorship is, in fact, lost, and either resolves in the falsely
reassuring affirmation of the always already resistant presence of viewers as
“real spectators”, or in the totalitarian image of complete and seamless ideo-
logical determination. On the contrary, we would find a different way of the
understanding and the experiencing of art, as Rancière suggest, in the blurring
of use and interpretation, proper and improper meaning, open and closed texts,
which would be characteristic of the aesthetic regime. In this sense, dissensual is
not what is recognisable as a subversive reading, but rather that reading which
is not recognisable, or acceptable, as such: an improper use, then, an act of
signification that refuses the very distribution of meaning into subversive and
consensual, and troubles the principles of this distribution. Dissensus is not
the expression of the under-represented, misrepresented, or the irrepresentable,
but rather what is incommensurable to a given regime of understanding of film
experience.
Aesthetics, indeed, is a matter of a conflict at the source of logos. We find
the concept of aisthesis in Rancière’s La Mésentente, opposed to hexis in the
context of Plato’s definition of politeia - of the politics of citizenship.177 In this
context, it is the quality of those who can only understand language, and not
exercise the agency of speaking beings. In this sense, precisely, the spectator
of apparatus theory is a slave: in that it does not speak independently, but
it is rather spoken, and in that it constitutes a textual subjectivity, instead of
being the agent of the subjective dimension of the text. The term aisthesis is
rediscovered then by Rancière as the radical aspect of the regime of art that
takes its name, as a form of active contemplation, or passive agency, that in
fact dissolves the principle of their distinction. Emancipation, Rancière wrote
177 Rancière, La Mésentente, 38.
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in The Nights of Labour , is the “thinking of whose not destined to think.”178
Not those who cannot think, but those who do not posses - or, rather, to whom
is not recognised - the agency and the autonomy of thinking. If domination
is expressed in the subdivision and distribution of the social space in parts, in
a policing of subjects and practices, political emancipation takes place, then,
in the struggle for the recognition of a voice as meaningful - of an image as
significant and a look as signifying. The struggle for emancipation is a struggle
for the emergence of logos from a place which is incommensurable to it. Logos
is not simply the spoken word, but the recognition that is given to it - it is
already dialogue, misunderstanding, and dissent.
If we like, we can picture the history of spectatorship as a long road, not
toward emancipation, but toward a more comprehensive discursive mapping
of the spectator’s fundamental emancipation: from the original scene which
constructed the spectators as visual ignorants, reacting to the image as to a
thing - the audience fleeing from the Lumières’ locomotive - to the recognition
(and the policing) not only of the spectator’s ability to comprehend, but of its
potential for an aesthetic use of film experience. It is fundamentally in the way
the very emancipation, contingency, and “waywardness” of film spectatorship
is interpreted and regulated, in fact - not in its outright repression - that its
normative regulation eventually takes place.
As final remark, one must not confuse the means of expressing the spec-
tators’ emancipation, with the fundamental emancipation that characterises
spectatorship and aesthetic experience. The availability of new technologies,
for instance, the extended accessibility of visual and social media, and their
increased integration in our everyday lives, has, of course, extended the specta-
tor’s means of representing its experience, and expanded the modes and forms of
this experiencing, but it is not in itself the origin of the possibility for such rep-
resentation. The expansion of the visible, in other words, does not necessarily
correspond to a more egalitarian experience of the visual, and the proliferation
of technologies of interactivity does not necessarily bring about greater agency
of the spectator. On the contrary, both must be seen primarily as forms of
police in relation to the forms of emancipation that spectators always already
have, and that basically correspond to their embodied experience of film. In
178 Rancière, The Nights of Labour , xii.
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this sense, the user of interactive technologies is precisely the opposite of the
subject making a free use of them - in other words, the very idea of interactivity
already entails a form of discursive hegemony.
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Contingency
He reads a part, or a piece of it, then stops, only to resume
reading another piece later, and, as so often happens, he starts from
the middle or from the end, then backtracks to the beginning. Quite
often he’ll read a couple of segments then toss the book aside, not
because he has lost interest in it, but because something else came
to his mind. [...] Might not just a phone call, or a fly, interrupt his
reading precisely at the point where all the individual parts unite in
a dramatic resolution?
Witold Gombrowicz, Ferdydurke.
The world of film is a flow of random events involving both hu-
man and inanimate objects.
Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film.
Contingency and film theory.
In different ways, all major critiques and revisions of the 1970s paradigm of
psychoanalytic film theory are concerned with reclaiming the contingency of
film experience and cinematic subjectivity, against the transcendental position
assigned to the spectator by the theory of the cinematographic apparatus. A
revaluing of the historicity, of the situatedness of the spectator’s experience,
and of its embodied implication with the film is characteristic of a broad range
of studies and perspectives, from David Bordwell’s “case” for cognitivism and
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its “contingent universals,”179 to Vivian Sobchack’s situated encounter between
the intentionality of the spectator and that of the film, from Laura Mark’s
haptic and synaesthetic forms of film experience, to Leo Bersani and Ulysse
Dutoit’s idea of spectatorship as an act of phenomenological illumination - just
to name a few. Even Žižek, one of the most “Theoretical” critical theorists and
film writers, addresses the ideological subject, as we will see, in terms of its
(of course, “radical”) contingency. Indeed, no one can comfortably negate that
the conditions of cinematic signification and of film production, marketing, and
reception, are, to some degree, situated and discursive, and no one can safely
affirm that they correspond instead to fixed features of cinematic technology
and the human psyche, entirely independent from their specific historical and
cultural coordinates. Taken in this broad sense, the idea of contingency offers
little or no controversy, and little or no interest. It would be relatively easy, in
this perspective, to define contingency simply as that which the apparatic theory
of spectatorship lacked, and thus proceed to map this field of contingencies at
the same time using any finding obtained through this approach for revising, or
subverting, the more and normative claims of Theory.
Not unlike the notion of spectatorship, however, contingency is more useful
for the kind of synthesis that it allows and for the heterogeneous objects and
perspectives that it is able to bring together. It is then primarily in the under-
standing and the use that is made of this fundamental ground of contingency
that disagreement can be found,180 together with the possibility of a significant
discussion. In this chapter, I will try to present contingency as a paradoxical
concept - one that tests the limits of the rational reconstruction of spectator-
ship - without relinquishing its fundamental link with the materiality of film
experience and with the emancipation and heteronomy of the subject.
The field of experiences and ideas that contingency brings together is vast,
complex, and heterogeneous. First of all, contingency can be seen to address the
various levels of historical, cultural and subjective specificity of spectatorship
as a social phenomenon and as an aesthetic practice. At the same time, it refers
to the embodied and bodily nature of film experience and to the subjectivity of
the subject’s experience - to put it simply, to the fact that no spectator can have
179 David Bordwell, “A Case for Cognitivism,” Iris 9 (1989), 22.
180 Ibid., 13-14.
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exactly the same experience of the same film. By this, contingency also points
to the potential for openness of film signification (or, rather, to the impossibil-
ity of its closure). In this sense, the contingency of film experience would be
defined by the capacity of the spectator to make use of the film, and to under-
stand and make use of its very position as a spectator. Contingency also evokes
the particular kind of reality that the cinematic medium is apparently capable
of capturing, the minute texture of visual, aural, and kinetic details that the
cinematic medium can record, and the very materiality of the medium’s images.
The concept of contingency relates to aesthetic practice and to scientific prac-
tice, in some ways bringing them together: both can indeed be seen to explore
and give shape to a world of empirical and phenomenal contingencies in order
to establish their meaning or further their significance in relation to the human
subject. As it refers to what cannot be foreseen or controlled - to what, most
radically, cannot be observed - contingency also presents a particular connection
with the unconscious, with the sudden manifestation of ideas and feelings and
to the lack of unity of the psychoanalytic subject. Finally, contingent is also the
status of spectatorship and theory themselves, as embodied and discursive prac-
tices. By troubling the distinction that authoritarian regimes of knowing and
looking establish between the subjective and the objective, between the mas-
terful subject and the intelligible object themselves, contingency would name,
then, the tension that animates praxis - that is, a non-authoritarian dimension
of spectatorship and theory.
Contingency should be seen more as a tension that inhabits knowing and
experiencing, than as a quality of an object or a circumstance, then.181 The
idea of contingent “objects”, indeed, or of a delimited “field” of contingency,
is already part of a reductive framing of contingency. Generally speaking, this
framing - typical of the discourse of empiricism and, arguably, of structuralism
as well - entails the idea that phenomena are tendentially contingent, while
processes, structures, and their understanding are tendentially more transcen-
dental. In this sense, the contingent phenomenon would exist as the counterpart
- as a product - of its (quasi-)transcendental systematisation in terms of more
or less universal or fundamental structures and laws. Seen from the lenses of its
systematisation, then, contingency becomes a quality of the phenomenal world,
181 If, in the following pages, I will write about “contingent” events, what I mean are actually
events in which this tension becomes manifest in some of its respects.
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rather than a tension traversing our relation to it. On the contrary, the chal-
lenge is to see how contingency insists in this very relation and systematisation,
and thus to address this further level of contingency in our understanding and
in our relation with the world.
Žižek writes, referring to Jean Claude Milner, that universal contingency is
“not opposed to causal necessity, but functions as its inherent obverse: causal
necessity works in the guise of rules which regulate the endless contingent’ -
meaningless - interaction of elements)”182 - or, to the very least, our under-
standing of this interaction. There is a slight, but crucial, difference, Žižek
argues, between taking the problem of contingency as being simply the relation
between contingent phenomena and essential explanations (like in the case of
a universality conflated with metaphysics or, arguably, in certain versions of
the empirical, mid-level, “problem-solving” approach)183 and as being the his-
toricity of the very principles that structure the relation between contingency
and its systematisation. A difference, in Žižek words, between historicism and
historicity. 184
Contingent, in the end, is that which does not derive from logical or meta-
physical necessity: that which happens causally, but not what happens in-
evitably as a result of an immanent and inalterable structure or law. A certain
degree of contingency is, then, inescapable: the very idea of knowledge, one
could say, implies contingency as its raw material. If contingency, then, already
names the productive gap between phenomenal reality and its understanding,
it is in how this gap is conceptualised and in how this conceptualisation invests
the spectator’s agency and experience that contingency finds a significant scope
in film theory.
In the case of film experience, then, contingency should be seen less as a
space in which different modes of spectatorship are articulated, than as an as-
pect of the tension that, in Mayne’s understanding, informs spectatorship itself.
The scope of contingency corresponds then to the tension between the radical
subjectiveness and materiality of film experience and its experiential and dis-
182 Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears, 100.
183 Bordwell, “A Case for Cognitivism,” 12.
184 Slavoj Žižek, “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, Please!,” in Contingency, Hege-
mony, Universality, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso,
2000), 112.
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cursive, theoretical, systematisation. On one hand, we have the fact that both
spectatorship and theory always take place in a specific context and that they
involve subjects and objects that have unique features and a complexity that
is never entirely graspable. On the other, we have spectatorship and theory’s
driving desire and somewhat inescapable function of trying to make sense of
this contingency through concepts and experience. To put it in a paradoxical
way, we can say that contingency is essentially our contingent relation to con-
tingency - that is, to the very contingency of this relation. The recursivity of
the concept is indeed what makes it palatable to non-authoritarian theories of
knowledge, because the concept eludes its own grasp (more difficult, however,
is to make a non-authoritarian use of this kind of meta-theoretical arguments).
More concretely, contingency refers to the singularity of the conditions of expe-
riencing - not merely to embodiment, but to the fact that embodied experience
is not entirely reducible to intelligibility. In this sense, contingency can be taken
as that tension that authoritarian forms of knowing and looking downplay - or,
rather, that they address in order to better reduce it within their grasp - and
that less authoritarian forms of experience instead attempt to address in its
own terms.
If we say that contingency is an aspect of the tension that animates specta-
torship, theories of film will differ in that they give different accounts of how this
contingency is made sense of, or not, and for what purpose. Cognitivist, as well
as metapsychological, approaches to film spectatorship take the passage from
the contingency of the spectator’s encounter with film to its systematisation at
the level of meaning and discourse to be governed by quasi-transcendental and
objectifiable processes: cognition and imaginary misrecognition, for instance.
Now, whether it is clearly possible to give very different accounts of what these
basic acts of cognition and misrecognition are, and of what is their significance
for an ideological and aesthetic understanding of film, limiting our description
of film experience to these processes alone would amount precisely to disregard-
ing the issue of contingency: it would mean reducing the tension between these
structures and processes and their radical ground of specificity and situatedness.
Our focus on free association and embodied experience will instead attempt to
show how the very process of systematisation of contingent experience is in itself
sensuous, conflictual, and somewhat erratic. In fact, the tension to which con-
tingency refers is what makes it possible to think and experience film in the first
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place. In order to experience a film as a film, indeed, the subject must have a
more or less systematic understanding of a what a film is, experientially as well
as discursively, both in relation to the discourses that distribute the space of
film in terms of positions and codes but also, as we have seen, in relation to the
contingent encounters that make up the subject’s unique history of spectatorial
acts.
Contingency and universality. Generally speaking - only apparently in a
contradictory or paradoxical way - a reduction of the contingency of film ex-
perience, film theory and subjectivity, also determines a reduction of the scope
of their universality. By refusing to address contingency, or by choosing to ad-
dress it only at a certain level or, so to speak, only up to a certain point, the
claims that a theory of spectatorship makes on the universality of the specta-
tor’s subject position become increasingly problematic. These claims can take
three main forms. First of all that of an identification of universality with meta-
physics:185 which is actually, in the case of apparatus theory, a reduction of the
scope of universality to the formulation of an ahistorical, metapsychological,
and ideological model of spectatorship. Quite clearly, this conflation is intrinsi-
cally normative, in a literal sense, as it is expressed through the articulation of
laws, and also in the sense that it reinforces an authoritarian regime of knowl-
edge and discursive regulation. In this way, the universality of spectatorship
would be subsumed not by its transcendentality, but, instead, by its normative
discursive definition.
Since no normative description can be complete and absolute, however, and
exist beyond its own historical context and discursive coordinates, in turn, we
find a second form of reduction of contingency and universality: the issue of
hegemony, or of the conflict between competing, particularised, notions of uni-
versality.186 For instance, if the universality of spectatorship can be thought, in
relation to the spectrum of existing forms of spectatorship, as a project aiming
at their progressive inclusion in a more and more encompassing articulation of
185 See Judith Butler, “Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism,” in
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 11. For a discussion of the “lure” of metaphysics in
film theory, see Richard Allen, Projecting Illusion: Film Spectatorship and the Impression
of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 47-80.
186 Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of
Political Logics,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 50-51.
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the universality of spectatorship itself (a liberal, multi-culturalist project), it
is also true that this idea of universality is always already an expression of a
contingent socio-political scenario and that it can thus be seen to represent the
interests of a specific group. We only have particular versions of universality,
then, that nevertheless (it cannot be otherwise) still claim to be universally
valid: hegemony is in fact inextricable from the issue of universality as such.
Indeed, hegemony expresses itself first and foremost by stating that the dynamic
between particular and universal is not subject to contingency.187
In other words, not accounting for the contingency of the relationship be-
tween contingent conditions and universality themselves is a way of objectifying
the former and reducing the latter within the discursive universe, or the ethos,
of a particular class or category of subjects that, by this, becomes “transparent”.
On the contrary, there is no possible “transparent” way of affirming universal-
ity beyond its particular historical and cultural situation. In a classic example,
by investigating the specificity of female or homosexual spectatorship, feminist
and queer theories of film foreground the contingency of cinematic subjectivity
in such a way as to rescue it from its male heterosexual, particularised, univer-
sality - by this not only allowing new forms of film experience to be addressed,
but also questioning the very principles by which subject positioning is lived
and theorised in the first place. Feminist, queer, and post-colonial criticisms
of apparatus theory can all be seen to attack hegemony at this level, as they
attempt to make more evident the particularisation inherent to the pretended
universality of the subject of the apparatus, as well as of the subject of appara-
tus theory. At the same time - and this problem is endemic to cultural studies
- a further contingency and particularisation of this very criticism and of the
position from which is it performed is always at hand, and constantly open for
further analysis. This fact becomes especially evident through an interdisci-
plinary approach: post-colonial criticism of capitalist dynamics, for instance, or
a queer critique of post-colonial studies, just to make two examples, are more
likely to expose those transparent categories and normative assumptions that
structure their reciprocal fields.
Finally, at a third level, one could imagine that the universality of specta-
torship consists in its potential to function as an empty position, that can be
187 Judith Butler, “Competing Universalities,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 163.
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occupied by all sorts of subjects and that, in this way, would stand as the condi-
tion of possibility of historical, cultural and subjective contingency themselves.
This does not entail a transcendence of contingency, but rather a foreground-
ing of a certain tension within the process of universalisation and within the
very position of the universal. A conception of universality that can be seen
to combine Rancière’s part de sans-part and Ernesto Laclau’s understanding of
universality. “The universal is an empty place,” Laclau writes, “a void which
can be filled only by the particular, but which, through its very emptiness, pro-
duces a series of effects of structuration/destructuration of social relations.”188
In a similar way, we can take the spectator’s position to be a radically con-
tingent one, opaque rather than transparent to its systematisation, and at the
same time, as a position that would be hospitable to the emergence of dissensus.
Radical contingency. In this perspective, Žižek proposes that we see con-
tingency as a relation between, on one side, contingent phenomena and the
existing variety of historical and cultural objects and conditions, and, on the
other side, as a radical contingency which would be in turn the foundation of
the very idea of universality. In his view, radical contingency would be the
paradoxical, minimal ahistorical kernel of historicism.
“Every version of historicism,” Žižek argues, “relies on a minimal
ahistorical’ formal framework defining the terrain within which the
open and endless game of contingent inclusions/exclusions, substi-
tutions, renegotiations, displacements, and so on, takes place.”189
“Historicity,” Žižek had written two years earlier, elucidating the relation be-
tween contingency and discourse,
“Is not the zero-level state of things secondarily obfuscated by
ideological fixations and naturalising misrecognitions; historicity it-
self, the space of contingent discursive constructions, must be sus-
tained through an effort, assumed, regained again and again.”190
188 Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and Hegemony,” 51.
189 Žižek, “Class Struggle or Postmodernism?,” 112.
190 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London, New York: Verso, 2008), 67.
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The same is also true, in a Lacanian perspective, of ideology and subject posi-
tioning in relation to the Real: “when Lacan emphatically asserts that there is
no big other [...],”’ Žižek writes, “his point is precisely that there is no a priori
formal structural schema exempt from historical contingencies - there are only
contingent, fragile, inconsistent configurations.”191
We can then understand the paradox of radical contingency precisely as
a tension between the historical and the transcendental - or, rather, as some-
thing internal to what is historically posited as transcendental. Something that,
however, can never be resolved by leaning on either side, so to speak: neither
by reaching some “truly essential” coordinate of description or interpretation,
nor by dismissing the radical contingency that traverses every articulation of
cultural and historical contingencies. In this sense, the contingency of spectator-
ship would not be intrinsically opposed to the ideological or discursive dimension
of which apparatus theory provides one possible description, but rather be a
constitutional aspect of this discursive dimension, one of the elements of the
tension by which the position of spectator is established. Since one could say
that our very perception of contingency, and the way particular spectator posi-
tions are articulated in discourse is itself contingent, radical contingency would
then name the fact that there is no solution to the problems of spectatorship
that is not also a reproduction and propagation of a fundamental conflict. “It
is the very focus,” Žižek writes from a Lacanian perspective, “on the notion
of Real as impossible [internal limit of symbolisation] that reveals the ultimate
contingency, fragility (and thus changeability) of every symbolic constellation
that pretends to serve as the a priori horizon of the process of symbolization.”192
Adapting one of Žižek’s claims, we can thus say that spectatorship names a
deadlock to which each contingent performance of spectatorship already consti-
tutes a tentative, partial, solution.193 With this definition, on one side, we do
not lose the theoretical frame, the radical contingency, nor the universal ideal
that a Marxist and psychoanalytic film theory can sustain; on the other, we are
able to address the spectator as a situated agent of ideological, and cinematic,
power.
191 Slavoj Žižek, “Holding the Place,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 310.
192 Slavoj Žižek, “Da Capo Senza Fine,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 221.
193 Wright and Žižek, Manufacturing Reality.
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The idea of a spectator who is thoroughly determined and informed by
ideology, a purely consensual subject, is, I think (other than a recurrent mis-
construction of which it is often made instrumental use in the debate between
antagonistic theories of film), fundamentally an authoritarian dispositif of in-
telligibility: it makes the spectator’s position legible beyond its contingency,
and beyond the implication of the subject of theory in its construction. On
the other hand, a theory of radical contingency has nothing beyond this very
contingency to assert - the rest of its significance belongs to a different regime
of knowledge.
Radical contingency would correspond to the founding lack of the Lacanian
subject, or, in other terms, to that otherness to oneself, to the heteronomy
that comes from the intersubjectivity and the discursivity of subject formation
and from the unconscious dimension of experience. It is then this radical form
of contingency - a constantly renewed encounter with the contingent, and not
its metapsychological systematisation in psychoanalytic theory - that would
constitute the specificity of psychic experience and provide a connection between
analysis and aesthetics. In the same way, indeed, radical contingency would be
a way to address the heterogeneity that characterises language and signification,
and that we have discussed in the previous chapter as the site of the emergence
of the logos from the point of view of Rancière and Pontalis. Dissensus and
political subjectivation would be, in this sense, first of all radically contingent
events, and it would be precisely through this contingency that a discourse on
universality would become possible.
Contingency and the psychoanalytic subject. Psychoanalysis, Žižek ar-
gues, finds its specificity against other forms of empiricism precisely in its re-
lation to the singularity of contingent events and to the radical contingency
of subjectivity that it envisages. Psychoanalytic epistemology, indeed, involves
looking for the exception to understand the norm, for symptoms in order to un-
derstand the structures and basic functioning of the psyche, for embodied use,
in order to understand meaning-making, and so on. Psychoanalysis presupposes
that singular contingency, as it emerges within the fabric of our language and
experience, holds a particular significance. And it also involves a jump from the
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singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of the particular.194 If this
can work, it is because there is no universalthat is not itself contingent. So if,
on one hand, the singular contingency of the case study elevated to the essen-
tial expression of a quasi-transcendental form of experience would never satisfy
the criteria for empirical validation, on the other hand, the kind of universality
which can be obtained through research in mid-level contingency would never
satisfy the more radical level of universality that radical contingency suggests.195
Two ways of dealing with contingency correspond then to two mutually incom-
mensurable epistemologies and, more importantly perhaps, two kinds of relation
to conceptual mastery. In other words, while instrumental reason is concerned
with our ability to foresee and control contingent events, psychoanalysis would
rather be concerned with our ability to encounter the unexpected.196
The fact that the side of cognition is generally aligned with the formation
of consensual meaning and the coding of consensual modes of signification does
not put, however, singular contingency and the play of the signifier outside
of the dimension of discursive power: the contingent, I think, should not be
taken as the external supplement of the discursive, but rather as a particular
level of discursivity. In the end, radical contingency constitutes a precondition
for the establishment of the field of discourse, much like the action of turning
back in the Althusserian scene of interpellation was at the same time made in
implicit observance of the law and as an expression of independent subjective
agency. Why is that the subject as the ground of agency does not become
automatically an effect of regulatory power, if not because of the polysemy
and contingency of discursive power itself, and of the radical inconsistency of
subjectivity - both of which are an expression of Žižekian radical contingency?
On the side of the subject, it is precisely in the eccentricity, in the compositeness
and heteronomy of its subjectivity, in the fact that subjectivation has no centre
and no stable point of cohesion, that the autonomy of the subject from discursive
determination resides.
“Even more radically,” Žižek writes, “the very basic constituents
of the subject’s identity - the signifiers around which his/her sym-
194 Žižek, “Da Capo Senza Fine,” 241.
195 Ibid., 240.
196 Pontalis, Après Freud, 114.
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bolic universe has crystallized itself, the fundamental fantasy which
provides the co-ordinates of his/her desire - result from a series of
contingent traumatic encounters.”197
The psychoanalytic subject would then exist, as in Mladen Dolar’s understand-
ing, where ideological interpellation fails.198 A failure of interpellation that,
again, does not mean an absence of discourse - the psychoanalytic subject is
not unrelated to ideology but, precisely, it is related to it in terms of ideology’s
failure to determine the subject entirely. Subjectivity would thus be the internal
limit of interpellation. And ideology would be in turn a way of coping with the
impossibility of becoming a subject - in the classical sense of a rational, self-
centred, and self-sufficient being. If it is true that ideology finds more power
in its alliance with the classical notion of the subject, then, it is not by claim-
ing the agency or the emancipation of a rational and unitary subject that the
order and the effects of ideology can be countered, but, on the contrary, only
by imagining an agency that originates from a failure of mastery, and resides
in the subject’s contingent alterity.
That the subject is never entirely determined by ideological institutions,
within the scene of interpellation, and that it is never proper and master of
itself are, I think, one and the same thing: a recognition of radical contingency
and the Rancièrian assumption of fundamental equality, together, have the ef-
fect of making the distinction between passivity and activity collapse. So that,
as Rancière argued against Foucault, the dimension of discursive agency does
not exhaust that of politics, and, on the reverse, the dimension of politics is
always found as the intrinsic conflict between itself and the forces of police.
Neither one essentially overpowers the other: subjectivity remains discursive
and the subject, on the other hand, is never dispossessed of its emancipation
and of its political potential and responsibility. From within film theory, Kra-
cauer’s thought appears to have a certain affinity with this understanding of
contingency: for him, Bratu Hansen writes, “film experience undercuts the still
returning illusion of the sovereign, self-identical, subject. For the materiality
film engages is not least that of the spectator,” which is involved with film as a
197 Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears, 100.
198 Mladen Dolar, “Beyond Interpellation,” Qui Parle 6, no. 2 (1993): 77-78.
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corporeal, and contingent, being.199
The flesh blanket: levels of contingency.
Having outlined the scope of contingency in its general relation to historicism
and historicity, universality and the psychoanalytic subject, I think it would be
useful now to start over, as it were, attempting a more “positive” articulation
of contingency, to see how it can be used to describe more concretely some
aspects of spectatorship and film experience. So, beginning with a formal defi-
nition: “contingent” would be that which is “neither impossible nor necessary;
i.e., both possible and non-necessary. The modal property of being contingent
is attributable to a proposition, state of affairs, event, or – more debatably – an
object.”200 In this sense, as we have already suggested, contingency individuates
the criticism that underlies most of the reactions against apparatus theory: that
the structures and dynamics of film experience are certainly materialistic, but
should not be normative, mechanistic, nor behaviouristic. That the experience
of the spectator is clearly discursive, but not discursively determined (at least,
not entirely and not in a way that can be entirely known). That there is al-
ways, in other words, a space of freedom from necessity, of possibility, of variety,
particularity, unforeseeability and uncertainty to spectatorship that ideological
institutions and discursive norms cannot repress nor regulate completely. Fi-
nally, that apparatus theory failed to take the effects of this contingency into
account.
From the point of view of authority and knowledge, then, contingent is
basically what escapes normative theoretical formulation. Contingency can be
taken indeed as the internal and the external limit of the authority of theory.
Internal, since, as we have repeatedly affirmed, theory is itself a contingent
discursive practice. External, since theories confront themselves with a world
that is incommensurable to the principles of its intelligibility.201
199 Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin,
and Theodor W. Adorno. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 262. Emphasis
added.
200 Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999), 181.
201 By this I do not mean that the phenomenal world, or our experience of it, are unintelligible,
only that they cannot be reduced entirely to what can be made intelligible about them.
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Contingency is, so to speak, akin to a certain nominalist vertigo, an unar-
restable, never ending (some would say inconclusive), game of ramification and
recursivity: each context presupposes another context, and there is positively
no limit to the degree of situatedness that can be that can be found in any given
situation or to the connections that stem from, and inform, any given experi-
ence. At the same time, over this microcosm of contingent experiences, looms
the shadow of a panoptical, “hyper-theoretical” and panoptical, fantasy - the
fantasy, that is, of registering and preserving each and every contingent nuance
and detail of our experience and accounting for every minimal movement of the
world and for every shift and faltering of our perception. Jorge Luis Borges
gave us a great fictional example of this aspect of contingency - a universe of
details that, once perfectly registered and remembered, would also correspond
to the collapse of the symbolic - in his short story Funes the Memorious.202 In
the story, the peasant Funes, after a fall from horseback, finds himself paralysed
and endowed with a limitless power of memory and perception. He becomes, if
we like, an all-seeing and all-remembering, but completely inactive, spectator
of the world in its normally ungraspable full material contingency. The power
he acquires makes any systematisation of experiencing entirely futile: not only
is he able to recall every object that he has ever seen, but he has a distinct
memory of every different perception that, in time, he had of it. He does not
need numbers any more: for all he cares, every number might as well have a
different name. Trying to talk with Funes, the narrator of the short story is
confronted with a radically incommensurable logic and form of experience:
“In place of seven thousand thirteen, [Funes] would say (for ex-
ample) Maximo Perez ; in place of seven thousand fourteen, The
Train [...] In lieu of five hundred, he would say nine. Each word
had a particular sign, a species of mark; the last were very compli-
cated... I attempted to explain that this rhapsody of unconnected
terms was precisely the contrary of a system of enumeration. I said
that to say three hundred and sixty-five was to say three hundreds,
six tens, five units: an analysis which does not exist in such num-
bers as The Negro Timoteo or The Flesh Blanket. Funes did not
202 Jorge Luis Borges “Funes the Memorious,” in Ficciones (New York: Grove Press, 1962).
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understand me, or did not wish to understand me.”203
In a way, Funes does not even need to remember - that is, if we intend by
memory a process of association, disassociation, condensation and displacement
of memory traces and of their representations - because his whole experience
is always already present to him as an all-comprehensive archive. At the same
time, however, acting becomes for him not only pointless, but impossible.204
At its most paradoxical level, a thorough account of contingency approaches
this kind of boundless nominalism, and by the same token, evokes its shadow -
one of a disembodied and disembodying reification of memory and experience.
Indeed, such “memoriousness”, such hypertrophy of memory and perception,
could be seen as one of the founding fantasies of the photographic and cinematic
image and to correspond in particular to their most direct uses (literally and
metaphorically) as instruments of authoritarian discursive police: disciplinary
observation and the archive. But, in this, they would arguably be the opposite
of theory - if we take theory to constitute an aspect of experience and a form
of sharing, that is. The story of Funes suggests in the end that an integral
inscription of contingency in fact corresponds to a fantasy of mastery: when
we imagine a more embodied memory or film experience, and less authoritarian
uses of cinematic technologies, we do not refer to the kind of incorruptible
memory and boundless perception with which Funes was cursed, but rather, on
the reverse, to the everyday forgetfulness of human embodied memory, to the
discursivity and contingency of our lived-experience.
This discursive contingency can be subdivided in three levels, of which the
first two have a diffused and widely shared use, and the third is perhaps more
relevant to the perspective of this work: historical contingency, cultural con-
tingency and singular, or subjective, contingency. Cultural contingency, albeit
under different names, is clearly a central focus of contemporary film theory,
especially that which finds in sociology and, indeed, cultural studies, its com-
panion disciplinary field. I would reserve the term cultural contingency for
referring to all those discourses that assume a variation of meaning and or sig-
203 Ibid., 113.
204 For a discussion of this story in relation to memory, see Pontalis, Avant, 37-41. For a
further analysis of the story in relation to media and embodied memory, see Carlo Coman-
ducci, “Forgetting to be Human: Embodied Memory and Memorious Media.” (Gdansk:
University of Gdansk Press, forthcoming).
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nification that depend on the characteristics of specifically identifiable social
groups within a given historical frame. Culturally contingent would be that
which depends on variations that have to do with the cultural and discursive
context of reception - issues of nationality, race, class, gender and sexuality are
all aspects of cultural contingency. All theories that argue for the meaning-
fulness of connections between and distinctions within these categories in the
study of film signification and in the reception of specific films are making a
cause for the contingency of spectatorship at the cultural level. Of course, cul-
tural contingency makes little sense beyond historical contingency and beyond
the historicity that makes every transcendental claim on a given medium or form
of experience contingent in the first place. Still, one might want to distinguish,
in a very basic way, those contingencies that depend on the place and context
of reception from those, potentially more “universal”, that relate to historical
periods. Taking historical contingency into account, “early spectatorship”, for
instance, would not be reduced to a simple expression of a different state of
cinematic technology, but addressed in its historical and discursive context. All
this is rather obvious and generally goes unquestioned.
As we come to the third level of contingency, however, contingency becomes
harder to map, and, from the point of view of the epistemology and the method-
ology of film studies, more conflictual. In the first instance, this level of singular
contingency would correspond to a variance in meaning and signification, which
takes place at the level of individual spectators and specific films, to the ideas
and the memories, the unique context, the accidents, and the histories that
make the watching of every single film a unique experience and the experience
of each spectator different from that of everyone else. Now, this difference can
be great or small, but, I would say, it is always significant. It is clearly signifi-
cant for spectators - after all, it is at this level, each time we watch a film, that
we first encounter it, and that our embodied and emotive engagement with it
takes shape.
This dimension of utterly contingent, situated and idiosyncratic meaning, I
believe, is also fundamentally significant for the understanding of spectatorship
as a field of shared practices, and of the position of the spectator in terms
of a tension: it is in fact through the tension between contingent signification
and “objective”, consensual meaning, that film signification becomes something
more than the mere decoding and communication of a message, and that the film
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subject acquires an agency beyond the agency of the text. The communality
of film experience - the extended, discursive and interpersonal, dimension of
spectatorship - takes place first of all within the universe of circumstances and
fleeting details that arise from our encounter with a film and from our sharing
of it: its contingency is not limited to its cultural and historical condition, but
extends to the story-like ordinary coincidences and interactions that make up
our lived-experience, our memory and our re-telling of film. Circumstances that,
in fact, are so intricate and interdependent that they can never be consciously
grasped in their entirety, nor followed in all of their ramifications - also because
the very act of brining them to mind already alters them significantly.
On this point, I like to refer as an example to Werner Heisenberg’s “observer
effect”: at the atomic level, the very interaction between subject and object,
the very act of observation and measurement of a phenomenon alters it so
dramatically, that it cannot in fact be known or registered as such.205 The
same goes for film experience at the level of its singular contingency.
Telling a story about watching a film. Take, for example, the ordinary
scene of someone telling someone else about a film that she has seen. This
apparently self-explanatory scene actually involves two scenes that are equally
fundamental to spectatorship, the scene of watching and that of telling. At the
same time, I would say, the scene of spectatorship never entails just one film, but
many, and never just one spectator or an individual subject, but rather more
than one person and an heteronomous subject and, thus already the introjection
of a scene of dialogue.
When does film experience begin? When do we cut into our lived-experience
and identify the first significant moment of our experience of a film? When the
lights are turned off? When we pay for the ticket? As we enter the cinema
theatre? When we decide what film we are going to see? And how do we
even decide? How far does what shapes our decision reach back? To some
extent, at least, the context of watching precedes and influences our experience
of the projection. This is usually accounted for in terms of intertextuality and,
precisely, the theory of spectatorship. But this is just the extent of extra-textual
contingency that can be addressed through the text, and only the contingency of
205 Werner Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of The Quantum Theory (Toronto: Dover,
1999 [1930]), 3.
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spectatorship that can be addressed through a model of the typical spectator -
that is, through a significant reduction of singular contingency. In fact, however,
everything that might happen - say, as we walk to the cinema - has the potential
to influence our experience of the film: not only and maybe even not essentially
what we can rationally connect with the film or reduce within a typical scenario.
On the way to the cinema, I might meet a friend who tells me about another film
she has seen: unexpectedly, and unaccountably, that film will become part of the
intertexual dimension of the film I am going to watch. In this perspective, our
walk to the cinema would become a part the experience potentially as essential
as the actual witnessing of the projection. In order to try to describe the singular
contingency of every act of spectatorship, we could imagine the experience of
each film to be a happening. The wayward, embodied and erratic, spectator we
are dealing with is then one who might not even reach the cinema, who might
change her mind on the way or arrive too late: paradoxically, we can say that
the experiences she might have instead of that of the film’s projection would
still constitute her singular experience of the film or, at least, that they would
still be part of her history as a spectator.
But let’s say that we do enter the cinema hall - which, of course, bears its
own set of more or less meaningful, but always significant, contingencies and
potential encounters - and that we actually watch a film. Of course, in this
phenomenological tracking shot of the contingency of film experience, we do
not get to see the film as such. From our point of view, we do not see images
as they are projected, and we see clearly something more, and something that
comes before what will be the objective “text” of the film: what we experience
is actually a series of shifting stains of light that we interpret as images.
In this sense, we always proceed from the contingent and material ground
of film experience to the text and to the abstract idea of “the” film, and not
the other way around. So that before we image film experience in terms of
the decoding of a message, we should first of all imagine it as an aesthetic and
theoretical activity by which a crowd of contingent sensations, thoughts and
feelings concurs to give shape to the moving image. The material images on
the screen are, of course, an important part of this crowd, but they are not
necessarily the defining one. In fact, many of the associations and feelings that
make up the moving image may have little to do with the film’s recognisable
content or with its material form: on the contrary, most of them are often free
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associative and, in respect to the film’s meaning, inessential. If the meaning of
the moving image must be, at least to some degree, conventional and consen-
sual, what makes it significant to the single spectator is possibly what is most
contingent about it. Film experiencing is characterised by a tension, Miriam
Bratu Hansen writes in her study of Siegfried Kracauer’s theory of film, between
the focussing of our attention and our being constantly “sidetracked by details,”
potentially wandering at the margins and corners of the screen, or committing
to our memory other transient and contingent images.206 For Kracauer, this
kind of “spectatorial mobility,” Hansen continues, induced a “centrifugal move-
ment [...] away from the film, into the labyrinths of the viewer’s imagination,
memories and dreams”207 - an aesthetic form of engagement with film that also
has the character of free association.
After the projection, our experience of the film loses something of its pres-
ence and detail, and at the same time acquires another, as contingent and even
more embodied, dimension: that of memory. In our memory, all those personal
associations that shaped the film as we experienced it during the projection are
already settling down, as it were, without us necessarily being aware of it: some
will acquire more importance with time and some will become something else,
some we will remember exactly, some we will remember not quite as they actu-
ally were, and some we will forget. Film, as it exists in the spectator’s memory,
is necessarily incomplete, non-objectual and bound up with subjective imagina-
tion: it inhabits a dimension of embodied memory which is in fact defined by its
forgetfulness, blurriness and free associative mobility. By remembering a film,
indeed, we are always already forgetting something about it: we are reshaping
it in an associative way and extending its significance in new, unforeseeable,
directions.
When we finally narrate our experience of a film to someone, every aspect
of the encounter and of the dialogue will concur to evoke yet another, different,
film in the person who is listening to us. On one hand, then, we can say that
the discursive meaning of film never exhausts the film’s contingent significance
(works of film theory, for example, are often a way to re-signify, to extend or
subvert, the significance of a film beyond its established meaning). On the
206 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 276.
207 Ibid.
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other, we see that the efficacy and the pleasure of the sharing of film experi-
ence, such as we can find talking about film, rests not only, and not primarily,
in the proficiency with which we command cinematic codes and the codes of
conversation, but essentially in our ability to engage with the singular contin-
gency of the dialogues and the encounters in which that experience is evoked.
In this sense spectatorship is primarily a from of aesthetic and interpersonal
involvement, and only after a matter of rational understanding and comprehen-
sion. The significance of spectatorship as an aesthetic and dissensual practice,
I believe, rests in fact in the incommensurability of the spectator’s contingent
and embodied memory, experience, and re-telling of film to the discourses and
the techniques that would reduce them to intelligible objects.
In the end, no theory of cinematic signification can aspire to reach the level
of complexity that is processed in the everyday, ordinary, scene of a person
telling another about a film she has seen. This simple gesture of telling a story
about watching a film is, I think, that living and fundamentally ungraspable
ground in which both spectatorship and theory have their source: a level in
which they are found together and in which it is in fact impossible to tell them
apart. What is peculiar to academic theory, then, and to authoritarian theories
in a much more pronounced way, is to abstract some elements from this ground
of contingent experience and argue for their more or less universal significance
or, even more significantly, to address and define the principles by which this
universal significance is supposed to be constructed. From the perspective that
a full account of singular contingency opens up, then, a film cannot be, strictly
speaking, “understood”: we should say on the contrary that its signification is
extended form the experience we have of it during the projection, to our memory
of it, and beyond, in a series of encounters with other people, other contexts,
and other films. Or, we can say that, at its most basic level, the experience of
film is always already the telling of a story about watching a film.
The position of the spectator is always characterised by a tension between
more conventional meaning and free association, the random thoughts and er-
ratic events that might change - and, from the perspective of communication,
compromise - our understanding of and our relation to film. The emergence
of spectatorial agency, in turn, cannot be disjoined from this dimension of sin-
gular contingency. A dimension that, again through the primary process and
free association, marks the heteronomy by which the position of the spectator
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is traversed. Dissensus and the agency of spectators should not be seen to come
only from their acquisition and autonomous performance of cinematic codes,
or their masterful perversion of the norms that regulate them, then, but, more
fundamentally, from the relative lack of control that they have over themselves
as they bring the moving image into existence. Indeed, the spectator can be
surprised by its own associations as much as she can be surprised by the im-
ages of the film. Both the encounter with the flux of the film’s images and the
encounter with one’s own flux of free associative thoughts and feelings high-
light the contingency of film experience and the otherness of the spectator to
itself. Film experience arises precisely as these two fluxes become connected,
from the interplay between the contingent materiality of the medium and the
contingent and embodied experience that the spectator has of it. Also in this
case, Kracauer’s theory of cinema seems to be close to this understanding of
contingency. His concept of camera reality, in particular, can be seen to refer
precisely to this interaction: in Hansen’s description it would correspond indeed
to a “complex intertwining of the material reality of the viewer - as embodied
subject of perception, memory, experience - with the life world.”208
The singular contingency of film experience is an indispensable part of the
conflict that sets up the position of the spectator: spectatorship remains in all
cases a discursive practice, but if we reduce the spectator to just an expression
of a set of historical and cultural, intelligible, contingencies, then the tension
between the particular and the universal and between dissensus and consensus
that informs spectatorship as an aesthetic practice would be lost. The meaning
and the relations that can be expressed as a function of cultural and historical
contingency alone can still be subversive, of course, but, arguably, the position
of the spectator in itself would not be dissensual.
In this sense contingency is a radical concept and is bound to remain opaque
to systematic research. It calls instead, in order to become productive, not only
for an aesthetic regime of the understanding of art, but, more generally, for an
aesthetic regime of knowledge: one in which the pretence of mastery that defines
more authoritarian conceptions of theory gives the stage to the contingent and
to the play of signification, taking them as something integral to the sharing of
knowledge, rather than as mere, and distinct, objects of research. One could
208 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 278.
109
say that dissent, in Rancière’s conception, is a paradoxical category: it does
not consist of the movement into meaning of the under-represented, nor does
it correspond to a dialectic between representation and the irrepresentable, but
should rather be seen as a confrontation between two incommensurable spheres
of existence and signification that finds its significance precisely by keeping their
incommensurability alive. I believe that we have shown how the domain of
singular contingencies and that of meaning are linked, precisely, as two equally
necessary and inevitable, but still mutually incommensurable, dimensions of
film experience.
Dissonance and the music of chance. A final issue to be discussed is the
relation between contingency, chance and fate, for it is all too easy to confuse
contingency with randomness and then, in a typical reversal, turn contingent
events into an expression of an underlying, fateful, meaning. Through this
gesture, in fact, contingency is transformed from an expression of incommensu-
rability to yet another measure of transcendental and discursive intelligibility.
Contingency, in fact, describes deterministic processes whose outcome is not
foreseeable, not random events whose meaning was in some ways ordained, nor
erratic phenomena whose sole import would rest in the possibility of their in-
terpretation. Contingency names then a contiguity and a coincidence - a music
of chance, to borrow Paul Auster’s words - that is bound to surprise us. One
that, while still inviting significance, is inherently meaningless.
The “insignificance” of the contingent, though, is never far from the imag-
inary fullness of meaning that is typical of faith and belief - from the idea of
inevitable connections, universal correspondences and uncanny, cyclic, returns.
Auster, I believe, provides us with good examples of the ambiguity of this rela-
tion between chance and fate. In his first novel, The Invention of Solitude, for
instance, we find the first in the series of incredible anecdotes that punctuate
his work, and that are thoroughly contingent at the same time suggesting the
inevitability of fate: without knowing it, a young man comes to live years later
in the same small Parisian room that his father had occupied in his flight from
Germany at the end of the Second World War. The chance is evident, the cir-
cumstances are ominous, but their actual significance is forever elusive, if there
is any at all.
In a similar way, the idea of destiny can become a way of making sense of
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radical contingency - in a sense, it can even be seen to constitute the fantasmatic
root of “meaningfulness” itself. This is the way Žižek addresses the relation be-
tween contingency, fate and meaning in his book on Krzysztof Kieslowski. Žižek
resumes the problem at the core of the idea of fate with this question: “is there
a deeper meaning beneath contingencies, or is the meaning itself the outcome
of a contingent turn of events?”209 A question that, we might note, echoes the
question of the ontology of the image in relation to its embodied experience:
is there a deeper meaning beneath the contingency of the experience of film,
or is the objective and discursive meaning of the text merely the contingent
outcome of an ungraspable series of events? Žižek’s answer to the first question
is that fate is, in all probability, just a desperate way of making sense of the
meaninglessness of contingent experience.210
By being contrasted with the fullness of meaning that the idea, as well as the
“feeling”, of fate allows to entertain, contingency constitutes instead the hori-
zon - the limit as well as the scope of possibilities - of the emancipated subject.
Fate, indeed, relates to fatum - to the subject which is spoken by a master-
ful discourse, and which is therefore deemed incapable of autonomous speech.
To put it schematically, fate appears to be the quintessential symbolisation of
consensus, and a fundamental principle of the regime of representation, while
contingency, on the other hand, can be taken as the fundamental condition
for dissensus and as a characteristic of the aesthetic regime. The very nature
of the image in the aesthetic regime can then be understood as the incom-
mensurability - a dissonance - between discursive articulation and that of the
material contingency of the encounter between the spectator and the film. Or,
as Bratu Hansen writes about Kracauer again, between “the implied horizon
of our ’habits of seeing’ [...] and that which momentarily eludes and confounds
such structures”211
In this way, the role of contingency, and its account in our understanding of
spectatorship and film experience, would also be a critical one in the passage
from the regime of representation to the aesthetic regime. To further discuss
this topic, I would like to use a short story by the Italian writer and playwright
Luigi Pirandello: The Bat. Through this story, we will address how the regime
209 Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears, 101.
210 Ibid., 107.
211 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 268.
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of representation is able to capture contingency, precisely by representing the
irruption of a contingent event that troubles the surface of its articulation.
By this, we will address in turn the ambivalent relation that the cinematic
medium and our understanding of it have not only with the contingency of film
experience, but with the material contingency of film and the world.
If only a bat hadn’t come into the story.
A few days before the première of his new play, playwright Faustino Perres is
precipitated into an unforeseen and intractable predicament. Things, so far,
had gone exactly as he expected. About the play - a rather conventional one,
and poorly written - there was “nothing so new and startling [...] that the
audience was likely to take offence,”212 and the actors, as well, were just about
adequate and satisfied with their parts. Everything was, then, as harmonious
and plain as a stale performance can be - that is, “if only a bat hadn’t come
into the story.”213
Each night, indeed, a bat that had presumably made its nest among the
beams of the theatre’s dome, or that came in from a hole in the roof, was lured
in by the stage lights during rehearsals and kept flying over the performers’
heads. All actors were disturbed, of course. But the young actress Gastina
was so terrified by the animal that she could barely hold herself together and
perform, disgusted as she was by the animal and being in a mad fear that it
could get stuck into her hair.
The night before the dress rehearsal, Gastina asks Perres to revise the script
to introduce more scenes in which the lights are dimmed, in order to reduce the
risk of attracting the bat. At the playwright initial refusal, she insists, setting
off a formidable, typically Pirandellian, dialogue on contingency, reality, and its
illusion. “No, I mean it!” she says, arguing for her solution with the playwright:
“After all, don’t you want your play to give a perfect illusion of
reality?”
“An illusion? No, that’s not it at all. Art creates reality itself,
not an illusion!”
212 Luigi Pirandello, “The Bat,” in Modern Italian Short Stories, Marc Slonim, ed., translated
by Frances Frenaye (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954 [1920]), 22.
213 Ibid., 23.
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“Very well. But if art creates reality, the bat destroys it.”
“What do you mean? Why?”
“Just because. Just imagine that in real life you have a family
quarrel, a scene between husband and wife, mother and daughter,
a question of money or anything you like. And in the middle of it,
a bat flies into the room. Well, what happens? I can tell you. The
quarrel is held up; either the lights are turned off, or the opponents
go into another room, or else somebody fetches a broom, gets up on
a stool and tries to knock the bat unconscious. And then they forget
what they were quarrelling about and gather around, half smiling,
half disgusted, to look at the creature and see how it is made.”
“All right, that’s everyday life, if you like [...] but I didn’t put
any bat into my play.”
“Maybe you didn’t, but the bat got into it, willy-nilly.”214
Since the bat imposes itself not only as a presence on the stage, but also, as
it were, as a presence in the fiction of the drama, Gastina continues, not only
she, the actress, cannot ignore it but Livia as well, her character, should not
act as if the bat were not there. The most natural thing to do, she says, would
be to have the characters take a broom, get up on a stool, and chase the beast
away or kill it. Without even letting her finish her sentence, Faustino protests,
exasperated, that that was surely impossible. To that, the actress rebukes:
“[But] your play is sure to benefit. After all, the bat is part of
the scene: whether you like it or not he’s forced his way into it...
A real bat, too. If you don’t take him into account, he’s bound to
seem artificial. [...] Can’t you see?”215
Throughout the exchange, Faustino is made to defend the regime of representa-
tion, with the clear-cut separation, and respective self-sufficiency, that it must
assume between real reality and the reality of fiction. A regime which admits
no contingency whatsoever and thus finds itself irremediably shattered by the
coming of the bat: for him, a thing - a bat or a character, an event or an expe-




certainly cannot fly from one to the other. The two spaces, and the two ideas,
are not permeable. Faustino is made to sustain the kind of notion of reality
that Pirandello usually compares to madness, and that, in his plays and short
stories, is often brought to a point of rupture. Faustino is now saying:
“If I were to take the bat into account and make my characters
pay attention to him, then he would have to be part of the reality
which I have created. And in that case he’d be an artificial bat, not
a real one. And, incidentally, an element of perfectly casual reality
can’t be allowed to introduce itself into the essential and created
reality of a work of art.”
“But what if it does introduce itself?”
“But it doesn’t! It can’t! That bat doesn’t get into my play; it
simply gets onto the stage where you are reciting it.”
“Very good! Where I am reciting your play. Then one of two
things (26) must be true. Either your play is alive, or the bat is
alive. And the bat is alive, very much so, I can tell you. I’ve proved
that to you because he’s so alive Livia and the other characters can’t
seem natural if they go on with the scene as if he weren’t there. So
the conclusion is this: either throw out the bat, or throw out the
play.”216
The dialogue touches here the relation between the reality of the scene and
the reality of the play and asks where this reality must be seen to exist: in
the diegetic reality of the play as it is written, in the material reality of its
performance, or somewhere in-between? Does one dimension exclude the other,
and can the two even be distinguished? Isn’t the bat, as Gastina compellingly
argues, the only real thing, if not in Pirandello’s short story, at least in poor
Faustino’s play?
The opening night comes and the bat has not been chased away, also because
of the dismissiveness of the director who cannot allow himself to take the whole
matter seriously. The play begins without incidents and Faustino is ridiculously
absorbed in his own creation, gesturing along as the lines are spoken and silently
mimicking the actors’ expressions. The bat flies in, but no one in the audience
216 Ibid., 25-26.
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notices it. Even Faustino, at first, fails to acknowledge it presence: he only
realises that the animal is there, Pirandello notes, when the mediocrity of the
play becomes painfully manifest and the performance is met with “little and
feeble applause.”217 He is only able to see it, that is, as an excuse for the failure
of his play. A moment later, Gastina enters the scene and the whole theatre
falls silent in expectation. Still, no one in the audience has noticed the bat
flying over the stage. The actress walks in, straining to keep her composure.
And then, of course, for the first time after days of rehearsals, the bat hits
her. With a cry, Gastina immediately faints into the arms of the actor who
was playing the scene with her. While he drags her away, to the surprise of
everyone in the crew, the spectators let out a thunderous applause: unaware of
the bat, they had taken Gastina’s reaction as a part of the play - and as the
most brilliant one at that. “The fainting scene,” Pirandello writes, “had been
played so realistically as to convince them that it was an integral part of the
whole, and this was the reason for their ovation.”218 The applause does not die
out and the playwright, the director, and Gastina are loudly called to appear
on stage. Unfortunately, the director has to explain, the actress had been so
proven by the intensity of her performance, that she could not go on with the
play: “the performance had to be interrupted.”219
Minutes later, when the theatre is finally empty, the troupe gather to con-
sider the situation. Not only, Faustino laments, it was way worse to acknowledge
that he owed the success of the play to the bat, than to admit the play’s failure,
this unexpected success causes the company a terrible problem. Indeed, how
could they remain true to the only successful scene of the representation the
following night, and then the next? How could they stage, this time, and repeat
that which had been a complete coincidence? If they wanted to go on with the
representations at all, they had to include, somehow, anyhow, the fainting scene
into the play. Surely, the director says, it won’t be a problem for the actors to
perform it. But that is not the point, Perres rebuts: if the scene came out so
well it has been precisely because the performance broke down. So, for him,
there is no possible solution: the play has to be cancelled. At that point Gastina





proved. With a smile, she rubs some salt on the two men’s wounds:
“I could have an artificial fainting spell in the second act, if Signor
Perres were to follow your advice and write it in for me. But you’d
have to have the bat under control, so that it wouldn’t make me do
the real thing, say in the first or third act, or right after tonight’s
scene.”220
Ignoring her, the director is thinking of forcing Gastina to play anyway, but
Faustino knows better and he is already resigned. In the end, indeed, the play
will be cancelled. As the narrator relates, concluding the story:
“[Faustino] was convinced that the success of his play was due
entirely to the violent intrusion of a purely casual, extraneous ele-
ment, which instead of upsetting his artifice completely had miracu-
lously fitted into it and given the audience the illusion of truth. He
withdrew it from the boards, and it was never given again.”221
The bat and the cinema. Now, imagine that someone has filmed the play.
Through the film recording we could, if not recreate, at least reproduce the for-
tunate coincidences that led to Gastina’s successful performance and watch it
over and over again. At a first glance, then, film appears to be the ideal medium
for capturing the irruption of contingent events: indeed, as Mary Ann Doane
argues, “the emergence of photographic and phonographic technologies in the
nineteenth century seemed to make possible what had been previously been
beyond the grasp of representation - the inscription of contingency.”222 Contin-
gency became indeed an aesthetic category in the first place, precisely through
the modern fascination with its legibility, through modernity’s fascination with
chance and the ephemeral that were often the object of camera reality.223
And yet, what a recording of Gastina’s unwarranted exploit would have
touched, is, arguably, not a true expression of contingency but, precisely as
Doane wrote, merely its inscription. As such, the recording would suture the
220 Ibid., 29.
221 Ibid.
222 Mary Ann Doane, in Linda Connor et. al., “Notes from the Field: Contingency,” The Art
Bulletin 94, no. 3 (2012): 348.
223 Ibid.
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contingent event to the regime of representation: “the paradox of photographic
(or electronic) contingency [...] is that once registered, once fixed in repre-
sentation, the contingent loses its contingency.”224 Cinematic technology surely
enjoys a great deal of mastery over the contingent: it can rule it out, by discard-
ing unwanted shots, and stage it in - waiting for it, as it were, in the unfolding of
staged as well as unstaged events. Cinema can evoke and provoke contingency
and, not least, it can fake it. But its capacity to record contingent events acts,
in fact, as a taming of contingency. In this, cinema is closer to literature, than
to the theatre (a real bat can fly on a stage, but can’t fly in or out of a page or
a screen).
We must not forget that the interplay between contingency and staged re-
ality that Gastina and Faustino discuss in the story is also active at the level
of the literary narration itself: the “real” bat that Pirandello wrote about is
fictional and, precisely, not contingent.The bat’s calculated dramatic effect dis-
rupting the play is indeed, in relation to the written story and the diegetic play,
the exact opposite of the intrusion of an unforeseeable and uncontrollable event.
If it is true that contingency lies beyond the regime of representation, be-
yond, in Bratu Hansen’s words, the illusory depth of the diegesis and beyond
the protocols that regulate our understanding of narrative,225 then cinema sud-
denly becomes much less hospitable to it. If, on one hand, film appears to be
the medium of contingency par excellence, on the other, it is the one that has
the highest potential for leading it back within the logic of representation. For
what film affords are, in fact, representations of contingency, and a particular
regime of its visibility. As in the case of Pirandello’s play, in which the reality
effect is produced by the spectators failing to notice the bat, film would then
aim at the creation of a perfect illusion of reality through a complete inscrip-
tion of contingency, which in fact would correspond to its complete foreclosure.
As Doane put it, “the act of filming transforms the contingent into an event
characterised by its very filmability.”226
If cinema appears to have a greater power to represent and control contin-
gency it is in the end on the account of the imaginary claim that its inscrip-
224 Ibid., 349.
225 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 277.
226 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the
Archive (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 23.
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tion of contingency is made in the same material of contingent reality itself,
and without human intervention. Contingency apparently corresponds to an
agency without volition (which is precisely the opposite of fate, in the sense of
a will beyond human agency). But this agency is rather the dissensual agency
of the heteronomous subject and of the unconscious, than the lack of agency of
automatic mechanical recording. In fact, cinema confirmed a regime of under-
standing of contingency based precisely in the statistical and archival reduction
of material reality and unforeseeable events,227 as well as in the reduction of
the heteronomous agency of the embodied subject to the lack of agency of the
automaton. With photography, Doane indeed argues, contingency was moved
to the realm of “the non-anthropological, the autonomous, that which registers
without consciousness of registration.”228 If there is a contingency to film that
has relevance in the aesthetic regime, in the end, it is not to be found in the
technological dispositif , but rather in the full range of contingency of embodied
film experience from the part of spectators, its historical, cultural and singular
situatedness. In a sense, also the materiality of the medium and of the condi-
tions of recording and projection can be the site of a disruptive manifestation
of a contingent event, not reduced to an inscription. The cinematic equivalent
of the irruption of the bat would be, in this perspective, something like a film
burn or the sudden detaching of the reel from the projector.
We can individuate four kinds of contingency in relation to cinema. The first
is the level of the contingent event, of the bat’s flight: the objectified presence
of the contingent which breaks down the performance of the play - the “latent”,
unseen, object that in fact produces the impression of reality. This level is
still internal to the regime of representation: in fact, it represents its cinematic
reinstatement, it codes the superior power of suture that film can achieve be-
tween the raw materiality of the visual and its visible capture. A second level
would be that of camera reality: the level of singular contingency of the pro-
filmic that the camera can capture, the precise rendering of visible features and
the apparently seamless tracking of movement of which the medium is capable.
Film could register what makes of the bat not just any bat, or a bat in general,
but that unique animal; of its flight, that particular unrepeatable trajectory; of
227 Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, 18-19.
228 Doane, “Notes from the Field,” 348.
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Gastina’s scream, a scream with a definite constellation of overtones, a specific
length and pitch, and so on. In fact, film cannot avoid this contingency. ICine-
matic contingency, in this sense, is that quality of the photographic image that
makes cinema appear to be essentially outside of the concerns of representation,
and rather aligned with the pure presence of the thing itself. A third level of
contingency would be the very materiality of the cinematic medium, beyond its
function and its transparency in the regime of representation: glitches and film
burns, and all the cases in which the machines of recording and projection fail,
in which the material support of the images ages or becomes corrupt, and thus
the medium itself becomes, in this failure, evident as something that is present
beyond the phenomenal reality of the moving image. At this level, the concept
of contingency brings together the idea of freedom from necessity with the idea
of physical presence, and the idea of getting in touch with the real, so to speak,
with a failure of representation.
“Despite the reputed realism and mimesis of photographic, elec-
tronic, and digital imaging systems,” Doane writes, “it is the defec-
tiveness of the image (or sound) its deficiencies, that constitute the
confirmation of its contact with (touching of) the real, its collabo-
ration of contingency.”229
Finally, a fourth level would be that of the contingency of film experience itself:
not just in that film experiencing is a situated and embodied practice, hap-
pening in a particular place and involving flesh and bone subjects, but in that
film experience is discursively contingent and subjectively contingent, at the
same time at the intelligible level of the historical and cultural specificity of its
meaning, and at the less manageable level of an associative flight of signification.
Contingency lies in the traumatic hit of an animal thing that shatters a
play of appearances, in fact making the illusion more real. In the relation of
indexicality between profilmic reality and its “memorious” visible and audible
recording - a connectedness that seems to promise an unmediated relation with
the thing as such. It lies in the fleetingness of existence that the photographic
image, both in its relation with time and in its own materiality inevitably
addresses - the withering touch of the fading image, the scarred reel and the
229 Ibid., 349.
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broken down lenses. Finally, contingency lies in the principle of contiguity
that drives free associations, in the passage from one image to another that is
what creates the moving image in the first place, in the resonance of a word
on another which is what allows for their significance and meaning. In all
these cases, contingency refers to a kind of contact and contiguity, of “close
contacts and resonant connections”230 that can be linked, as we will see, to free
association and synaesthetic sense experience.
230 Maria Brennan, in Mary Ann Doane, in Linda Connor et. al., “Notes from the Field:
Contingency,” The Art Bulletin 94, no. 3 (2012): 347.
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Free association
Psychoanalytic theory should only ever be given free-floating at-
tention.
Adam Phillips, On Flirtation.
The equality of all subjects is the negation of all relation of ne-
cessity between a given form and a determined content.
Jacques Rancière, Le Partage du Sensible.
A failure to account for the contingency of the spectator’s experience of film,
as we have seen, can be taken as one of the central features of those critical
reactions to apparatus theory that do not downplay or disregard the ideological
and political tensions that are proper of the dimension of spectatorship. This
contingency can be addressed in terms of the plurality of existing subject po-
sitions and modes of film experiencing, and in terms of a radical contingency
that would correspond to the fundamental emancipation of the spectator as a
heteronomous subject, against its normative interpretation in terms of an ut-
terly passive subject position. Many of the critiques against apparatus theory,
recognised this normativity to be a core attribute of the psychoanalytic under-
standing of subjectivity, and thus identified its overcoming with the rejection
of psychoanalysis as a whole - or at least with a drastic reformulation of its
basic principles. Contrary to this position, I would argue that the normativity
of the description of the cinematic subject in psychoanalytic film theory lies
not, or at least not exclusively, in specific shortfalls or limitations within the
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psychoanalytic account of subjectivity, but rather first of all in the reduction
of the scope of psychoanalysis itself to that of its metapsychology. Much like
discursivity does not automatically mean discursive determination, in fact, so
the psychoanalytic subject is something inevitably more contingent and less
intelligible than any of its possible metapsychological definitions. Psychic ex-
perience and psychoanalysis as a therapy, respectively constitute and address
a kind of self-experience and relationality that cannot be reduced to a form of
knowledge about the self.231 Moreover, in this, they can be seen to be essentially
opposed to the mastery that defines the function of metapsychological concepts.
If there is a fundamental rule to the epistemology and the phenomenology of
psychoanalysis, beyond its reduction to a psychology of the deep or to a soci-
ology of repression, in fact, it is precisely that there is a dimension in which
these concepts share the same materiality and indeterminacy of the phenomena
they pretend to describe. The longstanding argument against the scientificity
of psychoanalysis can indeed be seen to be an effect of the limited power of
objectification of its forms of knowledge and practice.
All too easily film studies have been drawn to the positive knowledge of psy-
choanalytic metapsychology, disregarding the dimension of rupture that makes
this knowledge possible in the first place. Aside from its reduction to metapsy-
chology, however, the dimension of experience with which psychoanalysis con-
stantly renews its encounter essentially sides with a non-authoritarian under-
standing of knowledge and subjectivity and suggests a conception of subjectivity
which is neither unitary nor normative, sustaining a regime of knowledge which
is at the same time embodied and incommensurable to discursive grasp.
Metapsychology and film theory.
Metapsychology constitutes at the same time the most systematic, the most
normative, and, potentially, also the most authoritarian dimension of psycho-
analytic theory. Metapsychology is, so to speak, the theoretical division of
psychoanalysis: its function is, indeed, that of constructing an articulated com-
plex of conceptual models that are “more or less far-removed from empirical
231 Pontalis, Après Freud, 13.
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reality”232 - to systematise, that is, the contingency of analytic experience, and
the specific results of its method of enquiry in therapeutic practice, into a series
of claims and notions, perspectives and scenarios.
It should not come as a surprise, then, that metapsychology has been for
Louis Althusser the key field for establishing a dialogue between psychoanalysis
and the analysis of ideology.233 Lacan’s return to Freud, in particular, clearly
fulfilled the Althusserian necessity for an eminently theoretical reassessment of
the fundamental concepts behind the founding acts, and the founding fathers,
of psychoanalysis’ “revolutionary” action. Founding fathers - Marx, Freud,
Nietzsche - that were for Althusser at the same time “unexpected” children:
Freud, in particular, was imagined by the French critical theorist to be a father
to himself, a theoretical self-made man, and the epitome of the autonomy, and
the solitude, of theory.234 A metaphor that, by the way, we can take as an
expression of the particular regime of power, knowledge, and subjectivity that
Althusser imagined.
Althusser was particularly interested in rescuing psychoanalysis from the
accusation of being a practice without theory.235 For him, metapsychological
concepts had to be more than an extension of psychoanalytic practice, they had
to be absolutely primary:
“Neither do the technique and method contain the secrets of
psycho-analysis, except as every method does, by delegation, not
from the practice but from the theory. Only the theory contains
them, as in every scientific discipline,”236 he wrote.
Althusser’s defence of psychoanalysis as a science, then, even as he struggled
to maintain its specificity against behaviourist and psychologist revisions, nev-
ertheless coincided with the establishment of the supremacy of its metapsycho-
logical dimension. If the scientificity of psychoanalysis had to proceed from
its metapsychological concepts to contingent practice, and not the other way
232 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis (London:
Hogarth Press, 1973), 249.
233 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 20.





around, then it was perfectly acceptable, in the context of the application of
psychoanalysis to the study of ideology and the arts, to disregard not only the
therapeutic aims of psychoanalysis, but also any of the specificities that could
be found at the level of therapeutic practice and of psychic lived-experience
as well. On the contrary, I would say that the very specificity of the psycho-
analytic method tends to undermine the normativity that its metapsychology
can acquire, that the radical contingency of psychic experience essentially re-
sists its normative description, and that the forms of psychoanalytic knowledge
that exist in contiguity with the dimension of the Id and the primary process
tendentially escape any pedagogical appropriation. What is characteristic of
the psyche rather sides with the aesthetic regime than with a logic, so typi-
cal of metapsychological reductionism, of positions of authority and an endless
process of interpretation.
The insistence, so to speak, of theory in psychic experience and therapeutic
practice, in turn, is what allows the transformation of psychoanalytic theory
into an ideologically salient discourse on subjectivity: that is, from an element
of the therapeutic method, to a particular distribution of psychic experience and
of the knowledge we can have about it. A discourse upon which, as Althusser
argued, the method itself had in turn to come to depend. However, I believe,
by submitting the psychoanalytic method to the structures of its metapsychol-
ogy, Althusser was hardly making a case for the scientificity of psychoanalysis,
and rather positing the conditions only for its discursive articulation. In other
words, he was sanctioning, from the standpoint of radical Marxism and the the-
ory of ideology, the use of psychoanalysis as a disciplinary discourse. It is this
discourse on subjectivity that responses to apparatus theory in film studies actu-
ally criticise psychoanalysis for. The perceived teleology of the stages of psychic
development, indeed, the ubiquity and hegemony of the Oedipal narrative, the
heterosexist bias of the psychoanalytic notions of pleasure and desire, and so
on, all take their full normative character only in the measure that psychoanal-
ysis is seen as little more than a normative discourse and a metapsychological
system. In its normative aspects this discourse is less a product of the limits of
psychoanalysis as a discipline, than it is a consequence of its reductive framing.
Especially in film and cultural studies, psychoanalysis is so often discussed
exclusively in terms of its metapsychology that most objections against its nor-
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mativity in the study of film signification and spectatorship in fact become
correct. Only, I would say, they are fundamentally misdirected: they are not
really pertinent to psychoanalysis as a practice or as a field of enquiry, nor of
the psyche as a dimension of embodied experience, but rather to the authori-
tarian and pedagogical reduction of their scope. A reduction, to be fair, from
which psychoanalytic writers are not always immune, but that is probably more
distinctive of the application of psychoanalytic metapsychology to the problems
of ideology and to the interpretation of the arts.
Metapsychology and analytic experience. At one level, metapsychology
names that regime of understanding of the psyche which gives the psychoan-
alytic method its shape: clearly, Freud’s ideas about the psyche, its topogra-
phy, economy and dynamics, have been consubstantial with the development
of psychoanalytic therapy, and different conceptions of psychic dynamics will
inevitably orient the therapeutic process and its instruments in different direc-
tions. At the same level, metapsychology also constitutes the ground on which
different psychoanalytic approaches and new theories confront themselves. It
is the space of the interaction between orthodoxy and currents, so central to
the history of the psychoanalytic movement. It is the dialogic, and the insti-
tutional, space of the analysts’ training, of the formulation of the procedural
standards that should regulate the therapy and the relation between analyst
and analysand. At the same time, metapsychological notions, coordinates, and
narratives provide, de facto, the most immediate mapping of the potential con-
nections between psychoanalysis and philosophy, other sciences, and the arts:
as we have noted, metapsychology is usually the object of choice both when psy-
choanalysts venture to write on art and as soon as a psychoanalytic approach
is adopted by scholars in the humanities and social sciences.
With the exception of the sometimes seductive but generally disdained writ-
ing of “psychoanalytic” biographies, this privilege of metapsychology as the
main connection between psychoanalysis and other fields mainly takes the di-
rection of interpretation. As we will see, in the measure that psychoanalysis is
reduced to its metapsychology, its interaction with the arts is also reduced to
the scope of a hermeneutics of the text or of the work of art, and of a fundamen-
tally pedagogical explanation of social relations and aesthetic experience. It is,
from the very outset, the prestige that Freud assigned to, and sought for, psy-
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choanalytic metapsychology - and, within it, for its most ahistorical elements
- that allowed not just for the translation of psychoanalysis into other disci-
plinary fields, but for its reduction to a structuralist “masterplot”237 as well:
the ambassador of psychoanalysis would, in this sense, also be its witch.238
At the level of therapy, instead, metapsychology has a more pragmatic role:
primarily, it sustains and informs the analyst’s acts of interpretation. Such
acts - of which the classic model would be, of course, the interpretation of a
dream - are focussed interventions on the part of the analyst within the session
and constitute its most apparent contribution to the analytic process. Quite
clearly, interpretations can only be made in relation to a metapsychological
frame, but, it is important to note, they are not made exclusively in relation to
it. The interpretation of a dream, for instance, can never be reduced to a purely
intellectual decoding of its manifest content - detached from the dimension of
transference and countertransference - or to a symbolic reading - separated
from the contingent play of free associations in which both the analysand and
the analyst are engaged during the session. Before being active at the level
of the latent meaning it uncovers, then, interpretation in therapy confronts its
effectiveness as an utterance, as a performative expression of the analyst’s own
emotive presence in the analytic field.239 This shift from the intellectual content
of interpretation to interpretation as an act that is internal to the relation of
transference is a fundamental one in psychoanalytic therapy and theory. It is
a change that took place gradually, beginning with Freud’s move away from
the classical, symbolic, reading of dreams to their interpretation in the context
of the analysand’s free associations, and with the foregrounding of transference
and recognition of the limited power of interpretation when confronted with the
237 Peter Brooks, “Freud’s Masterplot,” Yale French Studies 55-56 (1977): 285.
238 Indeed, Freud figured metapsychology as a Faustian witch that the analyst can, or rather
must, call to its aid. Sigmund Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” in Freud:
Complete Works, Ivan Smith, ed. (2000 [1937]), 5022.
239 The concept of analytic field (campo analitico) is characteristic of the work of the Italian
psychoanalyst Antonino Ferro, who drew from Kurt Levin, Madeleine Baranger and Wil-
fred Bion for its elaboration. With this concept, Ferro refers to the conscious and uncon-
scious, emotive and semantic space that the analyst and the analysand evoke and inhabit
during the session, and, more generally, to what “happens” in the transferal relation that
is established between the two. Through this, Ferro proposes an approach to analytic
technique and, in particular, to interpretation, that is based more on the collaboration of
analysand and analyst than in the latter’s authority or ability. See Antonino Ferro, The
Bipersonal Field: Experiences in Child Analysis (London, New York: Routledge, 1999).
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compulsion to repeat.240
In particular, it is the recognition of the centrality of transference that can be
seen to require, more than simply suggest, a rethinking of the analyst’s interpre-
tations and a reconfiguration of the authority of psychoanalytic metapsychology
as a whole. Transference, Pontalis suggestively wrote, is like a fifth season,241
a mark of the atemporality (ucronie) of the unconscious,242 and, quite clearly,
a part beyond the parts of time. A season which is not other to language,
but rather to what Pontalis calls the tout-langage243 - the all-language and the
everything-language - stranger, precisely, to the comprehensive articulation of
the sensible that language can appear to determine,244 and to the fantasy of
mastery that comes with it.
Moving away from the interpretation of symptoms to the interpretation of
transference is also, at least in part, a move away from a logic of demystification
and uncovering of psychic “truth” and toward a more embodied and collabo-
rative working-through of the emotive relation between the analysand and the
analyst. Something which is prompted by the recognition of the contingency
and embodiment of psychic signification itself, and of the acknowledgement of
a fundamental equality of intelligence of the psyche in the analytic encounter.
Adam Phillips is building on the same foundations when he states that psy-
choanalytic theory is made with sentences, not ideas.245 By which he means
that psychoanalytic practice rests more in the dimension of dialogue, of the
contingent encounter between two subjectivities, than in the masterful knowl-
edge of one of the two, or in the only apparently more neutral idea of a shared
rationality uncovering in psychic phenomena some deeper meaning.
On the contrary, in the reading of the unconscious that is characteristic of
Althusserian psychoanalytic film theory, there would no place for contingency:
nothing in it would be - nor indeed could be - accidental.246 I think, and in
this I am taking an approach opposite to Althusser’s, that what are surely the
240 Pontalis, Avant, 51.
241 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 35.
242 Ibid., 16-17.
243 Pontalis, Avant, 114.
244 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 35.
245 Phillips, On Flirtation, 105.
246 Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 22.
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most specific, and possibly the most radical, insights of psychoanalytic theory,
lay the closest to its therapeutic practice and to the dimension of the analytic
encounter and not, or not exclusively, in its grand metapsychological construc-
tions. The epistemological and theoretical significance of psychoanalysis would
lay beyond its reduction to the scope of a metapsychology and rather come
from its proximity to the unconscious and the primary process, and with its
connection with the flow of free associations and free floating attention that
characterises the analytic field.
The mastery of concepts. The unconscious, as a form of experience, is irre-
ducibly singular and contingent - it is accessible by psychoanalytic theory only
as a system, not in its individual contents.247 Or, if it ever becomes accessible
in its singular subjectivity, it is so only already within the interpersonal field
of transference - not as object, then, but rather as a shared form of significa-
tion. In the end, metapsychology cannot claim an objective knowledge of the
unconscious: it can merely attempt to give a systematic description of some of
its mechanisms.248 Instead of being a form of technical knowledge, then, or a
method for probing and collecting data from the unconscious, psychoanalysis
should rather be seen to touch upon a kind of non-knowledge, one which is less
a refusal of knowledge than the enjoyment of its partiality and incompleteness:
“Psychoanalysis bores me when it enters in every place without
being invited,” Pontalis wrote, “when it affirms itself as the inter-
pretation of all possible interpretations. I claim for everyone not a
refuge in the uninterpretable, but a land of the uninterpreted whose
borders will never be firmly set.”249
If there is something that psychic experience violently opposes in language it
is not signification, then, but rather the tout-langage, the fullness of meaning
and the pretence of mastery of rational discourse, as well as the comprehensive,
247 Pontalis, La Force d’Attraction, 18.
248 Pontalis, Après Freud, 117.
249 “La psychanalyse m’assomme quand elle entre, sans y être invité, en tout lieu, s’affirme
comme l’interprétation de toutes intérpretations possibles. Je revendique pour tout un
chacun non le refuge dans l’ininterprétable mais un territoire, aux frontières mouvantes,
de l’ininterpreté.” Pontalis, l’Amour des Commencements, 27. Translation mine.
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normative, mapping by which discursive power is exerted. Psychoanalysis, on
the reverse, invites us to entertain a relation to knowledge that values the
potential inherent in its suspension, a wisdom that lies in not assuming that
everything can, or indeed should, be known. This relation can be grasped, from
another perspective, in terms of the difference between a lack of knowledge,
which would be the foundation of the pedagogical regime, and a Lacanian lack
in knowledge, an irreducible gap in our understanding and within our very
“self”, that is at the same time the sole space in which a sharing of knowledge
and experience can take place and, thus, the sole place that we can inhabit as
speaking subjects.
Pontalis’ idea that psychic experience is radically incommensurable with
conceptual mastery proceeds very rigorously from a fact of analytic therapy:
that conscious apprehension of repressed material, or of the reasons for its
repression, is not enough in itself to suppress the effects of repression.250 Ra-
tional knowledge finds itself powerless when confronted with the compulsion
to repeat: we can obtain, through therapy and reflection, a reasonable under-
standing, image, or explanation of previously repressed affects or complexes of
ideas, without this leading to a significant change in their psychic economy, nor
in our behaviour, symptoms and desires. It is often easy enough to accommo-
date repressed ideas and feelings in the conscious mind: what is difficult is to
work through them at at their more intractable, thing-like, level. It is easy
enough, Slavoj Žižek would say, to educate the man: the point is to convince
the chicken.251 It is not through a process of disclosure, then, nor as an effect of
the mastery of concepts, but through something within transference and thus
beyond their power, that one is able to engage with repression in such a way
that its economy can be altered, together with its symptomatic effects.
250 Pontalis, Après Freud, 118.
251 The Slovenian philosopher likes to tell the following story. A man is convinced to be a
seed of grain and so he is afraid that chickens will eat him. Unable to lead a normal
life, he decides to admit himself to a mental institution. After many years and numerous
treatments, the doctors manage to cure him. The man is no longer convinced of being a
seed of grain, so they are ready to release him from the clinic. As soon as he leaves the
institution, however, the man sees a chicken and runs back to the doctors, utterly terrified.
When they ask him how come he is still afraid of chickens, since he now knows that he is
not a seed of grain, the man replies: “I know, alright, but does the chicken know?” For
one of Žižek’s versions, see: Cornel West and Slavoj Žižek, Talk at Princeton University,
5 May (2005): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBvASueefk4.
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Analytic therapy in fact involves a continuous, if partial, collapse of its
own metapsychological schemas, not only as an effect of the contingency of
the analytic encounter itself, but because the nature of the unconscious is to
escape the mastery of concepts,252 to provoke continuous diversions not merely
in the objects of knowledge, but in the very processes and positions of the act of
knowing - subtracting, in fact, consciousness from itself. Analytic experience,
and the psychoanalytic insights that can be translated to the humanities, then,
exist in counterpoint and defiance to the grasp of rationality and intelligible
discourse.
In this sense, the unconscious should not be understood merely in terms of
its accessibility or foreclosure to consciousness, but also, and more significantly,
in terms of the interaction between two incommensurable logics: that of the pri-
mary process and that of the secondary process. The dimension, the scope and
the effectiveness of psychoanalysis lies, then, in the acknowledgement of and the
engagement with this incommensurability, and at the same time in refraining
from giving any definitive solution to it: psychoanalysis addresses paradoxes,
not problems, and in this sense it can be taken to involve, from both the analyst
and the analysand, a form of aesthetic and theoretical practice.253 Psychoanal-
ysis is not a discourse that enables us to articulate and solve questions, then,
but rather a language that allows us to speak about paradoxes in their own
terms. If psychoanalytic experience is the tension between a drive to know
and its constant (sometimes pleasurable and sometimes traumatic) faltering,
psychoanalysis becomes a practice that attempts, but never quite manages, to
bridge not between language and the irrepresentable (which would be the enter-
prise of a psychology of the deep), but between the intelligible and the merely
significant, between the known and the contingent.
Pontalis’ writings indeed suggest that we can see in the unconscious not
just the psychic topography of latent meaning, but the dynamic agency of our
emancipation from the habits of reason, from the ethos of identity, and from the
consensual mapping of experience that the mastery of concepts affords. The
252 Pontalis, Après Freud, 13.
253 In particular, Antonino Ferro described this aesthetic collaboration in terms of a sto-
rytelling that takes the place of the interpretative cut. Antonino Ferro, La Psicoanalisi
come Letteratura e Terapia [Psychoanalysis as Literature and Therapy] (Milano: Raffaello
Cortina, 1999), 1-2.
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unconscious would be a source of a dissensus - internal to subjectivities and
language, but at the same time always interpersonal and thus - in the sense that
it does not address the subject as a unitary and self-sufficient individual - also
impersonal. Still, the dimension of psychic experience would never be essentially
nor entirely free from discourse: what it is constitutionally “free” from, is rather
our understanding of, and mastery over, experience and discourse themselves.
If, on one hand, psychoanalysis can potentially be used to extend the mastery
of concepts to the realm of the id and of the unconscious, downplaying and even
erasing the specificity and their “eversive” potentials, we still need it to name
and address the existence of an inalienable dimension of conflict at the core of
the human subject, something which makes experience intrinsically paradoxical,
and rational mastery always problematic. Without this psychoanalytic insight
(what we might call a radical psychoanalytic discourse), we could lose sight of
the very necessity of a critique of ideology as such - as it indeed seems to be
happening in film studies with the post-theoretical turn.
Nothing would be a clearest instance of collective repression, Pontalis jok-
ingly concluded, than a conference of the psychoanalytic association:254 the
pursuit of scholarly coherence in psychoanalytic theory was indeed for him of-
ten just a way of eluding a real confrontation with the unconscious. If his first
interest in psychoanalysis came as a reaction against the conceptual mastery
that he had disliked in philosophy,255 he quickly turned his critique to the pre-
tence of mastery that psychoanalytic discourse itself could perform. Pontalis’
writings, which he meant to occupy a place in-between the theoretical language
of psychoanalysis and the aesthetic language of literature and the psyche, could
be addressed in terms of a phenomenological shift from the dimension of psycho-
analytic knowledge to that of the significance of analytic and psychic experience
themselves - from the interpretation of the latent contents of dream to the signif-
icance of the experience of dreaming.256 If the essence of psychoanalysis and of
its language lies in its attentiveness to “everything that remains at the margins
of the prose of life,” as he wrote,
“It must then refrain from substituting to the singularity ofthis
254 Pontalis, Fenêtres, 23.
255 Pontalis, En Marge des Nuits, 20.
256 See Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Entre le Rêve et la Douleur (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), 19.
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experience a pre-established order of relations, even if this order has
been constituted through the discoveries of psychoanalytic practice
itself. The order that suits psychoanalysis is exactly the opposite.”257
It is not the order of metapsychology, then, that should define the epistemo-
logical and theoretical significance of psychoanalysis, but rather that of the
contingency and erraticness of its embodied practice, and that of the constant
disruption of its very grasp - in everyday life, as well as in therapy and criti-
cism. As Pontalis brilliantly put it, psychoanalysis is like Citizen Kane, without
Rosebud.258
Psychic experience could therefore be seen to be marked by a kind of indif-
ference to power and objectification, and a waywardness in relation to the lures
of identity and the calls of interpellation:
“This region of being that Freud has pulled out from the night,
and to which it is so difficult to assign an ontological status, ac-
quires its structuring effectiveness precisely from the fact of its la-
tency: psychoanalytic reality is trans-individual and pre-subjective,
trans-temporal or outside of the temporal sequence of events, and
it leaves consciousness, if not entirely without knowledge, at least
without grasp.”259
Grasp (prise) and mastery (emprise), not knowledge, are what Pontalis op-
posed to what is essential to psychoanalytic experience. Beyond the mastery of
concepts we find what he called a dreaming speech,260 or dreamful thought261, a
form of embodied, mental and emotional, process of association that attempts
to free itself from the constraints of organised discourse. A dimension which is
257 “À tout ce qui reste dans le marges de la prose de la vie [...] elle doit donc se garder de
substituer à cette singularité un ordre préétabli de rélations, fut-il constitué par le savoir
qui s’est organisé à partir de ses découvertes. L’ordre qui lui convient est exactement
l’inverse.” Pontalis, Après Freud, 39. Translation mine.
258 Pontalis. L’ Amour des Commencements, 24.
259 “[...] cette région de l’être que Freud à tirée de la nuit, et à laquelle il est si difficile
d’assigner un statut ontologique, doit son efficacité structurante précisément au fait de
sa latence: elle est transindividuelle et présubjective, transtemporelle, ou hors de la série
temporelle des événements, et laisse la conscience, sinon sans savoir, du moins sans prise.”
Pontalis, Après Freud, 19. Translation mine.
260 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, La Traversée des Ombres (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), 179.
261 Pontalis, Fenêtres, 37.
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still internal to signification, but in many ways one that lies beyond the mastery
of meaning and language: free floating, like the attention of the analyst during
a session, and free associative, like the dream-work and imagination, like the
free speech of the analysand and of each and every speaking subject who is
passionately lost in aesthetic contemplation.
Analytic experience, and psychic experience in general, would then consist
in a double movement: one, constantly departing from the equilibrium and
transparency of “normal”, consensual, life and language; the other, at each mo-
ment raising from the utterly contingent dimension of lived-experience toward
form. On one hand, the symptom, on the other, what the English psychoanalyst
Christopher Bollas calls formtrieb, or the drive to represent.262 In the end, the
relevance of psychoanalysis to literature and the arts must be sought for not in
the technique of interpretation, but rather, as Leo Bersani wrote, in “a certain
relation between meaning and movement in discourse,”263 a “coming into form”
which is also a “subversion of forms” and a resistance “to the formal seduc-
tions of all coercive discourses.”264 Psychoanalysis would thus be the discipline
that, at the same time and by the same token, sanctions the existence of an
unruly, unintelligible, dimension of experience, and attempts to reduce it into
something meaningful, ordered, or at least significant. “Like dream,” Pontalis
wrote, “analysis at the same time discloses what is boundless and tames it.” 265
We can then say that the space that psychic experience makes accessible is one
in-between the symptomatic disruption of a transparent subjectivity and the
aesthetic signification of our contingent being in the world.
Hysteria and “the great complex of associations”.
The idea of free associations was initially developed by Freud in the context
of his studies on hysteria: despite the more mechanistic character of this early
work, we find in Freud and Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria the first formulation
of what will become a basic principle in the psychoanalytic method. In the
Studies, hysteric symptoms were conceived to be the result of an idea getting
262 Christopher Bollas, Cracking Up (London: Routledge, 1995), 41.
263 Bersani, Baudelaire and Freud, 11.
264 Ibid., 11-12.
265 “Comme le rêve, l’analyse tout à la fois ouvre à l’illimité et l’apprivoise.” Pontalis, La
Force d’Attraction, 54. Translation mine.
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shut off from a process of associations constantly going on in the mind.
In order to develop an hysteria, Freud wrote, “one essential condition must
be fulfilled: an idea must be intentionally repressed from consciousness and ex-
cluded from associative modification.”266 Here we note how repression from con-
sciousness and exclusion from associative activity are not simply two conjoined
processes, but almost two ways of describing the same thing. The severing of
its associative link with the rest of the mind was seen to isolate a traumatic ex-
perience, thus preserving its quota of psychic energy, which in turn was used to
generate hysterical symptoms. Conversely, the physiological associative activ-
ity of the psyche constituted a functional response to trauma, which prevented
it from becoming pathogenic by reworking and discharging the initial quota of
affect.267 “The barriers of repression,” as Pontalis will later put it,
“Are located in-between representations. Their function is to
prevent the establishment of connections in between them. The aim
of the rule of free association is [instead] to establish new connections
and to multiply the associative networks.”268
So, as hysteria was conceived as an impossibility, or a refusal, to connect a
particular traumatic experience to other experiences and ideas in the “great
complex of associations”269 that constitutes conscious mental activity, therapy
was defined as the restoration of this connection - what Freud called an “asso-
ciative correction” of the trauma.270 Association was therapeutic, then, since
through it the patient could bring herself to experience a memory of the trauma,
find a place for it among her other experiences, and finally put up an adequate
response.
According to what we said so far, associative activity could seem to be a
prerogative of the conscious mind, but it is not so: unconscious ideas can be
associated among themselves, forming unconscious complexes of ideas.271 In
fact, the unconscious is characterised by a markedly free associative activity
266 Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “Studies on Hysteria”, in Freud: Complete Works, Ivan
Smith, ed. (2000 [1895]), 102. Emphasis added.
267 Ibid., 12.
268 Pontalis, Fenêtres, 109. Translation mine.




- what Freud will later describe in terms of the primary process - and it is
precisely the associations between unconscious ideas that the method of free
associations was devised to bring to the surface.
The idea of a missing connection between representations gradually gave
way to the idea of a displaced connection, as can be evinced by Freud’s de-
scription of the mechanisms of hysteric conversion and defence. Conversion,
he wrote, was “the transformation of psychical excitation into chronic somatic
symptoms,”272 which came as a consequence of the impossibility to process the
quota of traumatic affect through association.273 Rather than being simply a
blockage of an associative process, conversion was seen to take place when a
quote of affect could not take its intended path and rather attached itself to a
different, but still associatively connected, representation.274
In particular, conversion entailed what Freud called a symbolic transposi-
tion: the physical symptom symbolised the whole complex of ideas that consti-
tuted the memory of the trauma, in the sense that it was a means of representing
them in the psyche (a tentative abreaction), and in the sense that it evoked the
affects that were connected with it.275 Through the physiological function of
association, then (that of providing an adequate abreaction to trauma), the
task of representation and that of elaboration of traumatic experiences would
seem to coincide, but not in the simple sense of connecting an idea to a sym-
bol. Freud’s view of conversion involved the concept of symbol, but always in
connection with associations and polysemy. That “the symbolic relation linking
symptom and meaning is” characterised by polysemy, so that “a single symp-
tom may express several meanings,”276 as Laplanche and Pontalis note, can
indeed be explained by the fact that this relation is one between a symptom
and a complex of associations, not a single idea. In this sense, Freud’s use of
the word “symbol” in this context should be understood more as in its radical
sense (from the Greek verb symballo, to put together), than as in the sense of
a sign that conveys one specifically coded meaning. At least in Freud’s early
272 Ibid., 79.
273 Ibid., 102.
274 Indeed, associative connections between the physical symptom and the traumatic experi-
ence were still required in order for conversion to take place. Ibid., 158.
275 Ibid., 66, 86, 130.
276 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-analysis, 90.
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account of hysteria, then, symbolic representation in the psyche appears to be
more a form of associative signification than a linguistic, Saussurean, relation
between signifier and signified.
Displacement and screen memories. While the mechanism of conversion
shed some light on the process through which ideas are connected in the psyche,
the mechanism of defence addressed, to put it simply, the reason for repression,
and the role played in it by discourse and social norms. Defence was conceived
as “the refusal on the part of the patient’s whole ego to come to terms” with
a traumatic group of ideas,277 and it will acquire in psychoanalytic theory an
increasing scope, from being characteristic of hysteria to being a fundamental
mechanism in the functioning of neuroses and of the psyche in general. In
particular, we are interested in Freud’s conception of displacement, as one of
the forms of defence, in that it can be seen to ground the logic of manifest and
latent content that will become central to his understanding of dream.
In his essay on screen memories, which shortly preceded The Interpretation
of Dreams, Freud addressed the relevance of childhood amnesia, and the appar-
ent triviality of the few memories that one retained from that period of one’s
life. He conceived this phenomenon as a result of a displacement along associa-
tive lines, intended to preserve, and disguise, emotively significant experiences
subjected to repression:
“We shall then form a notion that two psychical forces are con-
cerned in bringing about memories of this sort. One of these forces
takes the importance of the experience as a motive for seeking to
remember it, while the other - a resistance - tries to prevent any
such preference from being shown. These two opposing forces do not
cancel each other out, nor does one of them (whether with or without
loss to itself) overpower the other . Instead, a compromise is brought
about, somewhat on the analogy of the resultant in a parallelogram
of forces. And the compromise is this. What is recorded as a mne-
mic image is not the relevant experience itself - in this respect the
resistance gets its way; what is recorded is another psychical ele-
ment closely associated with the objectionable one [...]. The result
277 Breuer and Freud, “Studies on Hysteria,” 151.
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of the conflict is therefore that, instead of the mnemic image which
would have been justified by the original event, another is produced
which has been to some degree associatively displaced from the for-
mer one.”278
So, the value of a screen memory resides not in its own content, “but in the rela-
tion existing between that content and some other, that has been suppressed.”279
The connection between the two is one of associative displacement: emotive sig-
nificance is diverted along an associative path within a network of associations.
And it will be by evoking other parts of this network, that the original, or at
any rate the contingently significant, displaced experience can be brought to
consciousness.
Freud affirmed that displacement was a form of substitution,280 but, I would
say, only in the sense that, in the conscious mind, we have the screen memory
and not the memory of the actual experience. Quite obviously, in fact, the
screen memory is present and significant in the first place only because the
repressed memory still exists in the unconscious, and since the associative link
between the two is unconscious, but still in pace: the two memories do not
cancel one another, but rather interact in order to give rise to the compromise
formation that is the screen memory. Latent does not mean something that
is lost, then, and thus something that can be “found” again or “brought to
the surface”, like a missing object. It refers less to an exclusion, than to a
quality of experience, and less to a substitution than to a superimposition and
a metaphorical relation.
Screen memories in turn provided the model for realising that apparently
erratic and senseless ideas and associations in everyday life can never be con-
sidered random or unmeaningful, and even less irrelevant (or, at least, that
they can always be made significant). On the contrary, analytic experience
brought Freud to think that, actually, the more an association seemed trivial
278 Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories”, in Freud: Complete Works, Ivan Smith, ed. (2000




and unreasonable, the more it was likely to be significant.281
In the case of dreams, describing their formation and their content as a
result of associative activity was necessary, according to Freud, to go beyond
an interpretative technique that “translates any given piece of a dream’s content
by a fixed key.”282 As Pontalis remarked, psychoanalysis is less concerned with
the distorted memory itself, than with the work that this distortion effects283
- a work that can only be addressed beyond a static, symbolic, reading of the
manifest content, through the method of free association. As any analytic
session shows, interpretation of a dream is only possible through (and in fact
consists first of all in) the evocation of an ample network of associations -
memories, dreams, phrases, events, emotions, and so on - in which, and only
through which, the elements of the dream acquire a contingent meaning and
assume their psychic significance. The method of free association is then a
method for the evocation of this associative field, and it is the whole of this field
of associations that is the object of interpretation, not the sole manifest content
- which, in fact, hardly exists as such. The “text” of dream interpretation
can never be the manifest content of the dream as it is experienced by the
dreamer, and is never just its verbalisation in the analytic setting, but rather
the experience of the dream as it is expressed and extended during the session
through free associations, in connection with everything else that the analysand
says and does during the session, as well as in relation to the analyst’s own free
associations, and free floating attention, and her memory of the rest of the
treatment. It is only in this embodied and contingent context that the psychic
significance of what is brought to the session can be felt, and, thus, eventually
addressed also as an object of an act of interpretation.
281 An idea that was coopted by the surrealists, and that they arguably pushed a little too far.
For Andrè Breton, in particular, free associativity lost its contingent character to become
instead an expression of an inevitable fate. His love for the trouvaille could be seen as a
flirt with utter contingency and at the same time as a form of mastery over it. Surrealism,
in a way, could have been moved by the idea and the desire that the chance encounter
between a sewing machine and an umbrella on a dissecting table, in which the Conte de
Lautréamont saw the essence of beauty, was not a chance after all. See Jean-Bertran
Pontalis (1988) “Les Vases non-Communicants,” Perdre de Vue (Paris: Gallimard, 1988),
133-150.
282 Sigmund Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” in Freud: Complete Works, Ivan Smith,
ed. (2000), 606.
283 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 114.
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Method and process of free associations. With “free associations” we
first of all intend a method in psychoanalytic therapy.284 Through the method
of free associations - that is, by saying aloud to the analyst whatever it comes to
her mind, regardlessly of logic or any other conscious concern - the analysand
shapes for the analytic couple her inner train of thoughts and emotions. In
this sense, free associations are the technique by which the analysand complies
with the fundamental rule - to speak her mind by relinquishing her conscious
watch over it. In more technical terms, the method of free associations is
intended to make the primary censorship - the one that represses ideas into
the unconscious - more evident by suspending the secondary censorship - the
conscious control over one’s utterances and flow of feelings and thoughts. While
the secondary process seeks to circumscribe and define meaning and works by
making rational, symbolically and linguistically viable connections in relation
to the reality principle, the primary process instead disregards the principles
by which representations are supposed to be connected, and rather aims to
extend and divert signification by working on the intensity and by trying to
satisfy the aim of the affect that drives them. The kind of regime of experience
which characterises the primary process is therefore characterised by paradox
and, irreverence, and by a constant “sliding” of meaning, by displacement,
condensation, overdetermination and the coincidence of opposites.
Free association, Pontalis argued, is fundamentally a language beyond the
mastery of concepts: a language that cannot be reduced to the functions that
describe it.285 In the analytic setting, he wrote, free associations are the way
through which the infans speaks.286 And the analyst’s free floating attention,
we might add, is the psychoanalytic name for the capacity all subjects have
to listen to it. Other than for the troubling indifference to its hierarchies that
free association brings to the order of language, then, free association (especially
when compared with the paradigm of interpretation) can be regarded as an egal-
itarian principle in psychoanalytic therapy and theory, for its significance lies in
the establishment of a shared ground between the analyst and the analysand,
which is in turn based on their equal emotional “intelligence” of their relation.
In this sense, as the pupil and the ignorant schoolmaster had in-between them
284 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-analysis, 169.
285 Pontalis, l’Amour des Commencements, 33.
286 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 32.
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the book as the material support of their equality,287 the analytic couple would
have the space of transference. In that space, language is something different
than a means for a symbolic distribution of experience and human relations,
and rather becomes more evident, in itself, as a space of sharing:
“Through analysis, language is released from all function. It is
returned, as it were, to its fundamental power and infirmity. It
moves us and carries us away toward what continuously escapes it.
It is transported outside of itself, it is transferred.”288
The lack of mastery that defines free associations, indeed, does not entail, like
hypnosis, a complete loss of consciousness or awareness from the part of the
analysand - it can rather be seen as a different regime of consciousness and
awareness, as a form of dispassionate self-observation,289 that would be char-
acteristic of both the analyst and the analysand, both the spectator and the
critical subject. With the method of association the analysand relinquishes her
conscious control over the flow of her thoughts and utterances, and by this it
allows another agency to speak, which at the same time is and is not herself. In
a way, free association is a self-shattering and self-dissemination that is more
done in language than trough it, by which the self is returned to a contact
with its own heteronomy and language is returned to its semiotic and unruly
dimension.
The removal of the secondary censorship, of the conscious control on the
activity of our mind, brings to the surface a flux of thoughts, feelings and
experiences that are continuously subjected to association. This stream of as-
sociations, which is constantly taking place in the mind and continuously inter-
twining conscious and unconscious thoughts and affects, could then be called
a process of free associations which the method of free association would be
designed to bring to the surface. In this sense, free association would not be
merely an analytic technique, but also relate to everything that goes on in the
mind independently from the scope and control of our conscious awareness: free
287 Rancière, Le Maître Ignorant, 37.
288 “Par l’analyse, le langage est délié de toute fonction. Il est comme rendu à sa puissance
et à son infirmité foncières. Il porte et déporte vers ce que lui échappe. Il est transporté
hors de lui, il est transfert.” Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 33. Translation mine.
289 Bollas, Free Association, 7.
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association constitutes, indeed, as Bollas argues, a creative component of ordi-
nary language and thinking.290 Still, the process of free association would be
something different than free talking or free speech:291 beyond the flux of verbal
associations and thoughts that the subject can willingly articulate, free associ-
ation is significant for the emergence, within this flux, of something radically
incommensurable with the order of language and with the subject’s established
sense of self.
Pontalis refers to the Freudian term Einfall - a term which means idea, but
that also means invasion, and that which comes unexpectedly into the mind - to
speak about the moment of the emergence of an association, before it is given
a further and more defined form (linguistic, emotive, visual or otherwise).292
Einfall, he wrote, is the unexpected thought, the strange thought and thought
as a stranger, the contingent event that contradicts the most assured theories,
a dissonance.293 Einfall, we can say, would name what in the process of free
association is radically contingent and dissensual: the analyst can prescribe
to free associate, Pontalis wrote, but he cannot “demand that the unexpected
come and meet his patients, or himself.”294
In the analytic setting, free association is complemented by the analyst’s
evenly suspended, flee floating, or evenly hovering, attention: free associations
made by the patient, that is, are met by the analyst’s own openness to associ-
ation, which is devised to produce a similarly unrestrained flow of thoughts in
the analyst, devoid of “personal inclinations, prejudices, and theoretical assump-
tions however well grounded they might be,”295 as a necessary step to relate to
and understand the analysand’s associations, and prior to interpretation. These
two processes - or, rather, these two states of associative contemplation - are,
as Pontalis attested, in many ways homologous.296 In order for her attention
to be floating indifferently from one of the analysand’s association to the other,
290 Bollas, Free Association, 67.
291 Ibid., 9.
292 Pontalis, En Marge des Nuits, 112.
293 Pontalis, l’Amour des Commencements, 148.
294 “L’analyste peut prescrire: associez’. Il ne peut pas exiger que l’inattendu vienne à la
rencontre de ses patients, ou de lui-même [...].” Pontalis, En Marge des Nuits, 112. Trans-
lation mine.
295 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 43.
296 Pontalis, Après Freud, 39.
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and from one to the other of the analyst’s own thoughts and feelings, indeed,
the psychoanalyst has to be engaged in a process of free association, even if
she does not voice it in the same way that is required from the analysand by
the fundamental rule. On the reverse as well, the analysand’s abandonment
to the free flow of her thoughts and emotions is not far from an instance of
self-listening or free floating attention. To both the analyst and the analysand,
the method of free association is a way of evoking a network of associations
and letting radically contingent events emerge within this network and in the
context of their encounter.
It is important to remember that free associations - although they consti-
tute, together with free floating attention, the defining mode of signification
and language in the analytic encounter - are not a direct expression of the pri-
mary process: they rather lay in-between, and thus connect, lived-experience
and signification. They occupy a place and institute a tension between a form
of aesthetic play and the destructuring effects of the unconscious and the id on
signification itself. Free associative speech, in other words, finds itself actually
in between the primary and the secondary process, and can be seen to consti-
tute, as we have written, a form of compromise and a connection between their
incommensurable logics. Free associations are “free” precisely in that they are
not controlled by the logic of the secondary process, of rationality and consen-
sual language: it is in this sense that they appear to be meaningless, and the
major breakthrough that psychoanalysis brought about was indeed to hold them
significant despite their lack of organised meaning. At the same time, however,
the irrational which was thus established as the object of psychoanalysis was
also submitted to the logic of its interpretation. In this perspective, the act of
interpretation does not incorporate and exhaust the significance of free associ-
ations and free floating attention: what makes them valuable to therapy in the
first place (and, arguably, to a conception of psychic and aesthetic experience
as well) is not the meaning that can be found in them, but rather the kind of
interpersonal space that they allow to establish. Especially in relation to our
focus on aesthetic experience, then, it is not to free association as the prelude
to an interpretation, but rather as a particular modality of experience that we
will refer to them.
As we have seen, while free associations as a technique is, strictly speaking,
exclusive to the analytic setting, the process of free associations would be instead
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an ordinary form of experience. At the same time, it would not be limited
to a series of connections and disconnections between words or concepts, but
involve all kinds of representations: images, sounds, the sensations of touch
and smell, actions, moods, and so on and so forth. In truth, even within the
scope of psychoanalytic treatment, the scope of free association is not limited
to a verbal play of the signifier, but rather potentially includes all other forms
of representation and expression: playing, for instance, is commonly used to
provide analytic material in the analysis of children in an analogous way to the
method of free associations in the treatment of adults. In the same way, Donald
Winnicott’s squiggle game, in which the analyst and the analysand take turns
extending and transforming a drawing, could be taken to be an example of a
visual form of free association and of its use in psychoanalytic therapy. All in
all, I would argue that the kind of experience that the free associative process
engages is, at its roots, synaesthetic - that is, characterised by an interplay
and a fusion between all kinds of sense-experience. Distinguishing one sense
from the other, would then be one of the first, associative and interpersonal,
articulations of embodied experience.
The metapsychological spectator and the paradigm of interpretation.
Where the application of psychoanalysis to the study of film should have led
to cultivate an attention to what is contingent, and even idiosyncratic, in film
experience, it regularly prompted, instead, an overvaluation and an abuse of
metapsychology. Further reduced in its scope and themes by its connection
with semiology, sociology and the theory of ideology, and then by a certain
routine, psychoanalytic metapsychology has often become in film studies some-
thing of a standardised canovaccio for textual interpretation. This paradigm
of interpretation, together with the logic of demystification, tends to survive
the criticism against psychoanalysis as a discourse and as a method: symbolic
readings tend to come up even from oppositional standpoints, and metapsycho-
logical counter-narratives are more often explored than non-metapsychological
approaches, at the expense of the epistemological, theoretical and aesthetic sig-
nificance that a different understanding of psychoanalytic theory could support.
This overvaluation of psychoanalytic metapsychology against both the phe-
nomenology of psychic experience and its radical contingency has, of course,
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conspicuous effects when it comes to the study of spectatorship and film. Much
like the spectator of ideological interpellation is not imagined in its contin-
gent encounter with language and ideology, but rather held to be possessed
and shaped by them, the psychic experience of the spectator is not taken as
a situated and substantially erratic phenomenon, but rather reduced to the
ahistorical order of the metapsychological structures and narratives that is sup-
posed to make sense of it. It is in fact by downplaying the unintelligibility of the
spectator’s encounter with film that the discursivity of her experience is turned
into discursive determination, and, in a similar way, it is through a reduction
of the erraticness of psychic experience that the more embodied and contingent
aspects of subjectivity are reduced within the Oedipal structures and narratives
that correspond to their explanation. The failure of psychoanalytic film theory
to account for the spectator’s emancipation can then be seen to rest, first of all,
in its endorsement of this kind of conceptual and Oedipal mastery.297
In this way, the scope of psychoanalysis and of the psyche in film and cul-
tural studies risks to be reduced to that of redoubling, and merely reinscribing
at a more intimate level, what has already been decided at the level of ideol-
ogy and discursive power. A level that is similarly made more “readable” by
its conflation with the intelligible discourses of the dominant “symbolic” and
their more or less clear metapsychological articulation. That is to say, on one
hand, that a recognition of the discursivity of the psyche and of the fantasmatic
character of ideology does not automatically allow to bridge the incommensura-
bility between recognisable social forms and the contingent subjectivity of the
symbolic order.298 And, on the other hand, that ideology and discursive power
are, like embodied psychic experience, themselves largely beyond our rational
grasp.
In apparatus theory, in particular, one has frequently the impression that
the ideological is used as a model to understand the psychic, and not the other
way around. On the contrary, one should rather be led to expect, within the
very domain of discourse, the same diversions and paradoxes, the same bizarre
297 Jan Campbell, Arguing with the Phallus: Feminist, Queer, and Post-Colonial Theory, a
Psychoanalytic Contribution (London: Zed, 2000), 82.
298 In this respect, see Julia Kristeva’s crucial distinction between “social symbolic system”
and “subjective symbolic order.” Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 67.
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logic and radical alterity that characterises the unconscious and the primary
process. The same lack in knowledge that troubles the identity of the subject
makes ideology itself less intelligible. Less intelligible but not, by this, less
effective. Discursive power is one thing, indeed, and another is its authoritarian
framing: the first is an inevitable dimension of experience and subjectivity that
individuates the discursivity and heteronomy of the subject, but also the level
of its agency; the second is a measure of pedagogical abrutissement that impairs
the subject’s emancipation and agency in a more direct and less ambivalent way.
With its particular appropriation of psychoanalytic metapsychology, appa-
ratus theory presupposes the overdetermination of the psychic dimension of
subjectivity, at the same time significantly downplaying the specific dissensual
agency that can be attributed to the unconscious. The irrationality of the id,
then, instead of providing the ground for the radical contingency and unforesee-
ability of the subject’s experience, and thus for her potential for emancipation
and subversiveness, is turned into a further sanction of its incapacity to un-
derstand - to relate, that is, to the dynamics of its own agency, to the extent
of its responsibility, and to the significance of its own lack of mastery. At the
same time, the unconscious is understood as the internalised form of an external
mastery over the self, and is thus made, again, into an incarnation of the logic
of inequality.
As a consequence, the apparatic spectator ends up being less a psyched
being, than a metapsychological subject. In fact, psychoanalytic film theory al-
most exclusively considers a spectator whose psyche is reduced to the metapsy-
chological concepts and narratives that are used to describe it, and whose un-
conscious, rather than constituting a radically incommensurable dimension of
subjective and embodied experience, is either taken to be a container of cul-
turally and ideologically coded meaning or - in a complete reversal which still
fulfils the same authoritarian function - a completely inaccessible site of trau-
matic refuse. Either by being taken as an essentially meaningful and intelligible
but hidden object - and thus as a prompt for the logic of interpretation - or as
a dimension absolutely external to meaning and signification - and thus as the
pre-discursive support of discursive power itself - the unconscious would thus
serve to cement the authority of theory. In the end, we can say that the spec-
tator of apparatus theory is a metapsychological subject not just in the sense
that it holds an abstract position, constructed according to a specific set of
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metapsychological concepts, but, above all, in the sense that it is a form of sub-
jectivity that results from a specific regime of understanding of psychoanalysis
and psychic experience - more specifically, as we have argued, from a normative
and authoritarian reduction of their scope to that of their metapsychology. The
limits of the apparatic spectator are first of all the limits of this reduction, not
(or not just) the limits of psychoanalytic metapsychology itself - and, clearly,
not the limits of a psychoanalytic approach to the arts as such.
The intelligent unconscious, Pontalis wrote, is also the intelligible uncon-
scious 299 - intelligent, that is, reasonable: one we could reason with and, in
the end, that we can bring to reason and thus imagine to control (or, at the
very least, one by which we are controlled in the same ways we can imagine to
control it, other people, animals and things). To this idea of the unconscious,
Pontalis contrasts its bêtise,300 its animality and its stupidity: in the sense, that
is, of its deafness to reason and of its intractability to meaning and authoritative
knowledge, and, eventually, in the sense of the incommensurability of its forms
of experience with conscious human “intelligence”.
Similarly, we could say that the intelligent and intelligible spectator is also
the one that can be most easily targeted and disciplined by cinematic insti-
tutions. The institutional power of normative framing of spectatorship and
subjectivity rests indeed in two concomitant assumptions: that the experience
of the spectator is fundamentally intelligible (even more, that it is essentially a
matter of meaning), and that the spectator is not capable, on its own, to under-
stand it for what it really is. By this, the incommensurability of the unconscious
is first reduced to a latency of meaning, and, then, this latency is equated with
the subject’s presumed intellectual incapacity. Through this double normative
reduction, the unconscious ends up certifying the helplessness of the spectator
in the domain of ideology and to its own heteronomy and desire, at the same
time that it grants a boundless (although not absolute) authority to theoretical
interpretation. In the pedagogical regime, the theorist is not infallibly right -
being “right”, after all, is mainly a matter of desire - but it can always say some-
thing: its presence in the space of film is already justified by the authoritarian
structure of the apparatus. More precisely, the theorist can always argue for the
299 Pontalis, L’Amour des Commencements, 120.
300 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 118.
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necessity of an explanation of the spectator’s embodied experience. From with-
out this authoritarian reduction, instead, the unconscious would rather signify
a limit of the very power of interpretation, and a lack in the intellectual mastery
of (and on) the discursive institutions that regulate subjectivity. In particular,
psychoanalytic interpretations of film texts, of the kind that read unconscious
complexes as the hidden structures of the narrative, or as the latent content
of the film’s discourse, in fact suppress the dissensual and aesthetic potentials
of free association, in that they concentrate on those theoretical assumptions
and conscious judgements that the method of free associations has precisely the
function to bypass.
The apparatic spectator would thus lose something of its emancipation, not
really because its position is discursive and ideological, but first of all because of
the pedagogical regime of understanding of the dynamics of ideology and fantasy
within which its position is further inscribed. Similarly, it would lose something
of its heteronomy and embodiment, not because psychoanalysis foregrounds the
subject’s lack of mastery, but rather because of a normative understanding of
psychoanalytic theory. What stands against normative institutions, then, is
never just the subject who is consciously and integrally aware of them, the one
who fully understands the mechanisms of ideology and film signification, and
thus the one who chooses to be subversive, but rather the one whose resistance
is first of all an expression of the indeterminacy of lived-experience and the
primary process.
If the subversive spectator must be one and awake - if she must believe in
and affirm its own autonomy, and, in turn, she must be told how to realize and
signify the very fact that she is aware - the wayward spectator finds a further
emancipation from its own identitarian, confessional, self-representation pre-
cisely in the dreaminess of its experience and in the forgetfulness of its memory
of film. By this, I am not merely revaluing the imaginative dimension of spec-
tatorship by putting it against the dimension of ideology, but I am arguing that
the discursivity of film experience as well as its ideological effect lay significantly
beyond the possibility of their mastery and of their rational reconstruction. In-
tellectual emancipation, as a consequence, would lay not beyond the dimension
of ideological fantasy as such - in the sense of the power of discourse and the
heteronomy of subjectivity - but first of all beyond an authoritarian theory of
ideology, beyond an authoritarian regime of understanding the interdependence
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of language and the subject.
Emancipation, indeed, expresses itself not only against the authority that
institutions perform, but also against the mastery that the subject can enjoy,
and exert on herself. If there is a ground of equality, then, it is never just
the speaking subject in the sense of the rational and self-sufficient self, the one
who possesses meaning, but the subject who is traversed by signification while
never grasping it (and herself, in it) entirely. to the extent that the subject is a
psychoanalytic one, in the end, it should also be seen as one whose indenture to
identity, and whose dependency from the mastery of concepts, are at the same
time inevitable and fundamentally in question.
Free association and film experience. It would be possible to recognise
in free associations a basic principle of film form (arguably, Sergei Eisenstein’s
montage theory was not very far from doing that) or to trace the import of
this concept in the history of cinema (its centrality in the aesthetics of surreal-
ism, for instance), or, finally, in the history of film theory. Here I would rather
examine the concept and the practice of free associations as the fundamental
ground of film experiencing. One that would correspond to the full range of
contingency of the spectator’s encounter with film, affirm its equal intelligence
of the medium, and relinquish neither the significance of the discursive dimen-
sion of spectatorship, nor the kind of agent heteronomy that characterises the
psychoanalytic subject.
If one takes the primariness of the primary process seriously, experiencing
in general would indeed appear to be an associative phenomenon: signification
would proceed from the evocation of a complex of heterogeneous associations
- sensations, feelings, ideas, words, memories and concepts - to their linking
in associative chains, from family resemblances of sensations, memories and
signifiers, to conceptual and linguistic meaning. It is actually the presence of
particularly dense “knots” in the network of associations that suggests the exis-
tence of a specific object in perception, or of a defined meaning in signification.
The same we can say about film experience. If the moving image emerges in
the spectator’s experience from a mass of vibrant visual substance, addressing
film signification would not be a matter of following polysemous connotations
arising from a definite representation, but, on the reverse, a matter of retracing
how the associative plurality of meaning engenders the moving image in the
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first place. This shift from an objectual to a phenomenological and associative
understanding of the moving image, despite its immediate counter-intuitivity,
corresponds in fact to a very basic assumption: none other than the discursiv-
ity of the image and of subjectivity, which are both central to the notion of
spectatorship. There is no such thing as a thing as such, one could say: a thing
would always already be the centre in the contingent and embodied, associative
network of its discursive articulation.
If an image can take shape within contingent discursive signification at all,
then, it is because the image is not the product of a fixed symbolic code, nor
of mimetic resemblance, but rather a composite, mobile and potentially contra-
dictory associative formation. One that, as we will argue in the next chapter,
returns signification to its more embodied and contingent dimension, making of
it first of all a function of contact and situatedness, and not exclusively a matter
of symbolic codes. At the same time that it confirms the discursive nature of
film experience, indeed, what is free in free association defines the fundamental
level of its situatedness and singular contingency, against and beyond its reduc-
tion within specific principles of meaning and cognition, and within the bound
dynamics of the secondary process.
The ideas of discursivity and subjective contingency eventually suggest that
we shift, in our understanding of the film image, from a logic of indexicality
or mimetic resemblance to a logic of associative construction. With this, they
also imply a move away from the regime of representation toward the aesthetic
regime, from the ontology toward the phenomenology of the image and from a
metapsychological toward a more embodied account of film experiencing. Free
associations are not beyond discursivity, then, but they should rather be taken
as a particular, “wayward”, way of engaging with the very discursivity and
materiality of film and film experience. As such, they constitute less a model
of linguistic signification than a mode of embodied film experience - or, rather,
what they provide is actually a connection between these two dimensions. As
we have seen, in fact, free associations mediate between the more material,
bodily and unbound logic of the primary process and the symbolic articulation
of the secondary process.
What matters most to us, is that the process of free association is not
intrinsically regulated by the principles of its intelligibility. Unlike the secondary
process, its aim is not to be understood, but rather to create significance: in the
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early Freudian terms of the Studies on Hysteria, its function was to allow an
affect to be abreacted; in relation to screen memories and dream, its function
was to signify a latent thought through a displaced representation; in relation
to transference, finally, free association can be seen to evoke the very space in
which the embodied and contingent encounter between the analysand and the
analyst can take place. Translated to film spectatorship, then, free association
would describe, at least in some of its respect, the aesthetic ground of film
experience, and a space in which the subject is exposed to its heteronomy and
to the dissensual contingency of the Einfall.
What free association plays against, then, is not really the dimension of
meaning and significance - whose existence, in fact, they enable - but rather the
regime of interpretation and, more specifically, the principles that individuate
“proper” meaning and consensual connections. While still being a source of con-
tingent and singular significance, the process of free association is not reducible
to a definite articulation of meaning: each new association in fact prevents us
from understanding the whole, because it moves signification further and dis-
places the meaning of the whole complex by a slight, but always significant,
degree. In order to reduce it to meaning, this process must be, at some point,
interrupted - not unlike, as they say, the life of a person can be judged only after
its death, meaning would arise at each faltering and interruption of the flow of
associations. In concrete reality, signification is never a pure and continuous
current of associations: it can be better described, in fact, as a tension between
free associativity and the laws of language, between the structures of meaning
and concepts and their situatedness and singular appropriation, between the
primary and the secondary process.
Still, the experience of free association and free floating attention shows to
the subject a place beyond the logic of interpretation, beyond the reduction of
experience to the principles that make it intellectually intelligible, a realm of
what is left uninterpreted and that can be extended, instead, in directions that
exceed our habits of being. Free association can thus be taken as a means, but
even more as a site, of self-shattering and dissensus. In this sense, free associ-
ation stands against both the idea of communication, and that of identity as
an intelligible form of the “self”, predicated on a necessarily normative articu-
lation of the personal and the social. In the free associativity of its embodied
experience, the spectator finds indeed its heteronomy, together with a lack of
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foresight, a lack of mastery over its look, and over its capacity to understand,
that are in fact the aesthetic guarantee of its contingent freedom and funda-
mental emancipation. In order to be an emancipated spectator, in the end, one
should not attempt to “read” the film: for it is in fact first of all in the attempt
to reduce its encounter with film into meaning that the spectator, as a subject,
is reduced into meaning as well.
Coherently, the difference between a passive and an emancipated spectator
would not be a function of knowledge and mastery, but, as Rancière put it, of
a shift to a different kind of sensible world: one which entails the rupture of
the links between meaning and meaning, as well as the rupture of the sensual
coordinates that allow one to be at its place within a given order of things.301
“The spectator,” Rancière wrote, elaborating on this point, “who experiences
the free play of the aesthetic [...] enjoys an autonomy of a very special kind.
It is not the autonomy of free Reason, subduing the anarchy of sensation. It is
the suspension of that kind of autonomy. It is an autonomy strictly related to a
withdrawal of power”302 In this sense, free association is not intrinsically beyond
the dimension of discourse and power, as we have said, but it rather constitutes
a different modality of their performance, corresponding to a non-authoritarian
regime of of knowledge and subjectivity. If put under a certain mastery, in-
stead, the method of free associations loses its hospitality to the Einfall, to the
disruptive irruption of the id, and, with it, also its therapeutic, aesthetic, and
political function. This mastery is usually that of the interpreting analyst, too
eagerly performing her function as the subject supposed to know, but it can
also come in the form of an extreme associative proficiency on the part of the
analysand. In this case, the analysand becomes so comfortable in the flow of
her associations that they end up circumventing the unexpected. “Free” in free
association is indeed the opposite of “volitional”. As we have argued, in free
association, a dispossession of meaning and a shattering of identity takes place,
and it is arguably only in the space that the collapse of the secondary process
opens up, in the as-if relation that can be seen to characterise film experience,
301 “Ce qui opère [dans le passage d’un monde sensible à un autre], ce (75) sont des dissasso-
ciations: la rupture d’un rapport entre le sens et le sens, entre un monde visible, un mode
d’affection, un régime d’interpretation et un espace de possibilités; c’est la rupture des
repères sensibles qui permettaient d’être à sa place dans un ordre des choses.” Rancière,
Le Spectateur Emancipé, 74-75.
302 Rancière, Dissensus, 117.
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that the spectator’s acts of identification and its aesthetic encounter with film
become possible in the first place.
In this respect, it could be misleading to think about free associations just
as a series of connections, and of the process of free associations as a simple
accumulation and superimposition of distinct “unities”. While it is surely true
that the Einfall is always perceived a synaesthetic tangle of heterogeneous im-
pressions, and that free associative speech or imagining tendentially proceed by
addition, linearly in time and contiguously in space and enunciation, it is also
true that the very precondition of the process of free associations is a cut: a
disassociation. To associate, Pontalis writes, is first of all to dissociate from con-
sensual meaning.303 As Freud wrote, free associations “upset” the innocence of
the manifest dream,304 or, we could say, borrowing a concept from Bollas, they
ironically “crack up” the self we are accustomed to.305 The freedom that free
association enjoy from the bounds of the secondary process takes indeed first
of all the form of negative link, a disconnection from conventional codes, from
our habits of feeling, thinking, talking and seeing, and of a disrespect toward
all that, in signification and dialogue, is proper, rational and correct. To free
associate is first of all to dissociate from the consensual and the transparently
meaningful, from, as Pontalis put it, “the established associations, those that
are firmly in place, in order to make other associations appear, often dangerous
ones...”306
Free association is necessarily more troubling and dissensual, but also less
“material” and clearly identifiable, than any act of free speech: if free speech
can very well be the expression of a self-possessed rational and unitary individ-
ual, free association is bound to expose its heteronomy, to disturb the subject
and the articulation of the social space it inhabits. On one hand, then, the
contingency and “freeness” of association make it so that even a conformist or
escapist spectator is always liable - threatened, if you like - of defying its own
intention to conform: the Einfall is always an opening for dissensual meaning,
not only directed against institutions and discursive hegemony, but also against
303 Pontalis, L’Amour des Commencements, 115.
304 Sigmund Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” in Freud: Complete Works, ed. Ivan
Smith (2000 [1900]), 673.
305 See Bollas, Cracking Up, 168-169.
306 Pontalis, Ce Temps Qui ne Passe Pas, 115. Emphasis added.
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the pretence of mastery that is performed by the self. On the other hand,
the agency thatare characteristic of psychic experience and the subversiveness
that can be recognised in the subject other to itself, is never truly volitional,
never fully intelligible and controllable. To lose the productive potential of this
otherness, to downplay the spectator’s “waywardness”, is at the same time a
way to reduce it to intelligibility and to reinstate a pre-Freudian conception
of desire and a pre-Marxist notion of ideology as a false consciousness. Free
associations, on the contrary, force the subject in an extreme and intrinsically
distressing proximity not only to what she encounters, but to herself and her
peculiar ways of encountering the world. The dimension of contiguity and con-
tingency to which free associations give a shape is at the same time a form
of escape from identity, and a way of not overlooking our own finiteness and
specificity as embodied subjects.
The scope of spectatorship shifts our focus from an understanding of film
experience centred on a unitary and self-sufficient individual, to one that is at
the same time interpersonal - that is, dialogic and made of encounters with
other people - and impersonal or heteronomous - made of encounters with what
(in us and outside of us) is not us. Free association evokes a dimension that
lies in-between people, but also one that is the shifting shape of subjectivity
itself. Even in the solitude and withdrawal that characterise the moment of
projection, at least in its dominant form, our experience of film involves us
as a subject with a history of encounters, it evokes in us the people and the
the circumstances that, as they say, made of us what we are and that, in their
ungraspability, are still making us be something different than what we think we
are. Free associations would be relevant to our understanding of film experience,
then, less as a formalist model of film signification (which will eventually return
within the logic of the text and the regime of interpretation), than for the kind
of interpersonal space and heteronomous subjectivity that they call into being.
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Embodiment and film experience
If there is an essential characteristic of embodiment, it is inde-
terminacy.
Thomas J. Csordas. Embodiment and Experience.
But how is one supposed to run from something one is, where
is the reference point, the footŋhold from which to oppose it? Our
form permeates us, imprisons us from within as well as from without.
Witold Gombrowicz. Ferdydurke.
Ontology and the phenomenological turn.
In recent years, we have come to speak of a phenomenological turn in film
studies, which is taking place in the context of the decline of the paradigm of
apparatus theory, and of an overall renewal of interest in embodied and bod-
ily experience on the part of cultural studies and the arts. To set a landmark
for the use of the expression, it is becoming customary to refer to the 2013
Queen Mary University of London symposium that was dedicated to the sub-
ject.307 The foundations of the turn itself, however, were established gradually
in the mid and late Nineties through a range of references - from transcendental
to existential phenomenology, from radical feminism to cognitive theory, from
307 “The Phenomenological Turn in Film Studies.” Queen Mary University of London, 23
May 2013.
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deconstructionism to the neurosciences. There is hardly one simple common
measure to these works: the “phenomenological” denomination in film studies
is in fact heterogeneous in its methods, in its very conceptions of phenomenol-
ogy, in its foci, and in its aims. If any common features are to be found they
are, first of all, in the general intention of placing film phenomenology beyond
apparatus theory and psychoanalytic film theory through a revaluation of the
embodied agency of spectators, of the situatedness of their encounter with film,
and of the bodiliness and the material sensuousness of their experience. Other
recognisable features of the turn are less specific objects and perspectives than a
series of tensions - between pre-discursive forms of knowledge and their norma-
tive regulation, between presence and meaning, vision and the flesh, cognition
and sensation, pleasure and desire - that phenomenology allows to reshape and
connect in a more coherent way, despite the fact that these tensions are often
resolved by different authors in antithetic directions.
In a most basic way, we can say that film phenomenology entails a turn away
from the logic of ontology - from an idea of reality as something independent
from, or preceding, its apprehension by a human subject. So, a phenomeno-
logical approach to film would, or should, place itself first of all beyond an
ontology of the moving image. That is, on one hand, beyond the idea that the
moving image can be studied “as such”, independently from it being a more
or less contingent object of embodied experience. And, on the other, beyond
an objectification of the spectator’s relation to the image, and of the image to
the phenomenal world (beyond the idea that to the indexicality of the moving
image would correspond an unmediated representation of reality). In any case,
a phenomenological approach would shift the focus from an eminently textual
conception of film signification to one that is centred in embodied and situated
experience. It should be clear that, in this broad sense, a phenomenological per-
spective is not a recent fact in film theory, but rather represents a longstanding
concern in understanding film experience, reaching beyond the adoption and
the articulation of a specific philosophical paradigm, and back to the funda-
mental problems of perception, realism, the imaginary and, indeed, the concept
of spectatorship.
With the idea of cinema as an ideological institution, of film as a discursive
object and of spectatorship as a signifying practice, psychoanalytic film theory
already entailed a fundamental shift from the ontology of the moving image
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toward its phenomenology - if not in terms of embodied experiencing, at least
in terms of the discursivity of film experience. In many respects, then (the
situatedness of spectatorship, the relation of the “real” subject and of more
bodily forms of experience with the dimension of language and discourse, the
role of the body in the conceptualisation of subjectivity, and the politics of the
body’s representation), the phenomenological turn comes as a critique but also
as an extension of some of the fundamental issues that were first addressed by
apparatus theory.308 What is characteristic of a phenomenological approach,
then, is less the disclosure of a previously uncharted territory, than a different
account of the phenomenological dimension of film experience and spectator-
ship, an alternative regime of understanding of the body of the spectator in its
encounter with the film.
It goes without saying that a phenomenological approach is bound to fore-
ground embodied film experience film as the main object of film theory, and of
the spectator’s body as the main site of its significance. A phenomenological
turn, then, inaugurates a revival of the study of spectatorship, at the same time
recognising more power and responsibility to audiences in relation to aesthetic
experience, and shifting the centre of the theoretical account of experiencing
itself closer to the individual viewer. Closer to its singular contingency, that
is, and thus away from the intelligibility of the text (if not necessarily away
from the situatedness of its cultural context) and away from the structures of
metapsychology and the institutions of ideology (if not entirely away from film’s
discursivity). From a phenomenological perspective, in fact, the spectator’s ex-
perience is still culturally and historically located, but is less unavoidably and
never entirely determined by film textuality and by the ideological institutions
of the medium.
In some of its forms (Laura Marks, Laura McMahon, Jennifer Barker), phe-
nomenological film theory pursues an epistemology of touch, contiguity and
connectedness, as opposed to the distance-based, objectual, forms of knowledge
and experience that are characterised by an alliance of vision and intellectual
mastery.309 While embodied experience - in the work of Vivian Sobchack, for
instance - is centred in the body but can still be a form of conscious cognition,
308 Richard Rushton, “Deleuzian Spectatorship,” Screen 50, no. 1 (2009): 46.
309 See Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the
Senses (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000), 162-163.
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the description of bodily experience and the revaluation of its scope against
that of vision that we find in the work of Marks points instead to a different
epistemology and a different equilibrium of power relations between bodies and
their representations. What this approach suggests, I would say, is to look for
the significance of embodied film experience not in the contraposition of the
visible and the invisible - of the body and its screen (mis-)representations - but
rather in a tension between the visible and the visual.
This particular form of film phenomenology displays an attention to the
discursivity of bodies beyond their discursive objectification - beyond, more
generally, what we could call an “objectual” regime of knowledge and experi-
encing. At the same time, it reaches out to touch forms of experiencing that
are closer to the contingency of the subject and the materiality of the medium,
forms that a cognitive philosophical approach, on its own, is not equipped to
address. Indeed, a “tactile” approach to the materiality of the world and to
its fleeting forms of being entails first of all a change in our forms of knowing.
Other than being a philosophy of embodiment, then, phenomenological film
theory would also aspire to be a more embodied philosophy of film.
For Marks, a tactile epistemology “conceive[s] of knowledge as something
gained not on the model of vision but through physical contact.”310 She claims
that the modality of this form of knowledge is not representation but mimesis,
which she understands in Auerbach’s sense of a “lively and responsive relation-
ship” between the listener of a story, a reader, or a spectator, “such that each
time a story is retold it is sensuously remade in the body of the listener.”311
Since mimesis in this sense corresponds to the embodied nature of experience
and to our sensuous and psychic implication with the world, I would not op-
pose it to representation and signification, but rather take it as an expression
of their semiotic dimension. The way I understand it, mimesis can be taken as
a form of symbolic relation that is not subordinated to an act of interpretation,
while it still implies a form of theoretical (spectatorial) understanding: if it is
a way of knowing, then it is a way of knowing that replicates the form of its
object, rather than reducing it to the principles of its intelligibility. Mimesis is,
for Jan Campbell as well, a fundamental form of embodied relation that comes
310 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 138.
311 Ibid.
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before, and cannot be reduced within, an Oedipal and authoritarian regime of
knowledge.312 In the perspective that Marks and Campbell open up, then, it
is not vision as such that should be criticised for objectifying the body, but
only one particular modality of its experience and one particular regime of its
understanding: that sort of “instrumental vision”, as Marks puts it, “that uses
the thing seen as an object for knowledge and control.”313
Even in its most “cognitive” formulations, like Vivian Sobchack’s early work
The Address of the Eye, what phenomenology brings to our understanding of
film is the sense of a more material (if not always necessarily more contingent)
and more egalitarian (if sometimes no less transcendental) relation between
viewer and film. In its more distinctive, and perhaps more radical, expres-
sions, the phenomenological turn attempts to refuse the reduction of vision to
visibility and puts a more bodily and subjectively contingent subject in place
of apparatus theory’s metapsychological spectator, and images that are more
visually material as projections on a screen in place of the film text. At the
level of spectatorship as a social practice, as well, phenomenological film the-
ory can be seen to foreground the presence - and, by that, the agency and
responsibility - of subjects as they interact with film and with other specta-
tors. Yet, at the same time that film phenomenology looks for the relevance
of the contingent, and attempts to universalize it, it sometimes tends to look
for non-phenomenal elements as well: not only to what might be invisible or
irrepresentable in embodied experience, but to a pure, pre-discursive presence
of the body and of things in the world, and thus to pre- or post-psychoanalytic,
pre- or post-ideological, conceptions of subjectivity as well.
In some respects, film phenomenology competes as a paradigm of film expe-
riencing against the metapsychological account of the position of the spectator
in psychoanalytic film theory, against semiological accounts of textuality and
signification, and against cognitive explanations of the processes of perception.
As such, phenomenology finds, or at any rate should find, in the contingency
and situatedness of the spectator’s encounter with film an ally against the ab-
stractness and potential normativity of these approaches. Still, even as film
phenomenology generally refuses to take film as a non-intentional object, as
312 Jan Campbell, Film and Cinema Spectatorship: Melodrama and Mimesis (Cambridge:
Polity, 2005), 53.
313 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 131.
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a text or a physical item “absolutely external to any mind,”314of the kind a
cognitivists like Dominique Chateau posit as the counterpart of subjectivity
in film experience,315 it does not necessarily address the contingency of expe-
riencing and embodiment and the heteronomy of the subject. What I mean
is that phenomenological film theory may still seek to systematise and objec-
tify sense-experience and the body on the ground of basic psychological and
cognitive processes or transcendental categories, by this eventually failing its
intended critique of the body’s normalisation.316 A focus on the body, indeed,
does not automatically come with a recognition of the radical indeterminacy of
embodiment. In this sense we can understand the distinction that James Pen-
ney proposes between a film phenomenology of Deleuzian ascent, like Shapiro
and Marks’, and one based on the work of Merleau-Ponty (as well as Husserl’s)
like it is the case for Allan Casebier and Vivian Sobchack:317 in relation to the
classification of contingency that we have proposed in the third chapter, then,
the latter approach would, so to speak, fall shy of radical contingency. An-
other possible categorisation of the phenomenological approach could be estab-
lished on the difference and the articulation of embodied and bodily experience
- between an interest in the situatedness of perception on one hand, and the
particular qualities of sense-experience on the other, as it constitutes a kind of
pre-objectual or non-objectual component of perception itself. This distinction
in some aspects runs parallel to the philological one advanced by Penney - we
might associate a focus on the body as a centre of cognition to the former, and
an interest in a sensual and desiring bodiliness to the latter - but it also cuts
through it and crosses over, with different results, to the fields of feminist and
queer studies, medical humanities and the arts.
Embodied experience becomes significant, in my view, inasmuch as we take
the body as a site of conflict, as a discursive category and as a radically contin-
gent and material ground of experiencing and agency. From this perspective,
314 Dominique Chateau, “A Philosophical Approach to Film Form,” in Subjectivity: Filmic
Representation and the Spectator’s Experience, ed. Dominique Chateau (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 165.
315 Ibid., p. 163.
316 Jenny Chamarette, “Embodied Worlds and Situated Bodies: Feminism, Phenomenology,
Film Theory,” Signs 40, no.2 (2015): 289.
317 James Penney, “The Failure of Spectatorship,” Communication Theory 17 (2007):
6n57-58.
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the body becomes a site of significance, rather than a field for collecting data,
a repertoire of basic conceptual structures or a unitary agent of meaning and
action. In that it is driven by and drives towards what it is not - toward other
people, toward its own uncanniness - the body is never a mere object of sig-
nification. What we have first described as a move away from ontology, also
implies a move away from objectification and a critique of the mastery of vision
together with the authority of the institutions that regulate it - including, es-
pecially in the case of spectatorship, film theory itself. As Judith Butler wrote,
not only “bodies tend to indicate a world beyond themselves, but this movement
beyond their own boundaries, a movement of boundary itself, appeared to be
quite central to what bodies are’.”318 Embodiment is then a matter of shifting
boundaries, an horizon more than a border, and, thus, something marked by
a radical indeterminacy. The contingency of the body and the heteronomy of
embodiment are always something more than their situatedness, and the former
dimension actually undermines the latter (in the sense that the body is never
fully present, or that, at least, it is not entirely intelligible as a presence). There
can be no simple, unbiased or non-normative, representation or understanding
of the body, then: in this way, issues of normative authority and self-mastery
become central to the life of the body and to the discussion of embodied experi-
ence. Contemporary critical theory, in fact, can be seen to extend the material
contingency and the discursivity that is characteristic of the psychoanalytic
subject to the domain of the body, precisely to counter its conception as the
naturalised ground of identity. If film phenomenology, then, at times attempts
to return to the idea of the body as a unitary centre of selfhood and experi-
ence, as a non-contingent but still situated presence, as an essential measure of
universality, or as an always already pre-discursive or subversive dimension of
experiencing, the kind of body that Butler describes, instead, is never a pure
presence. Despite, or rather precisely because of its indeterminacy and radi-
cal heteronomy, the body is never simply an object, even when it is effectively
passive or perceived to be utterly other to the self.
Non-objectual embodiment. There are, of course, precedents of this posi-
tion in phenomenological philosophy that radically oppose the reduction of the
318 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York and Lon-
don: Routledge, 1993), ix.
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scope of phenomenology to that of a cognitive mapping and objectification of
both lived-experience and things in the world, and that make an alliance of film
phenomenology with a radical feminist, queer and psychoanalytic conception of
the body and the subject not only coherent, but, in more than a way, necessary.
To quote from an author who is mostly evoked in film theory on the issue of
ethics, but who is also interesting for his critical evaluation of the foundations
and the development of phenomenology, Emmanuel Lévinas: “phenomenologi-
cal reduction has been a radical way to suspend the natural approach of a world
posited in terms of the object - a radical struggle against the abstraction that
the object epitomizes.”319 In relation to film, then, to reduce perception to a re-
lation between an object and a subject, independently whole and distinct from
each other, and to disregard the mutual implication, and even the fusion, of the
two that the concept of intentionality instead entails, is indeed already a way to
concede to abstraction and normativity, and to subsume the contingency of our
lived-experience of the moving image to a kind of naive, pre-discursive, realism.
Phenomenology, on the contrary, can be said to denounce any direct vision of
the object (and any unmediated form of self-representation) as naive,320 and to
hold instead that our perception of the object is an integral part of the object
itself.321 Subjectivity, then, would not exist prior to our acts of experiencing
and separated from our contingent experience of the world - a claim that sup-
ports, at the same time, the discursivity of lived-experience and the fact that it
can never be made completely intelligible by rational and discursive categories.
In this sense, phenomenology would not address the relation between sub-
jects and objects, but rather, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, a “thing-subject”
(chose-sujet)322 - a subject which is also an object, and an object that always
already bears a subjective mark. This idea of subjectivity entails indeed what
Merleau-Ponty called a chiasm, a confusion and a circularity of perceiving and
being perceived, of speaking and listening, of seeing and being seen, suggesting
that perception is made within things themselves and that passivity and activ-
319 “La réduction pénoménologique a été une façon radicale de suspendre l’approche naturel
du monde posé comme objet - la lutte radicale contre l’abstraction que l’objet résume.”
Emmanuel Lévinas, En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heiddeger (Paris: J. Vrin,
1994), 122. Translation mine.
320 Ibid., 114.
321 Ibid., 122.
322 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l’Invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 305.
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ity can therefore hardly be distinguished.323 In this particular understanding of
embodied perception, the phenomenological concept of intentionality (the idea
that consciousness is always consciousness of something) should not be confused
neither with the general idea of conscious intention, nor with the one-way direc-
tionality of our conscious apprehension of objects, for it actually constitutes a
sign of the indistinctness of subject and object and an expression of the radical
contingency of embodied perception.
There are no objects beyond consciousness, then, but there is not conscious-
ness beyond the objects it beholds, either. Embodiment would then become
something different than the centring of conscious experience in the body as an
hospitable and intelligible site of agency and signification, and rather a form
of utterly contingent decentering and scattering of the subject in the world.
As Thomas Csordas aptly puts it embodiment is “the existential condition of
cultural life”, not reducible “to representations of the body, to the body as an
objectification of power, to the body as a physical entity or biological organism,
nor to the body as an inalienable centre of individual consciousness.”324
It is then through a dissolution of the body as a concept and as a thing
with boundaries that film phenomenology can transcend the logic of discursive
determination, intelligibility and misrepresentation that informs the cinematic
apparatus - not by making embodiment more comprehensible, nor the body
more familiar. In this way, phenomenological film theory reaffirms the discur-
sivity of spectatorship and film experience, and at the same time subtracts it
from the authority and the Oedipal mastery that characterised apparatus the-
ory. From this perspective, one of the characteristic claims of Althusserian film
theory - that the spectator’s subjectivity is a product of film textuality - could
be reformulated in a less authoritarian and deterministic way. There would
not be any spectator beyond its encounter with the film, but also, conversely,
no film beyond its contingent and subjective experience: at the same time this
would not mean, however, that either film or spectator would be determined) or
made essentially intelligible by the other. Neither the “textual” spectator nor
the “real” viewer is, or should, be addressed beyond the contingency of its en-
counter with film. Embodiment is not a structure of intelligibility, eventually, it
323 Ibid., 312.
324 Thomas J. Csordas, ed., Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture
and Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), back cover page.
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is, rather, a material and aesthetic, but still discursive, ground of signification.
The encounter of the spectator and the film can be described as embodied,
then, precisely inasmuch as the dimension of the subject and that of the object,
that of the living body and of its discursive articulation, that of significance and
meaning, of spectatorship and theory, of light and image, are not kept apart, and
their relation is not reduced to the expression of some principle of intelligibility.
In other words, we can say that film experience finds its significance not merely
in relation to the dimension of reading and meaning, but more fundamentally
to the dimension of an embodied aesthetic use - not just in relation to more or
less fixed and consensual semiological and sociological (never merely “cultural”)
codes, and not just in the interaction between the position of the spectator and
the film’s ideological forms. Losing this embodied tension, which is proper of the
spectator’s fantasy, is, arguably, also to lose the specificity and the significance
of the experience of spectatorship. As a matter of fact, apparatus theory already
understood that the boundary between the spectator’s embodied fantasy, on one
hand, and ideology and cinematic discourse, on the other, is always a permeable
one. In fact, it was precisely by assuming the spectator’s desiring involvement
with film and the essentially fantasmatic dimension of meaning and signification,
that the idea of the spectator’s passivity and ideological determination was
elaborated in the first place. The heteronomy and contingency of the subject in
its encounter with film, however, were then subjected to interpretation, thereby
reducing the theoretical dimension of film experience to a meta-language and a
meta-politics of spectatorship, and thus arguably framing film experience, and
the very ground of film theory, in an authoritarian way.
Withdrawing oneself from the discursivity of the body discursivity is not, in
the end, a way around its normative determination - quite the contrary. It is in
fact in relation to the issue of intelligibility of film experience and spectatorship,
not in their discursive nature, that rests their reduction within a pedagogical
regime, and that their submission to the power of normative institutions takes
place. A move away from the ontology of the moving image, then, entails both
the recognition of the discursivity of the body and the acknowledgement of the
contingency of embodiment itself: not only a transformation of the body from
visible object to visual agent, but a radical foregrounding of the subject’s lack
of mastery over its own body as well. All the tensions that film phenomenology
allows to think together coalesce, indeed, as Csordas suggested, in an indeter-
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minate and non-objectual notion of embodiment: never just the mere material
presence of the body, nor just its mise en discours (its normative classification,
say, from a medical, sociological or metapsychological perspective), never just
its mise en images (its cinematic representation and its inscription within the
regime of its visibility), never just the dynamics of the body as a passive object
of power and ideology, as an active instrument of volition, nor as the always
hospitable and inalienable site of subjectivity. When we address embodiment
in these general terms, then, we are addressing the implication of experience
with bodily sensation, of embodiment with subjectivity, and of the role of the
body as an agent of social power and as the ground of political subjectivation.
Abandoning from the start any pretence to be comprehensive on such wide-
ranging issues, I will concentrate on the points in which these issues intersect
the ideas of authority, theory, contingency and heteronomy that we have already
encountered.
Discursivity of the body and incitation to discourse. The relation of
embodiment to spectatorship is first of all addressed in terms of the relation
between the lived-body of spectators and the representations of bodies that
are given on-screen. The connection of these two domains - the space that
this connection entails in-between them - defines at the same time a particular
dimension of the politics of spectatorship and filmmaking, and constitutes itself
as a specific epistemological and methodological field. In different forms, this
relation and this space have been a constant concern of film theory.325 Still,
it would be impossible to say a final word about the body and the screen, for
their interplay is constitutional of the tension by which spectatorship is defined,
a tension which is never simply resolved by a shift of paradigm or through a
different modality of experiencing. In particular, a phenomenological turn is
not, or should not be, a move away from the discursivity of this relation: for the
viewer is itself a discursive construct, and its body is, in fact, the quintessential
“object” of regulatory power.
The reduction of the body to visibility can be taken as the model of its
normative regulation. A mise en discours of the body begins indeed with its
disciplinary observation: its surveillance, its classification, its examination and
325 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 131.
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self-inspection, its autopsy, and so on, but also, in a different way its promotion
as a commodity and as an aesthetic “form”. The surveillance of bodies, however,
does not stop with the limits of optical technologies, nor at the frontiers of the
logic of visibility or of the regime of representation: for it corresponds more
essentially to a reduction of the body to intelligibility. As such, not only the
articulation between the body and its image, taken in its broader sense, is
inevitable: it is inevitably a tension. On one hand, a minimum of distance and
mastery over the body is inevitable for our existence and, on the other, this
self-mastery is consubstantial with and contiguous to the existing institutions
of domination and regulatory power. Embodiment and the body, then, far from
being the material and conceptual sites of an intrinsic subversiveness, actually
name a fundamental level in which authority and discursive power at the same
insist and become somewhat ungraspable.
It is not by chance then that the disembodied language of apparatus theory
addressed the relation of embodied film experience to ideology through the La-
canian metaphor of the mirror. The inexhaustible mirror metaphor of cinematic
identification relates in fact to this aspect of embodiment, to this inevitable ten-
sion, suggesting on one hand the very contingency and heteronomy of the “real”
subject, and, on the other, the imaginary mastery that corresponds to its vis-
ible representation. And yet, as the illusory self-mastery that is attributed to
the spectator is made intelligible through theory and interpretation, another
mirror and another illusion of mastery - that which defines the action of theory
- manifest themselves. Faced with a psychoanalytic subject and a discursive
body, the fantasy of mastery is not just the fantasy of a unitary subject and
a pre-discursive body, but first of all that of controlling the instruments that
make our lack of mastery intelligible. Both mirrors pretend to give to the sub-
ject a unity and mastery that amount in fact to its institutional regulation and
normalisation. A sense of the body’s dis-unity and of the subject’s heteronomy,
then, would be consubstantial to the subject’s emancipation. Before its repre-
sentation, before the interpretation that makes it intelligible, embodiment takes
place as a contingent encounter and a sharing, which cannot be reduced to the
expression of a pre-determined message, to the volition of an independent, self-
possessed, individual, nor to the unmediated presence of things in the world.
Marks, in this regard, envisages haptic visuality as “a respect of difference, and
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concomitant loss of self, in the presence of (193) the other.”326
The transformation of this heteronomy into the utter passivity of identifica-
tion would then be the most evident aspect of apparatus theory’s authoritarian
reduction of spectatorship: in fact, while heteronomy is not intelligible and
manageable passivity is. The passivity that the critics of apparatus theory ad-
dress, in fact, can be seen as the principles of an authoritarian, heterosexist,
fear of heteronomy: a transcendental authority is imagined where no one can
actually be found, in a desperate attempt to account not for our servitude, but
for our lack of freedom, and not really for the power that others have on us,
but rather for the one we cannot have over ourselves. It is precisely through an
intellectual fantasy of mastery that the imaginary subject attempts to control
the pleasurable contingency of the Einfall and the traumatic eruption of the
symptom, thereby attempting to nullify their shattering effects. We could say
that the normative subject is the one for whom every Einfall is nothing but
a symptom, for whom every instance of self-dissemination becomes a moment
of traumatic loss. In turn, one could say that repressive subject positions are
first of all tentative authoritarian solutions to the deadlock of the psyche, of
its heteronomy, discursivity and situatedness. The masterful distance of the
apparatus theorist is, in the end, what allows for the discursive regulation of
the spectator’s polymorphic and perverse pleasure. In a Foucauldian fashion,
we can say that perverse spectators, and wayward ones as well, were “invented”
not by cinema as such, but when film theory established itself as a technology
of spectatorship.
We have seen in the second chapter how spectatorship theory entails a mise
en discours of the spectator and of its subjectivity. The same can be said, even
more appropriately given the Foucauldian descent of the concept, on one side, of
the longstanding interest of film, feminist and cultural studies in the body and
its representation, and, on the other, of the focus on embodiment which is char-
acteristic of the more recent phenomenological turn. Like sexuality, the field of
our knowledge of the body is subordinated to the relations of power that inform
it in the first place: so that, in turn, as Foucault wrote, “between techniques of
knowledge and strategies of power there is no externality.”327 In this sense, the
326 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 192-193.
327 Foucault, Histoire de la Sexualité, 129-130.
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practice of theory - and of a theory of the body in an exemplary way - can never
claim a comfortable distance from its object, nor from its function of policing
and control. It is always hard to distinguish a more positive articulation of em-
bodied experience and of a discourse of the body, from the body’s disciplinary
reduction into discourse. The normative definition and the governance of the
body, indeed, is not just performed through its material coercion and through
its repression, but it is also positively affirmed in the articulation of our modes
of living and ways of understanding embodied experience itself. Normativity,
Foucault argued, affirms itself first of all in an intensification of the scope of the
body, of its valorisation as an object of knowledge and as an element of power
relations.328 In this sense we could read the relation between the body and the-
ory as an intrinsically normative one: through a mise en discours of the body,
what is said about it appears to be bound to betray that indeterminacy that
grounds the embodied subject’s emancipation. All those theories of film that
aim to make embodiment and forms of bodily experience more tangible and
comprehensible, in fact, run the risk overstepping their subversive intentions -
subversive, that is, of the disembodied subjectivity of the apparatic spectator,
and of the power over the spectators’ bodies that is exerted by cinematic insti-
tutions - precisely by determining an extension of the field that those powers
can reach. In this proliferation, the body becomes again an inert object. An
inert object of a more dynamic discourse, that is true, but still an object that
is made more visible, and that is thus subjected, in the greater freedom that is
recognised to it, to an intensified surveillance; and that is made more knowl-
edgeable and intelligible, and, by this, subjected to an increased mastery and
control.
If institutional power aims at the reproduction of the conditions in which its
own power is established - that is, in the case of film, at the reproduction of the
spectator as a passive subject position and as an active consumer of film - the
kind of power which is characteristic of an incitation to discourse works instead
on a principle of comprehensive mapping, through a permanent extension of the
domains and of the forms of control. Ideology attends not only to the definition
of spectatorship as a specific subject position, but also to the articulation of a
plurality of forms of spectatorship. Power, Foucault suggests, is not confined to
328 Ibid., 141.
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repressive authority, but rather insists in the very articulation of forms of life,
including practices of subversion and rearticulation of the social space.
Slavoj Žižek is referring to this Foucauldian understanding of discursive
power when he links Lacan’s discourse of the university to what he holds to be
one of the defining features of capitalism - its capacity to absorb everything that
exceeds it.329 At the same time, Žižek criticises this understanding of discourse
and subjectivity, on the grounds that Foucault identifies the subject with that
which is created by the mise en discours, not with what this mise en discourse
fails to address or that is otherwise left unaddressed:
“The university discourse is enunciated from the position of neu-
tral’ Knowledge; it addresses the remainder of the real [...] turning
it into the subject ($). The truth’ of the university discourse, hidden
beneath the bar, of course, is power, i.e. the Master-Signifier: the
constitutive lie of the university discourse is that it disavows its per-
formative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a polit-
ical decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state
of things. What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misread-
ing: the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises
as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but
its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power.”330
The discursivity of the body is, then, fundamentally, a matter of the limits
of normative discourse and of its very contingency - it relates to discursive
lack and opposes discursive hegemony, not (or not essentially) the contents
of a given dominant discourse. While hegemony, as we have seen, refers to the
operation of appropriating the principles that regulate the very conflict between
opposing discourses, a discourse becomes powerful in the measure that it can
convince us that it has in fact added something to our understanding, that it
has extended its domain to a previously uncharted territory. The body, and
especially the body as the ultimate remainder of ideological interpellation (that
is, as a pre-discursive entity), becomes then the ideal object of the discourse
329 Slavoj Žižek, “Jacques Lacan’s Four Discourses,” Lacan.com (2006): http://www.la-
can.com/zizfour.html.
330 Slavoj Žižek, “Homo Sacer as the Object of the Discourse of the University,” Lacan.com
(2003): http://www.lacan.com/hsacer.html.
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of the university. This discourse is, in a sense, the prototype of pedagogical
authoritarian power, but of course it should not be seen to be limited to the
university as a literal institution. In fact, a pretence of mastery over the body
is an integral part of spectatorship as well - it defines, precisely, the scope
of the spectator’s power and of its capacity for rational understanding. Its
subjectivity, however and, with it, its fundamental emancipation as well, remain
incommensurable to the principles of its mastery and can thus be seen to lay
fundamentally in what cannot be entirely grasped, defined, and controlled of
the spectator’s contingent and embodied experience.
The discursivity of the body is not tantamount to its mise en discours,
then: on the contrary, the idea of a comprehensive discursive articulation runs
counter the very discursivity of the body and the contingency of embodied
experiencing, which in fact escape autonomous agency and full intelligibility.
In relation to this, the academic incitation to a discourse on the body - the
renewed interest in bodily and embodied experience - can be seen in part to be
a function of power, in that it extends a field of intelligibility and not only one
of signification, and in that it determines a re-distribution of the sensible and it
is not merely an instance of its sharing. What resists discursive determination
is not the dimension of the body as such, then, but its contingency, of which its
discursivity is a fundamental part and, in a sense, the ultimate guarantee.
That the body and subjectivity are discursive does not mean, in turn, that
their performativity is volitional (“I can create what I am”), nor that they are
entirely determined by discourse, dominant or not (“what I am is created for
me”). As we have seen in the first chapter, these two assumptions actually
require and reinforce each other: both presuppose the same mastery, they only
assign it to a different subject position, to a different side of a normative split.
In this sense, the idea of a masterful apparatus and of a masterful theory un-
derscores and supports the fantasy of mastery of the cinematic subject, and the
reverse. Film theory can then be seen to be an integral part of the authoritarian
apparatus it describes, precisely as the institution that sanctions this fantasy
of intellectual mastery. What apparatus theory did not address, indeed, was
the crucial role that its own pretence of mastery played in locking up the spec-
tator in a passive position. Much like the intelligible unconscious, the idea of
a body that can apprehend the world and act autonomously entails the idea
that it can be controlled by an external agency. What a radical phenomenolog-
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ical and psychoanalytic approach suggests considering, on the contrary, is not
just the spectator’s agent passivity, heteronomy and embodiment, but, more
fundamentally, an agency that lies in the lack of their intelligibility.
If the body is, in relation to normative discourse, the excessive dimension
par excellence, then the proliferation of discourses on it - from its framing as an
organism by medical discourse to its framing as a commodity in consumerism, to
the academic/artistic discourse of the body as the domain of the irrepresentable
and the pre-discursive - becomes in the end a function of regulatory police. On
the contrary, it is precisely because the body is discursive that it can resist its
normative determination, without having to entertain a fantasy of mastering
itself or to reduce the scope of its agency to that of conscious choice. At the
same time non-phenomenal remainder and centre of embodied experience and
knowledge, the body must be defined, again, in terms of an irresoluble tension.
Visibility and the visual.
It is characteristic of the mise en discours of the body that it be at the same
time overtly and widely discussed, and presented as something intrinsically un-
fathomable: as Foucault wrote of sex, the body is at the same time exposed and
prized as a secret.331 The real body is hidden from sight, and yet it is defined
and desired in terms of its visibility. Embodiment, in a similar way, is beheld in
the mind as an impenetrable, shapeless form of experience: something invisible
and irrepresentable that nevertheless invites to explore the aesthetics and the
categories of its visibility and representation. The incitation to discourse that
we have discussed requires indeed first of all to establish a territory absolutely
external to discourse, in relation to which the articulation of discursive power
can then be effected. Seeing it from a different angle, we can say that what
is considered external to discourse is actually defined by discourse in the first
place, and in turn motivates the performance of its regulatory function. The
distinctive operation of discourse would be not simply to dictate what the body
is, but rather to appropriate what it is not, to articulate what is proper and
improper to the scope of the body in a social and symbolic space, and what is
subversive as well as consensual in the relations between these two dimensions.
331 “Ce qui est propre aux sociétés modernes, ce n’est pas qu’elles aient voué le sexe à rester
dans l’ombre, c’est qu’elles se soient vouées à en parler toujours, en le faisant valoir comme
le secret.” Foucault, Histoire de la Sexualité, 42.
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Even more, it would be to dominate and impose the principles of this articula-
tion, and, of course, the principles of the principles: in this way, the authority
of theoretical and meta-theoretical discourse comes to support social norma-
tivity and becomes in some ways consubstantial with the power of discourse -
with its very dominance.332 In this context, Rancière’s concept of the partage
du sensible is particularly appropriate, for it does not address discursive power
as some kind of entity defined by its symbolic content, but rather as the very
act of social distribution and discursive articulation, thus suggesting that the
landscape of governance cannot be separated from the underlying dimension
of sharing and equality, and from the contingent dynamics of their interaction.
In the end, the distinctive scope of the mise en discours would be precisely
the inclusion in a given distribution of the sensible of what specific discursive
“entities” appear to exclude.
If, on one hand, these discursive entities are necessarily normative, and
the mise en discours clearly aims at an hegemonic mapping, the dimension of
discursive power as such, on the other hand - what we could call discursivity - is
neither essentially authoritarian, nor intrinsically subversive. More specifically,
discursivity is not positional, it does not allow for a clear identification of the
parts: in this, is should not be seen as a domain framing the body from the
outside, but rather as an integral aspect of the unintelligibility of embodiment
itself. If the body is never simply an object, then it is never just visible or
invisible, representable or irrepresentable. Embodiment would not name either
the discursive determination of the body, or the fullness of a pre-discursive
dimension, but rather the partiality and situatedness of both lived experience
and its representation - a partiality that makes subjectivity and signification
possible in the first place.
In this perspective, the invisibility of bodies would appear to be already a
category of authoritarian vision, and an expression of the discursive hegemony
of the visible over the embodied experience of the visual. The normativity of
discourse, in this sense, would correspond not only to a recognisable mise en
discours of the body, but also to the absolute presence of the invisible that
332 The authority of meta-theoretical discourse is not necessarily judged in meta-theoretical
terms: for instance, a prolific author is often more powerful than a good argument. At
the same time, however, a “pure” and effective meta-theoretical approach brings about an
even stricter normative control.
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this mise en discours presupposes: an absolute presence of the invisible that
is precisely the opposite of the contingent and ungraspable presence of the
visual. Visibility entails, then, a reduction of the scope of vision, as well as an
authoritarian and objectual regime of understanding of visual experience and
the image. Visibility is in fact the first form not only of a regulation of the body,
but of a normalisation of synaesthetic experience and a regulation of visuality
itself: once it is made intelligible, a body becomes not just less than what it is,
but also less than what can be seen of it.
Spectatorship is never quite a problem of the impossibility of representation,
then, nor of its being always already determined by dominant discourse, but
rather entails, as Rancière argues, a problem of relational distribution and of
representational distance.333 As we have seen, Rancière suggests a shift from
the idea of the irrepresentable to that of a fundamental, and fundamentally po-
litical, incommensurability at the core of the distribution of the sensible. From
the point of view of the fantasy and the lack of mastery that we are pursuing,
then, this incommensurability is first of all one in-between the embodied ex-
perience of the the spectator and the categories of its intelligibility. While the
idea of irrepresentability puts the body not only beyond consensual meaning
but altogether beyond signification, incommensurability implies a instead a dis-
sensual relation between signification and discourse, which can be taken to be
the foundation of subjective speech and political subjectivity. The hegemony
of vision, then, is always already the hegemony of a particular regime of under-
standing of vision, over other possible ways of understanding and experiencing
the visual. Technologies of visibility (which are never just optical technologies)
not only frame the body in terms of what can be made visible and intelligible
about it, they subordinate visual experience to its visible forms.
What we normally call vision, then, already names a particular regime of
distribution of the visual: a masterful vision that implies intelligibility and ob-
jectification and that, in fact, constitutes a form of visibility without visuality.
The fantasy of mastery leads indeed to a disembodied vision, which would be
in turn the defining feature of both the cinematic apparatus (as a principle of
intelligibility of spectatorship and its pleasures) and, more generally, of the ocu-
larcentric apparatus (as an authoritarian and disciplinary regime of the visual).
333 Rancière, Le Destin des Images, 128.
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Metapsychology and the regime of interpretation, the reduction of the radical
contingency of subjectivity and the reduction of the body to the principles of
its visibility, as well as the pedagogical assumption of the lack of knowledge
and agency of spectators, would all be, then, functional elements to the es-
tablishment of surveillance, of the authority of theory, and of the mastery of
instrumental reason. The alliance of vision with reason and cognition that takes
place through optical technologies appears to grant us the wish of seeing the
invisible. However, not only this wish is bound to remain unfulfilled, but such
an alliance is bound to diminish the richness of our visual experience. The
results of this pretence of mastery over experience is, indeed, a mastery over
the self that is also a form of sensory deprivation, one that entails and further
reinforces the nostalgia for unity and wholeness which is typical of normative
subject positions - or better, of a normative distribution of subjectivities.
The visual, on the contrary, would be informed by what is contingent, em-
bodied, discursive, and thus constantly elusive, about the subject’s experience of
vision. Rather than being identified as invisible, it would correspond, as Marks
argues, to the diminished visibility of the haptic image:334 not a lack of vision,
really, but a lack in our mastery over the visual. A blurring of the image that is
as much “filmic” - that is, taking place at the level of the camera, of the surface
of the recorded reel and of the light projected on the screen - as it is experi-
ential and conceptual. In the end, this alternative regime of the visible would
still constitute a form of sensuous knowledge, one that, as Marks argues, can
be organised and “cultivated” not unlike rational and conceptual knowledge.335
In this sense we can speak of a tactile or haptic epistemology. Therefore, as we
have been arguing, a more sensuous experience of the visual would not bring
about a complete freedom from mastery and discourse, but rather bring with
it alternative forms of understanding that involve a diminished mastery over
embodied experience.
But what does it mean that an experience can be visual, while not being
either visible or invisible? A classic example would be the dream. To dreams,
indeed, is generally attributed a visual nature, even though a dream is not,
strictly speaking, visible. Nor is it invisible, in the sense that it cannot be
334 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, (Minneapolis, London
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 91.
335 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 144.
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experienced visually: on the contrary, dream is in itself already a form of sig-
nification. The dream-work already provides a signifying connection between
incommensurable forms of experiencing and incommensurable “parts” of the
subject. In the process, one should note, this incommensurability is not re-
moved, nor reduced into the expression of an immanent meaning (which is the
task of interpretation and its regime), but rather maintained and allowed to
be significant as it is. It is actually the experience of dreaming, not the latent
meaning that can be found through interpretation, that opens up our conscious
thought and our waking life to the dimension of the unconscious. Meaning and
interpretation, at least in their authoritarian forms, are on the contrary what
attempts to return the symptom and the Einfall to meaning. While the logic
of representation and interpretation presuppose a translation into meaning, the
kind of significance that is proper of dream and of an embodied visuality works
instead by preserving its indeterminacy. From the point of view of its mise
en discours and of the fantasy of its mastery, then, the body is taken to be
like a reified unconscious: a domain of experience which is by definition irrep-
resentable, but that can nevertheless be objectified and, by this, reduced to
intelligibility through masterful interpretation. In other words, as it becomes
a reification of the irrepresentable, the unconscious is in fact articulated as a
recognisable part in the regime of representation.
Precisely as a discourse assigns to the body the position of the irrepre-
sentable, then, it makes possible to say about it no matter what: coherently,
we are faced with a proliferation of representations of the irrepresentable, of
shapes of invisibility and figurations of the abject - which come of course with
their unspoken disciplinary assumptions. Rather than having the body stand
for a reified domain of the irrepresentable, then, we should understand it to
be more like a radical psyche (or, as Pontalis put it, as something akin to the
insurrectional, explosive and anarchic body of the dream336): not as the incar-
nation of an identifiable domain of experience or a specific form of experiencing,
but rather as a site that is traversed, like the psyche, by a radical contingency
- always already interpersonal, and thus, heteronomous.
If we describe dreams in terms of vision it is, in the end, because vision
encompasses more than what is visible. We can find another example of this
336 Pontalis, Traversée des Ombres, 65.
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kind of visuality in the moving image itself - that is, in the film image as it is
experienced by the spectator. On one hand, the frames of the material reel are
clearly visible, and the images of the “objective”, optical, film are an abstraction
that further affirms their visibility - in this respect, photographic technology de-
pendsupon and supports the very regime of objectual, objectifying, vision.337
On the other hand, however, as soon as they enter embodied experience, these
visible images lose at least some of their visibility: no two people experience the
same film in the exact same way, and one can never “see” the film that someone
else perceives in the same way that one looks at the images on the screen. Both
these examples relate to the radical contingency of experiencing. Laura Marks,
instead, focusses on forms of visuality that have to do with the material con-
tingencies and passing situatedness of spectatorship (memory and migration),
with the indexical aura of filmed objects and the physicality of the cinematic
medium itself - as such, even if they cannot be addressed in terms of the object,
they still have a material referent, with which the critic can enter in contact
and engage in a haptic way.338 As we have said, then, embodiment would not
be a function of discourse nor something entirely detached from it, but rather
a further instance of discursive and subjective contingency. Like the psyche,
the body could not be probed nor signified without being at the same time
transformed, and not without involving the “observer” in this transformation.
Embodiment and contingency. The problem with the logic of visibility is,
indeed, that it circumvents the contingency of embodiment and reduces what
can be represented of, said about, or experienced through, the body to the ex-
tent of what can be understood about it, and thus subjected to surveillance.
Embodiment would in fact name what escapes the mise en discours of the body
(and, of course, of the idea of embodiment itself). In this sense, the problem
is again one of mastery: what makes embodiment more graspable and control-
lable, in fact, is also what diminishes the discursive, existential and, eventually,
political scope of the body. We could say, then, that the discursive mapping of
the body and the kind of mastery that attends to it, are in a way disembodied
or, rather, disembodying. Disembodied would be what is regulated about the
337 Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 36.
338 Marks, Touch, p. xiii.
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body, masterful about subjectivity and objectual about vision. Disembodiment,
in turn, would not mark a loss of materiality, nor of presence, but rather a loss
of contingency and an increase of mastery and intelligibility. It would not name
the heteronomy of the body nor the indistinctness of synaesthetic experience,
but, on the contrary, the embodied experience of a disembodying mastery. It
would essentially correspond to those normalised, non-existential, spaces Marc
Augé defined as non-places, and to the disciplined modes of relations that they
produce.339
If embodiment surely points beyond the individual and rather leads to see
the subject as a “site of correspondences with the world,”340 it also names the
fact that there are certain limits to our sharing of experience. As much as the
subject can be permeable and not correspond exactly to the boundaries of the
organism, the body still individuates a border: the idea of a heteronomous body
does not entail automatically a perfect correspondence of the world with our
embodied experiencing. Despite its heterogeneity and radical dissemination,
the body is still forcibly “individual” - it names a limit of our capacity for
sharing, as well as a limit in our ability to reach out to the world and be
imbued by it. The body is never self-sufficient, but at the same time it is never
perfectly hosted in the otherness of the world. The contingency of the body
has a weight, so to speak, that on one hand conditions its extensibility in time
and space and the transparency of our “being-there-ness” (of our partaking in
contingent encounters) and, on the other hand, renders the body opaque to the
authoritarian gaze.
The body further points to this other limit to the mastery of concepts: our
situatedness and contingency not only as subjects, not only as mortal bodies
facing a fleeting world and disappearing images, but as sensual beings. As the
ocularcentric regime articulates the visual under the aegis of visibility, it also
distributes the other senses, and their interaction, in relation to itself, thus es-
tablishing a hierarchy and a regime of separation among the senses. The very
distance that defines sight as a distance sense, then, is forced upon our under-
standing of other forms of sense experience. The ocularcentric regime sustains
339 Marc Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (London and
New York: Verso, 1995), 80.
340 Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010),
70.
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an epistemology, and a whole mode of being, that are based on distance and
objectification: it establishes the separation of the senses not only as the prin-
ciple of their intelligibility, but of their subjective experience. On the contrary,
Marks argues, the human sensorium is primarily characterised by synaesthesia:
a connectedness and permeability of all sense impressions, such that a sensa-
tion can evoke sense impressions that pertain to different sensory domains (sight
can evoke smell, for instance, or touch, and the reverse).341 Synaesthesia, at the
same time, names specific instances in which sense impressions and experiences
traverse their assigned boundaries, and a particular regime of understanding of
sense experience in general: a “syn-aesthetics”, if we like, in the sense of an aes-
thetics of connectedness, which would be inseparable from the indeterminacy
of embodiment that we have discussed.
Furthermore, to understand sight and spectatorship in terms of a more tac-
tile epistemology entails the idea that seeing already constitutes a form of touch,
that one could not see, in fact, without both entering the image and being
othered by it. As one cannot bring about power effects (subversive or other-
wise) without being involved in them, one cannot indeed touch without being
touched.342 Contingency, then, would essentially be a form of co-presence and
touch, as the origin of the word indeed also suggests: from the Latin contingo, to
enter into contact, reach, meet, touch.343 In turn, free association would bring
the condensation of synaesthetic experience and the contiguity of contingency
together. Free association can thus be seen as a principle of signification, of
experiencing and of its sharing, which proceeds by contact and contiguity: un-
folding, as it were, the synchronicity of our thoughts and feelings through time
and into form, and articulating synaesthetic experience through our memory
and intuition. Free floating attention and the process of free association would
then embody a mimetic, semiotic and dissensual aspect of language and speech
that is fundamentally like a form of psychic and aesthetic touch.
While Marks’ concentrates on the mastery of vision on the other senses,
however, I am focussing here on a discursive mastery over vision, effected not
through the look, but rather through the discursive account that is given of
our embodied visual experience. Vision does not necessarily master the object
341 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 213.
342 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l’Invisible, 304.
343 See Marks, The Skin of the Film, xii.
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that it beholds, as Marks suggests, but this haptic gaze can still be subjected
to normative surveillance. As we have argued in the case of the spectator’s
emancipation, of the embodiment of its experience, and of the subject’s het-
eronomy, it is precisely by recognising, mapping and regulating the hapticity
of the visual that a control over vision can be exerted in the first place. The
point is less, then, to have more haptic films or more haptic media, but rather
to recognise the fundamental hapticity of each and every spectator’s experience
of any film whatsoever. Locating the hapticity of the image, that is, not only
in the materiality of the medium or in some of its specific forms, but rather in
the contingent dimension of aesthetic use that characterises spectatorship as a
praxis. As such, like embodiment, hapticity exists fundamentally as a tension.
According to Marks, meaning is “encoded in objects not metaphorically but
by physical contact”344 - not by substitution, but through physical contiguity.
She analyses in particular how meaning is encoded in objects which are “wit-
nesses” of a change of culture or “bear” the loss of its original culture by an
individual. She calls these objects “transnational objects”, by comparison with
Winnicott’s transitional objects: in a sense, for her, both mediate between two
incommensurable forms of experience and subjectivity - between two cultures
and between the infant and the mother.345 Transnational objects are fetishes
produced by intercultural contact since, Marks claims, “they insist in the ma-
teriality of the original presence to which they refer [...].” In this sense, “they
do not symbolically represent power, they physically embody it.”346 She then
continues:
“To think of the moving image as a fetish [...] implies understand-
ing it not as a representation, which is volatile only because of the
projections brought to it, but as an emissary, which is volatile to
the degree that the viewer/receiver has access to the materiality of
its original scene.”347
What is material and immanent to the object, however, is already in part a






as a sensuous, mnemonic and semiotic association. The subject’s encounters
with things in the world would then have the character of an Einfall. In this
perspective, it does not matter whether the Einfall is seen to come from within
or from without the subject since, in the radical contingency of lived-experience,
the two dimensions cannot really be told apart.
On the contrary, in the measure that we downplay radical contingency or
turn it into an expression of an external (invisible) agency, we can entertain
the fantasy of a world clearly partitioned into an exterior and an interior, into
subjects and objects, and further imagine that something might be (or should
be) in control of this distribution. It is then by relinquishing this fantasy of
mastery, through a doubt and a questioning which provokes a constant shift
in our ways of being and categories of understanding, that authority can be
opposed, both intra-psychically and socially. Which is not to say, of course,
that all social action or the whole scope of politics can, or should, be reduced
to this anti-authoritarian principle: as much as intellectual emancipation must
be matched with a struggle for the equality of material conditions, a critique of
authority turns into a self-indulgent (and yet still imaginary) impotence, if not
accompanied with the recognition of our inevitable involvement, with the partic-
ular form of presence which is responsibility. Rancière often evokes the political
dimension at the same time in impersonal terms and as a being-there (il y a de
la politique). Political subjectivation is indeed first of all described, though of
course not entirely defined, as a form of dissensual and indeterminate presence
- if not as an individual with an established identity, which would already be a
part of the consensual distribution of the sensible and of a disciplinary fantasy,
then, as an embodied, floating, subject.
This presence, however, is never unmediated, never entirely intelligible,
never pure. As we are in the world, not only we take part in its connectedness,
but we share in its injustice, not only we experience the contingency and equal-
ity of all things, but we are active part of existing inequalities. Empathy should
name not just the potentially self-absolving capacity to feel (for) the other’s
suffering, it should also entail the acknowledgement our involvement with its
causes, and the working-through of ourimplication with the historical process.
Much like one can reject the idea of the spectator’s passivity, and recognise it
as the expression of a masochistic agency and of a paternalist theory of film,
we, as world spectators, cannot claim any form of detachment either, nor deny
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the responsibility that comes with our very existence - a responsibility that, in
the end, is nothing but the interdependence of everyone’s existence. Reducing
this heteronomy of the subject within a regime of activity and passivity, as
Aaron suggested, authorizes instead a strategy of disavowal that grants to the
“active” subjects the means they need for oppression, and to the “passive” ones
the imaginary distance they desire from it. In this sense both the passivity and
the impassivity of spectators are integral to the logic of the apparatus.348 From
Rancière’s perspective, in fact, the spectator’s agency and its share of discursive
power would not be enough to make of looking on a political act: there is a
politics of spectatorship only when spectatorship becomes, like we have seen,
an expression of dissensus, rather than a re-articulation of existing positions of
power or the establishment of a new particular “part”.
The fantasy of pure presence. If we attempt to translate these considera-
tions more specifically to the domain of the body of the spectator, then, we will
see that they tendentially thwart any attempt to assume it as a comfortable
ethical ground, and that they prevent us from making of it the essentialized, a
priori, figure of equality: for, indeed, as there can be no equality beyond dis-
sensus, there can be no embodiment without a tension between its discursivity
and its mise en discours. The idea of pure presence of the spectator’s body -
that is, of the body as a given ground of signification or as the site of a perfect
correspondence of the subject with the world - appears then to be a way to
avoid this tension, an attempt to negate the indeterminacy of embodiment, to
master the discursivity and contingency of the body, and thus to negate its
politics.
This depoliticization is not only championed by the most manifest discourses
of hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, examination, and exploita-
tion (the medical supervision of the body, its genetic, neurological and psycho-
logical mapping, its discrimination in terms of race and gender, its religious re-
vilement and ritual mutilation, its commodification, and so on), it can arguably
be brought about even through the body’s idealisation. As Judith Butler has
suggested, ideas of the body that construe it as an essentially pre-discursive
348 Their passion and pleasure, instead, are clearly sought for by the apparatus, but at the
same time they are somewhat feared, and thus they are tentatively put under surveillance
as both desirable and dangerous objects.
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and intrinsically subversive domain are in fact likely to support its further reifi-
cation and regulation.349 What we are looking for is then a form of dissensus
within the very physical presence, the psychic significance, and the ideological
significance of the body.
As we have argued, not the invisible, but the blurred, is what escapes and
subverts the regime of visibility: the power of normative distributions of the
sensible is performed in the establishment of a clear split between embodied
experience and disembodied mastery, between normal and abnormal bodies or
subject positions. Hegemony, in turn, implies the production of such a split and
its incisiveness depends on the neatness of the cut between the abnormal and
the normal. Authoritarian discourses split when there is in fact a tension, and
discriminate where there is in fact a continuity, thereby attempting to regulate
the fundamental indeterminacy of embodiment, the heteronomy of subjectivity
and the discursivity of human relations. The fantasy of a pure presence of the
body, and its reduction to an observable and intelligible object, then, meet at
opposite ends as two equivalent positions defined within a normative regime of
representation of the body and of the embodied subject. The two are positions
within the same regime and, together, they articulate the split that allows for a
normative framing of the body in the distribution of the social space. In other
words, the hypostasis of the pre-discursive body corresponds essentially to the
logic of discursive interpretation.
If only a fly hadn’t come into the body.
I would like now to discuss an apparently odd topic: teleportation. The science
fiction trope of teleportation, in fact, especially as it is dealt with in David
Cronenberg’s famous remake of The Fly,350 allows us to address how the rep-
resentation of a split between the raw, traumatic, presence of the body and its
“pure” normative regulation, eventually becomes a means to make the radical
contingency of real bodies more manageable and submit the embodied subject
to disciplinary regulation.
What is teleported, indeed, if not the pure, non-situated, autonomous and
349 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 123.
350 David Cronenberg, The Fly (20th Century Fox, 1987). 35mm. I am referring in particular
to the pre-2005 theatrical release.
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self-sufficient presence of the normalised body? And what is the monstrous fly
of the film, then, if not a figuration and a reification of the radical contingency
and impurity of the body? What are the heteronomy and contingency of our
embodied encounters, finally, if not what cannot be teleported, what cannot be
replicated about subjectivity or de-contextualised about the flesh? Teleporta-
tion makes visible a fantasy of mastery of the body: it stands to the flesh like
the cinematographic apparatus stands to the spectator’s embodied vision. It
literalises a regime of understanding by which the body is reduced to the prin-
ciples of its intelligibility and that implies and performs a reduction of matter
to information, of the body to a mappable organism, and of the subject to an
expression of the ahistorical self-sameness of identity.
More computing than commuting. To begin with - in case the reader did
not catch up with recent issues of Scientific American - I have to break some
news: quantum teleportation appears to be perfectly feasible. And yet it surely
is, compared with the heights of cinematic imagination, quite a disappoint-
ment. In fact, nothing about quantum teleportation points to the effortless and
instantaneous transportation of matter, let alone objects, animals or people.
“Teleportation,” writes Doctor Jeff Kimble of the California Institute of Tech-
nology, “is a protocol about how to send a quantum state - a wave function
- from one place to another.”351 What is teleported is not matter, then, but
rather certain properties of quantum particles: a pattern of information en-
coded in quantum states.352 Even in the future, we will not be able to teleport
objects, but rather a blueprint for their replication - not bodies, but merely
the instructions for their reproduction. In the end, as J. R. Minkel put it, tele-
portation is “more a matter of computing than commuting,”353 and its only
imaginable applications lay indeed in the field of information technology.
The essential imaginary feature underlying quantum teleportation would
be then its potential (a prerequisite, really) for an absolutely comprehensive
351 J. R. Minkel, “Beam Me Up Scotty?: Q&A about Quantum Teleportation with H.
Jeff Kimble,” Scientificamerican.com (2004): http://www.scientificamerican.com/arti-
cle/why-teleporting-is-nothing-like-star-trek/.
352 Joel N. Shurkin, “Quantum Teleportation in Space Explored as Message Encryp-
tion Solution,” Scientificamerican.com. (2013): http://www.scientificamerican.com/ar-
ticle/quantum-teleportation-in-space-explored-as-message-encryption-solution/
353 Minkel, “Beam Me Up Scotty?”
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“knowledge” and mapping of the object to be teleported. Human teleportation,
in particular, would require and perform an extremely precise mapping of the
body, like an all-encompassing quantum “picture” of it. After the mapping,
the body would not be, strictly speaking “moved,” but rather destroyed and
recreated according to the blueprint that has been obtained. This is, at least,
the understanding behind the transporter that we find in an influential main-
stream science fiction like Star Trek, as well as in the telepod device of David
Cronenberg’s film. If we hold that the body at the other end of the teleporter is
exactly the same body, and exactly the same subject, that came in, this coding
of the body must be seen to constitute a normative mapping as well. Indeed,
as long as we hold the two subjects to be the same, teleportation would imply
not just a translation of the body into a digital code, but its reduction to it: the
subject would be proved to be nothing more and nothing less than its mapping.
Teleportation would be, in the end, still a question of dematerialisation: but
only in the sense of the body’s loss of contingency and indeterminacy.
Here we see how the fantasy of teleportation is yet another form of the
fantasy of mastery, one by which the embodied subject is not only entirely
reduced within knowledge (nothing would escape the mapping), but reduced
to the principles of its intelligibility (reduced to an “imprint” of its quantum
states in Star Trek, as well as in George Langelaan’s original short story The
Fly354 and, in Cronenberg’s film, to its molecular and genetic composition). The
mapping would entail in fact a reduction of embodied experience to measurable
matter, and of the body, the mind, and the psyche to what can be predicated
about them. Especially in Cronenberg’s rendition of the teleportation device, it
is on this preliminary operation, more than on the jump through space, that the
fantasmatic and fictional potential is concentrated. In this sense, the teleporter
is above all a disciplinary device. The molecular mapping that takes place in
the film acts in turn as the fantasmatic ground for all other sorts of normative
distributions of the human body: it fulfils the wish of a complete knowledge of
the subject and, thus, of its total reduction under masterful control.
Normative mapping of the body. The body that is teleported - in a Fou-
cauldian sense, the body that the imaginary technology of teleportation pro-
354 George Langelaan, “The Fly,” Playboy (1957): 17–18, 22, 36, 38, 46, 64–68.
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duces - is one with impermeable boundaries, perfectly self-contained, and fully
reduced to intelligibility. The subject that corresponds to this body, in turn, is a
classical one: unitary, male, and proper. Teleportation would grant the subject
in a normative position that validation of its own self-sameness and absolute
autonomy, which the embodied subject can never find in its contingent presence
in the world. Nothing less and nothing more than what can be mapped about
it, the subject of teleportation is clearly an imaginary subject: like the child
in the Lacanian mirror scene, the subject who passes through the teleporter
can identify with a mastered “image” of itself - only the image, in an ultimate
wish-fulfilment, is now its very body, flesh of its flesh. In this sense, teleporta-
tion entails an extension of the imaginary wholeness of the normative subject
from the ocularcentric apparatus to the very idea of embodiment, intensifying
the discursive regulation of embodied experience and the flesh. What is lost in
exchange for this imaginary mastery are the contingency, the heteronomy and
the historicity of the embodied subject, as well as, eventually, its fundamental
emancipation. The loss of situatedness and contingency that characterises tele-
portation confirms, more specifically, the subject’s mastery over its heteronomy:
the fantastic capacity for displacement that the body acquires corresponds in
the end to the certification of its fixed identity. Once a human subject has run
through the teleporter, indeed, we know for sure that he is identical to himself
(a dead ringer?) - a human body that is made to fulfil the law of logical identity,
which is also the ground of the subject’s ideological identity.
It is as a reaction to this untenable ideological wish of self-sameness that
teleportation is bound to go awry, at least in some of the stories that figure
it. In this sense, the unforeseen intrusion of the fly in The Fly - not unlike the
irruption of the bat in Pirandello’s The Bat - is not a contingent event, but
precisely the opposite, a coincidence and a normalisation of the contingency of
embodiment. The fly, indeed - the measly insect, not the monstrous creature -
intervenes to unsettle the normative scenario of teleportation and, apparently, to
reinstate the troubling presence of an embodied, heteronomous, subject, against
the rather unbearable fantasy of perfect self-knowledge and self-replication.
Inaccurate self-replications. Even before the fly incident, though, the tele-
pods were far from being functional. Questionable things had been happening
to a series of animals: Doctor Delambre in Langelaan’s short story phased
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out the house cat, and, in Cronenberg’s adaptation, Doctor Seth Brundle (Jeff
Goldblum) managed to turn a baboon inside out and into a homage to John
Carpenter’s Thing.
In the film, the problem with the teleporter seems to be the incapacity of the
computer to process the erraticness of the flesh. Running a steak from a pod to
the other merely gives you a computer’s interpretation of a steak - synthesised
and disgusting. Flavour functions here a sign of a harmonious, more-than-
objectual, embodiment. What Brundle seeks, then, is a better mapping of the
body, but not simply in the sense that this mapping has to be more precise.
What is left to be mapped is, in fact, the unmappable. What the technological
and ideological machine has to achieve in order to master the contingency and
heteronomy of the body is, precisely, a mise en discours of its pre-discursive
deviance (an abnormality which is also what makes it desirable). What the
computer has to perform is not just a reduction of the body to molecular or
genetic information, then, but a reduction that reduces to information what
escapes this very reduction. Without the “molecular” mastering of what is
more than molecular, in fact, the computer’s mastery of the body would not
amount to much - from an ideological standpoint, at least. As Brundle puts
it, the computer has to learn how to “get crazy on the flesh.” And of course,
in order to teach the computer, Brundle has to teach himself first, with the
gracious compliance of the film’s heroine Veronica Quaith (Geena Davis) - the
scientific reporter to whom Brundle had confided the results of his research and
who ended up living with him in his laboratory. In fact, what Brundle needs
to teach his computer about is hegemony: more specifically, male heterosexual
hegemony.
After he has sex with Veronica, indeed, Brundle is finally able to teleport
a baboon (the brother of the other unfortunate animal, but probably the same
baboon actor) successfully. The computer’s mastering of the flesh is made
to coincide with the main male character’s getting of the girl. We are not
surprised. Indeed, beginning with Langelaan’s story - which had been published
on Playboy and thus necessarily interacted with the magazine’s own version
of the objectification of the body - the story of the fly is inseparable from
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its sexist underpinnings.355 Cronenberg’s film picks up and arguably makes
an interesting use of the sexist para-text, or ecosystem, of The Fly. Much
of the film indeed addresses the relation between Veronica, a rather typical
figuration of the “independent” woman journalist, and her ex Stathis Borans
(John Getz), a blatantly unsympathetic male chauvinist character, who also
happens to be her boss - in one of her most earnest moments, she describes him
as a “petty schmuck.” I will not go into details, but we can safely claim that the
coordinates of sexist hegemony are all in place. If Stathis’s vulgarity strives to
look funny, with little success, Veronica’s acquiescence is outrightly despairing:
seeing her coming back to the man for counsel and comfort at every difficulty
is as painful to watch as the final agony of the creature. Apparently thanks
to a panning from a preview audience in Los Angeles,356 we have at least been
spared a “happy” ending in which Veronica and Seth got married. An ending
which would have completely changed the tone of the film and, for me at least,
completely compromised its significance.
Metamorphosis and anamorphosis. Once the double discursive mapping
of the frenzy of the flesh - of the taste of the steak and of the sex of the woman
- is completed and implemented in the computer, teleportation as a technology
of body and subjectivity is finally perfected. However, when Brundle himself
decides to test his device in a drunken fit of jealousy, a fly happens to get locked
with him inside the telepod. Fatefully, the computer maps its body together
with Brundle’s and, acting like a gene splicer, fuses them into a single being.
After that, Brundle will gradually transform into a monstrous fly, as the genes
of the insect take over his body and his personality. In this respect, Langelaan’s
story was more simplistic: the human and the fly swapped body parts - the doc-
tor ended up with the fly’s head and arm, and the reverse - but each displaced
part maintained its recognisable physiology. In the Playboy story, then, the
355 At the same time the story is markedly, if crudely, intertextual: spanning, a few pages at
a time, for almost the whole length of the volume, the text of The Fly is intercut with
pictures of the Winter’s playmate winner of 1956 on pages 20 and 21, a cartoon about
spectatorship, historical films, and gender performance on page 31, a piece on shorts and
other elegant men’s attire on pages 35 and 36 - just to mention a few. The bottom
right corner of page 67, at very climax of the tale, features a cartoon about a “die-hard”
seductress inviting a man to join her from inside her coffin.
356 David Prior, Fear of The Flesh: The Making of The Fly (20th Century Fox, 2005). Video.
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ideological function addressed the body more as a visible form, while in Cro-
nenberg’s rendition (despite the fact that what we see on the computer screen
is actually the body’s chemical composition) the body is addressed more at the
level of its organic composition and genetic coding. This allows to map more
directly the blurriness and the indeterminacy of embodiment, at the same time
determining an intensification of their normative regulation. While in Lange-
laan’s story the monstrous embodiment was a matter of an immediately visible
redistribution of body parts, in the film, instead, the horror is made visible
only gradually and represented as a matter of hybridization and contamina-
tion - coherently, we can say, with the fantasies and anxieties, and with the
intensified knowledge of the body, that came with human genetics and digital
technologies. Compared with 1957, indeed, teleportation technology, and the
narrative framing of contingency that it allows, seem to imply and require a
further mise en discours of the body: not just a representation of the body’s
troubling heterogeneity, but a representation and a reduction into discourse of
the very unintelligibility of its heteronomy.
Cronenberg’s The Fly presents, albeit in another context, the same repre-
sentation of contingency, and the same representation of the breakdown of the
regime of representation, that we have found in Pirandello’s short story. Like
the bat’s, the contingency of the fly is a staged one, precisely the opposite of
the irruption of a contingent event. Within the universe of the diegesis, in-
deed, the fly enters the pod by pure chance. But if we consider the level of the
narration, instead, this intrusion is not a chance at all. Moreover, and more
importantly, this intrusion is not even truly disruptive. Through the fly, in fact,
the story and the film provide a figuration and a manageable understanding of
contingency, by this not only leaving the logic of representation intact, but ar-
guably contributing to reinforce the normative framing of the body. Similarly,
the heteronomy of the subject is eventually reified, represented as the creature
into which Brundle gradually transforms himself, and finally “disciplined” with
a shotgun shell.
In other words, the “chance” irruption of the fly ultimately serves to code
a split between the purely human and the purely monstrous: on one side,
the (male) body of Brundle (and Stathis), on the other, the alien body of
the creature. The story of The Fly seems to produce this split through its
narrative of hybridization, while in fact the split is tacitly assumed from the
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very beginning. The contingency and the troubling heteronomy of the body
are shown in the story to be a product of the disruptive effects of change on
a masterful technology, while they are in fact constitutional features of the
embodied human subject. In fact, the ideological effect lies in the initial, biased,
assumption that the human subject and the contingent fly are not one to begin
with. In other words, the body “without the fly” that Brundle has at the start
of the film is already the result of a normative framing, it already corresponds
to the fantasy of an autonomous body: one “without its heteronomy” and, in
fact, without the thing.
In this sense, the coming of the fly in the diegesis is fateful. And in this
sense as well, the computer does not really splice two different creatures to-
gether, as much as it tries to make Brundle whole again. From this perspective,
the teleporter’s program appears to give the right, properly tragic, solution to
the problem of the flesh that it was asked to solve: by recognising a single being
inside the telepod and by fusing them together, it apparently attempts to re-
deem the primal split onto which the normative male subject was constructed.
As the further developments of the plot make clear, however, what the com-
puter is actually doing is putting to use its newly acquired proficiency in male
heterosexist hegemony.
I say this, because the rediscovered heteronomy of the subject is presented
by the film as an irremediably traumatic event (while in fact it is a matter of or-
dinary life, and it is not necessarily unpleasant). By setting up the heteronomy
of the subject as a trauma, the film eventually allows its narrative regulation.
What appears to redeem the split between a normative and a heteronomous
subject, then, in fact reinstates it: as Brundle metamorphoses into the final
stage of the fly-creature, the subject he represents loses its heteronomy again to
become a reification of the abject, a figure of the body’s irrepresentability which
is indeed functional to the mise en discours of real human subjects. The split
between the transparent normativity of the human and the immediate contin-
gency of the fly that we have at the beginning, is reinstated at the end as the
split between the visible humanity of Stathis, with his stereotyped masculinity,
and the overstated, spectacular, and reified monstrosity of the creature.
While contingency and embodiment are not per se intelligible, their reified
representation, indeed, can be mastered much more easily: this is precisely
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the scope of the ideological mechanism that Žižek calls anamorphosis.357 The
whole narrative can then be read as a symptomatic attempt to frame and tame
the anxiety which the founding indeterminacy of the body and heteronomy of
subjectivity provokes to subjects in normative positions. As a matter of fact,
instead, we are all “Brundleflies” (as the film calls the intermediate stage of
the metamorphosis): human subjects already bear with them the contingency
that the story first projects into the fly, and then removes entirely through the
killing of the creature. Brundle is the closest to a human subject, then, when he
is neither the monstrous insect nor the pristine human, but rather something
in-between.
Not only Brundlefly seems, momentarily, to be more human than Brundle,
then: while he is precariously balanced in-between the two identities that, so
to speak, lay claims onto his body, he feels positively liberated. What he is
liberated from, I would say, is a stable identity - little matters if it is that of
a heterosexual male or that of a giant insect, for both are equally bad, both
equally internal to the sexist and authoritarian regime of representation that
sustains the narrative. In one scene, Brundlefly describes the disintegration and
the reintegration that he has experienced as a purifying process, comparing the
teleporter to a coffee filter. In the view of the hybrid, the impurity being filtered
would be nothing but the purity of the heteronormative subject. Coherently
with the normative split that regulates the film, however, Brundle’s liberation
from “society’s thick and grey fear of the flesh” - as he and the fly put it - finally
amounts to little more than a paroxysm of masculinity, involving random feats
of gymnastics and arm-wrestling, and picking up a blonde in a bar. Brundle’s
potentially liberating “dive into the plasma pool” eventually “evolves” in a
totalitarian position (“insect politics,” as the film refers to it). Both the human
and the monster are pure: that is, artificially made distinct and autonomous
and, thus, intelligible and manageable in their opposition. Purity and impurity,
in fact, defilement and redemption, are all terms of a totalitarian fantasy of
mastery. In the end, the fantasy of purity and separateness that sustains the
normative subject reverts into the fantasy of the “pure presence” of the impure
(that is, the monstrous creature). Confronted with the normative alternative
between pure monstrosity and pure humanity, then, actual humanity would be,
357 Slavoj Žižek, “Melancholy and the Act,” Critical Inquiry 26, no. 4 (2000): 659.
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instead, on the side of the (impurely) impure. The idea of the body as a pure
“thing,” a mere mass of protean horror, no less than the idea of a purely human
body, is indeed a production of the same disciplinary apparatus.
On choice and the benefit of doubt. If we limit ourselves to Brundle’s
perspective, we might see the deadlock and the tragicness of this normative
framing of his body, but we would miss what is most essential to its hegemonic
dimension. The narrative of The Fly is indeed linked from the beginning with
the hegemony over another body: that of Veronica. The technology of telepor-
tation - the technology that was supposed to produce the transcendental male
subject - indirectly frames the body of women, and, by this, is used to negate
the fundamental emancipation of all human subjects.
This framing of Veronica’s body takes above all the form of a forced choice.
While in the short story, Delambre’s wife plays the role (at the same time
and by the same token) of the female killer and the faithful wife, Cronenberg
introduces a whole new element in the plot: Veronica is pregnant. The baby is
surely Brundle’s, but of which Brundle (before or after his splicing with the fly)
she, and the spectators, cannot be sure. Veronica, then, is confronted with, and
eventually defined through, two equally unfair alternatives (to give birth to a
potentially monstrous child or to have an abortion) and two equally impossible
choices (to be devoured by a monstrous bug or to live the rest of her days with
a pretentious schmuck). In metapsychological fashion, we could say that she
is caught between the visible presence of a prick and the monstrous reification
of its lack. It is not really that she is confronted with a situation in which all
choices are equally horrible and unjust, she has actually no choice at all: for
both the obnoxious Stathis and the fusional creature are equal expressions of
the same normative and sexist regime that attempts to control her - choosing
one or the other, she would still be opting for the same heterosexist thing. Even
if we direct our sympathy to the shapeless thing more than to the male one,
that is not enough to avoid the heterosexist normative regime. Veronica’s sole
possibility for independence - and, with her, the sole possibility we have to
imagine some kind of emancipation for human subjects in general - would be
to refuse the terms of the alternatives she is presented with. In this sense, her
agency must become more than the expression of her freedom of choice (brutally
reified as if it were just a matter of marriage and abortion): her agency must
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transform the very terms in which the question and the situation are posited.
Even as she blasts the creature with a shotgun, indeed, she is not really the one
pulling the trigger.
Unfortunately, the film does not give her the opportunity to negate her
choice, nor to express it. Fortunately, however, as the film ends we still do
not know if the child will be born or not, if it will be monstrous (a larva) or
post-human (a human baby with butterfly wings), nor can we be sure that
Veronica, like in the “happy” ending we have mentioned, will rather opt for
abortion and have a “normal” child with Stathis. The openness of the plot
is what finally allows to imagine the heteronomy of the embodied subject: it
does not matter wether the child will be born as a she or a he or a it, for this
indeterminacy is the actual condition of all human beings. The whole story, in
Cronenberg’s version, can then be taken as a narrative, a kind of infantile sexual
theory, about the “birth”, or the imaginary “nature”, of the heteronomous and
embodied subject. A birth that we do not - and indeed must not - witness:
the film acquires its interest, I believe, precisely in that this indeterminacy is
not resolved nor made visible. By the same token, to be fair, the spectators
are somewhat protected from it, in the sense that they do not have to confront
it directly: but indeterminacy, like emancipation, is not something that can
be given. It is only in the dimension of spectatorship, beyond the text of the
film, that the prospect of a actual human subject can be maintained - “whole”
only in that it is heteronomous, “individual” only in the sense of its contingent
embodiment, and independent only inasmuch as it does not indulge in a fantasy
of mastery, as it does not curb the mobility and the ambivalence of its desire




Isn’t life a series of images that change as they repeat themselves?
Andy Warhol.
Unburdened from the weight of memory, one is nothing more
than a pure gaze.
Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Traversée des Ombres.
Oh, one can go out to a movie, lookin’ for a special treat
Two can make that single movie somethin’ really kinda sweet
Marvin Gaye, It Takes Two.
Partages de l’ombre.
I am borrowing the title of this paragraph from a collection of poems by the
French writer and film theorist Raymond Bellour. When I read it, I inevitably
give the word “partages” a Rancièrian ring, suggesting at once a more egali-
tarian dimension of practices of sharing, and more normative attempts at its
distribution. At the same time, in this context, “l’ombre” - the shadow, the
darkness - is necessarily a cinematic one, and thus bring with it a series of
metaphorical connotations.
First among these metaphorical references is a Platonic absence of true light:
the obscurity of the cave, the flicker of the candle projecting the illusory play
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of shadows, that in turn inevitably suggests a certain regime of understand-
ing of cinema. There seems indeed to be an essential likeness, as Jean-Louis
Baudry noted, between the Platonic apparatus and the cinematographic one.358
In both cases, Baudry claimed, the illusory impression of reality and the ide-
ological effect do not come from the images’ fidelity to the real, nor from the
content of the play, but from the structure of the apparatus itself - from its
production of a subject position.359 It is through the bonds of the prisoners,
then, through the immobility and lack of wakefulness of the spectators, that
the images acquire their more-than-real, hallucinatory, reality. It is, in other
words, from the coercive disembodiment of their conditions of experiencing -
and, more precisely, from the devaluation of their forms of experience - that
the prisoner’s perceptions are given their illusory character. The images do not
even have to try being persuasive, because persuasion is already secured by the
dispositif . As a result, their impoverished materiality (in the Platonic cave,
they are shadows not of real objects but of cardboard figures, and in the case of
the cinema, they are mostly “shadows” of a set) becomes a means of a further
stultification: the shadows of the cave are intended to put a further distance
between the subjects’ experience and the real world - that is, ultimately, be-
tween the world of the prisoners and the world of the people that keep them
captive.
No one can be more in the dark, then, than the spectators who choose
to lock themselves in the cave. And yet, who is in the position to say that
their world of shadows is intrinsically inferior to the real one, if not those who
have already escaped it? Who is in the position to say that the prisoners’
impoverished environment has impaired their intellect to the point that not only
their world, but their experience and their understanding of it, are of no value,
if not those who believe their own world and understanding to be intrinsically
superior? We can comprehend the intended meaning of the allegory, in fact,
only because we are not living in a cave and because we understand what we
would lose if we did. Though, we are told, even if we did live in the darkness
we would still believe that we did not. The allegory, on the one hand, asks us
to occupy the position and share the mastery of the philosopher (the subject
358 Jean-Louis Baudry, “The Apparatus,” Camera Obscura 1, no. 11 (1976): 104-114.
359 Ibid., 110.
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who really knows). But by the same token, on the other hand, we are made
to occupy the position of the prisoner (the subject who merely believes that he
knows). Why? Because, in Rancièrian terms, by giving our assent to a logic of
explication and we therefore subscribe to a regime of inequality of intelligence.
Since we believe that somebody’s experience and understanding of reality can
really be superior, we tacitly confirm the superiority of the philosopher that
presented us with the example in the first place. In other words, by accepting
the very split between true and false knowledge that the allegory presents, we
are already sanctioning the external authority that distinguishes them, and
by accepting that emancipation requires an agency external to phenomenal
experience, we are already relinquishing our own. The dialectic philosopher
performs his act of abrutissement precisely through his demonstration of the
necessity of emancipation, for which the allegory of the apparatus was indeed
devised.
In this sense, the allegory of the cave and the theory of the apparatus con-
stitute an argument for the subject’s passivity, and hold it into a double, hege-
monic, grip: that of its arbitrary oppressive material conditions, and that of
their authoritarian understanding. What is established by this, on top of the
discursivity and the heteronomy of the subject, is an authoritarian split within
the scene of knowledge and experience.360 At that point little matters what
positions we know or we believe we are occupying, because in any case we will
be performing and reinforcing this authoritarian split. Until the whole sce-
nario changes, the philosopher will always need his imbeciles, and the imbeciles
their philosophers. Until our understanding of spectatorship changes, appara-
tus theory will always need an intelligible and passive spectator, and passive
spectators will always need the masterful agency of the apparatus and of its the-
orists. Here, cinematic darkness corresponds to an authoritarian distributions
of its lights and shadows.
As a matter of fact, Baudry did affirm that the dualism of the apparatus -
its forced dynamic of “two scenes, or two places, opposing or confronting one
360 Of course, this authoritarian distribution of spectatorship and film experience does not
concern only apparatus theory and psychoanalytic film theory, but also, and to a greater
degree, those theories that grant a rational, autonomous, agency to the spectator while
still holding it as a passive and intelligible object of their knowledge.
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another, one dominating the other” - was one of its structural characteristics.361
But still, he omitted to see the role played by the position of the film theorist
in sanctioning this dynamic and establishing the spectator’s position. Even-
tually, a binary articulation of light and shadow, of knowledge and embodied
experience, of activity and passivity, conscious and unconscious, discursivity
and ideological determination, and so on, is less characteristic of spectatorship
as such than of its authoritarian explanation. The spectator, in fact, always
occupies both scenes or, rather, it occupies an undefinable in-between - a place
that is actually untenable, meaning that it can be traversed, but not held in
possession. If the spectator is there at all as an aesthetic, embodied subject,
then, it is precisely because each scene fails to dominate the other - in this
sense, as we have seen, the spectator is better described as a “site” traversed by
tensions. On the other hand, if the film is there at all as an aesthetic object - or,
rather, as a contingent aesthetic experience - it is because it has been brought
into being in that quality by the spectator.
Spectatorship as an act of illumination. In Beauty’s Light, Leo Bersani
and Ulysse Dutoit suggest that we take spectatorship - and, more generally, an
aesthetic modality of looking at the world - as an act of illumination.362 What
they allow us to imagine is that the visuality of the film spectacle would not
be merely an effect of the projector, but would take place through a further,
embodied and aesthetic act of illumination performed by the spectator, who
would “light up” the scene of film, in fact making it exist as a scene, through its
reflexive implication in it and by the virtue (or the perversity) of its passionate
look.
At the same time that they “perform” the moving image, the spectator’s
acts of illumination would bring into being its beauty: not in the sense that
spectatorship would disclose a pre-existing beauty, inherent to the object, but
rather in the sense that the appearance of beauty would coincide with the sub-
ject’s non-sadistic relation to the seen. Illumination must be understood, then,
in counterpoint to conceptual explication or to a gesture of making-visible:
361 Ibid., 104.
362 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, “Beauty’s Light,” October 82 (1997): 17. See also Leo
Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Caravaggio’s Secrets (Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 1998).
And, Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Caravaggio (London: British Film Institute, 1999).
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far from resting on an act that draws apart light from the shadows, specta-
torial illumination would bring them inseparably together. The beauty that
the spectator evokes is essentially a form of its relation to the object, and a
manifestation of the subject’s vaster implication in the world:363 understood in
this way, spectatorship would correspond to a form of non-objectual embodied
passion, a relation that eroticises the object’s specificity, and even its distance
from the subject, at the same time that it does not produce a split in-between
them.
A relation that, in turn, individuates the space of spectatorship as a radical
form of sharing.
“Now the world of the film can no longer be seen as an object;
the film-maker, his representation, and the spectator are all working
together, and in so doing, they are discovering and constructing
their being as that working together, as an incessant compositional
and associative activity of which, finally, the film itself is only an
episode.”364
The look that arouses the beauty of the spectacle is understood by Bersani and
Dutoit also to be the presence of a witness within the scene365 - the spectator’s
reflexive implication would be a mise en abyme of the act of illumination itself.
In their work on Caravaggio, Bersani and Dutoit discuss this idea mainly from
the point of view of the artist painting a figure of himself as an observer inside
his works: the spectator would then be present in the aesthetic scene as a re-
doubling of the gesture by which the artist re-discovers itself in the work of art.
I do not think, however, that the aesthetic presence of the spectator has to take
human form, nor that it has to be necessarily signified, and thus coded, by the
spectacle or, more specifically, mediated by the work of the artist or, even more
specifically, through its figure. On the contrary, the spectator’s implication nec-
essarily precedes its representation: it coincides with the embodied experience
of film as such, and it is thus one with the phenomenological coming into being
of the moving image itself.
363 Ibid., 27.
364 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Caravaggio (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 57.
365 Bersani and Dutoit, Beauty’s Light, 27.
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The spectator’s implication in the moving image would begin with its grain,
so to speak, and it would be precisely in the soundtrack’s timbre, in the mi-
crocosm of fleeting correspondences and erratic associations, in the marginal
details, and in the unfathomable vibrations and tinges of the light of film -
in a word, at the confluence of the material contingency of the image and the
embodied contingency of the spectator’s experience of it - that film and specta-
torship would find their aesthetics. What defines spectatorship, in the end, is
not the relationship of the moving image to reality - here we agree with Baudry
- and not even to the images’ own material reality, or to the physical presence
of spectators, but rather the contingency of film experience and the communal
forms of its sharing. In fact, if the artist might find in its work a space ample
enough to accommodate the expanse of its agency and passion, the spectator
can only do so in a dimension that extends from the moment of projection and
transcends the film scene as it is conventionally described. In this sense, what
is peculiar to the spectator’s aesthetic involvement lies perhaps first of all in
the dimension of the film’s memory and retelling, in its transformations and
dissemination.
In a way, the spectatorial illumination can be said to be an “apparatic”
characteristic of film experience. As it constitutes an integral part of the cine-
matographic dispositif , rather independently from the contents of specific films,
it presents a certain degree of universality. At the same time, it suggests re-
vising the fundamental normativity and the authoritarian assumptions of the
classic understanding of the cinematographic apparatus. Other than being a
site of imaginary unity - a unity which in fact covers up and entails a separation
of the subject from the world - we can imagine the scene of film as a site in
which, precisely by the greater permeability between subject and the world that
aesthetic contemplation allows for, the subject embraces its heteronomy and is
thus moved beyond itself.
Through its implication with the film (not only with the projection but with
the whole “scene” of filmmaking and spectatorship) the spectator illuminates
it as an aesthetic and political object. On the reverse as well, in its encounter
with film, the spectator is illuminated by it as an aesthetic and political subject.
Part of the tension that defines spectatorship is indeed the fact that the position
of the spectator is created in its contingent encounter with the film. As much
as the spectator’s relation to the film is not essentially one of objectification,
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though, the film’s discursive effects are not necessarily confined to a normative
framing of the subject. In this sense, as we have argued, the discursivity, the
contingency and the embodiment of the cinematic subject does not entail either
its perfect correspondence with the phenomenal world, or its complete discursive
determination - which are both a measure of its reduction into intelligibile
discourse: we are made and unmade in our encounters in the world, but the
moment and the effects of these encounters are never entirely foreseeable and
controllable.
Against the shadows of its abrutissement, then, spectatorship would oppose
the light of beauty, but a light that is accompanied by the shadows of the sub-
ject’s embodied and impersonal being. Spectatorship’s acts of illumination can
in this respect be taken as the exact opposite of the pedagogical “displays” of
enlightened reason and of the subject’s self-regulatory identifications. Spectato-
rial illumination does not proceed by a reduction of the world to the principles
of its intelligibility, in fact, but is rather based on a reflexivity and an involve-
ment that negate the separation of the subject from the object of knowledge,
thereby not only thwarting the attempts of institutional control, but also rad-
ically troubling the mastery that the subject might want to exert upon itself.
Because of this, they suggest that subjectivity and agency in fact produce a
form of dispossession. What spectatorial theory is to the gaze, we can say, sex-
uality would be to the embodied subject: a form of erotic turning back of the
subject upon itself,366 which at the same time individuates the presence of the
subject to the world and (partially) shatters the subject as a “person” with a
recognisable identity and an autonomous agency. The recognition of the passiv-
ity of the spectator’s agency and the realisation of the subject’s heteronomy at
the same time put the spectator beyond the imaginary power of the apparatus.
Which is not to say, however, that they put the spectator beyond the dimen-
sion of power and discourse, as we have repeatedly affirmed, but only beyond,
or rather against, what is made intelligible about them within an authoritarian
regime of knowledge.
Heteronomy and homoness. Illumination is a look that is also a passionate
contact but, at the same time, precisely because it blurs the distinction between
366 Leo Bersani, “Sexuality and Aesthetics,” October 28 (1984): 31.
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subject and object, it does not take place as a definite relation between clearly
established parts. From this perspective, aesthetic subjectivity ceases to be
defined in terms of the articulation of specific positions, and is rather reimagined
as a site of an impersonal relationality: for Bersani “the desiring individual” is
erased in order to become a site of correspondences with the world.”367 The
subject can then be seen as the history of her illuminations: she is, at once,
what of her has been brought into being by her encounters, and what, of the
people and objects and situations that she has come into contact with, she has
brought into being. In this sense, Bersani’s connectedness of being would be
another name for what I have called so far the heteronomy of the subject.
An heteronomy that we might as well call “homoness”.368 It is unfortunate
that centuries of heterosexist mentality may tend to give homoness and het-
eronomy oppositional connotations, that in fact have no reason to exist: as
much as homoness is not specific to an homosexual identity, indeed, but rather
refers to an homosexual modality of desire that is shared by all subjects,369
heteronomy does not entail, in my view, a reaffirmation of sexual differenceor
of a heterosexual, sadistic, “split” identity.370 If I maintained a difference be-
tween the two terms, in the end, it is because, in the permeability of the border
between object-love and identification which is characteristic of both homoness
and heteronomy, heteronomy does not imply a perfect correspondence between
the subject and the world, nor the latter’s boundless hospitality.371 While
Bersani appears to predicate the possibility of universal connectedness and of
the self-shattering and self-dissemination of the subject on a universal solidarity
of being,372 I tend to see the possibility of this correspondence and impersonality
precisely in the fact that there is no essential order or harmony that guarantees
them. Rather than universal correspondences, we would have universal, but
367 Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 70.
368 Homoness is defined by Bersani as “a communication of forms, [...] a kind of universal
solidarity not of identities (44) but of positionings and configurations in space, a solidarity
that ignores even the apparently intractable identity-difference: that between the human
and the nonhuman.” Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43-44.
369 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Forms of Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity (London:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 120.
370 See Leo Bersani, “Psychoanalysis and the Aesthetic Subject,” Critical Inquiry 32, no. 2
(2006), 145-146.
371 Cfr. Ibid., 152-153.
372 Ibid., 150.
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dissensual and inessential, contingent associations.
Heteronomy would thus name a connectedness that does not rest upon,
nor necessarily encounters, a perfect correspondence with the world - one that
does not depend on immanent resemblances,373 or, as Kaja Silverman puts
it, on “ontologically equalizing similarities,”374 one that does not promise, nor
expect, any unscathed and boundless bliss. To say that all is connected but that
not everything harmonically and essentially corresponds - in between subjects,
things, and within things and subjects themselves - does not seem to me to
constitute a relapse into the idea of a fundamental hostility of the world to the
subject, but rather to be the necessary recognition of the existence of suffering
and struggle, and of our responsibility toward this existence.
In order to begin to question what appears to me a troubling disappearance
of trouble and dissensus from Bersani’s aesthetic subject, we could ask, from a
Butlerian perspective: how does one become an aesthetic subject? Would it be
through a realisation of this essential harmony of being, in the same way one
is supposed to become a woman, a homosexual, or a human being, by realising
the imaginary harmony and by embodying the transparency of what in fact are
their normative definitions?375 What about those subjects that are unwilling,
or unable, to correspond? Or, from a Rancièrian perspective, we could ask: can
a world of perfect correspondences also be hospitable to dissensus? Aesthetic
being would prove, Bersani and Dutoit write, that there are “no gaps, no empty
spaces in creation. [That we] are not cut off from anything; [that] nothing
escapes connectedness, the play of and between forms.”376 In this sense, it
would name the perfect, and most oppressive, of regulatory regimes. And while I
agree that everything is indeed connected (heteronomy and dissensus clearly are
373 “Immanent in every subject is its similitude with other subjects (and other objects).”
Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 8. “Universally immanent” connections that are in
turn made to correspond to a “limitless extensibility [of the subject] in both space and
time.” Ibid., 9.
374 Kaja Silverman, Flesh of My Flesh (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 4. Her
concept of world spectatorship seems to entail, if I am not misreading her, the ontological
presence of phenomenal forms. Strictly speaking, we cannot say that phenomenal forms
exist outside the subject, for they only exist as the presence of the subject to the world. As
such, they do not correspond to visible forms (they cannot be seen), but they are rather
the forms that exist in the subject’s experience (they are the seen). See: Kaja Silverman,
World Spectators (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 2.
375 Butler, Gender Trouble, 152.
376 Bersani, Dutoit, “Beauty’s Light,” 28.
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a form of our connection and implication with the world), Bersani’s insistence
on an essential correspondence risks to make of the aesthetic subject the subject
of a consensual fantasy.
Within Bersani’s universal connectedness of being, then, heteronomy would
name the moment of dissensus, a realisation of non-correspondence that corre-
sponds in fact with the finiteness and contingency of our being. Heteronomy
would name the moment in which the subject does not perfectly correspond with
itself and with the world, a moment that, in turn, is open to the emergence of
something radically incommensurable to the existing order of correspondences
(to the existing distribution of the sensible). Something that in the realm of
form would not yet or no longer be form, that in the domain of speech would
not be recognised as a voice, something that in respect to the subject, would
not yet or no longer be a human body, and so on. Heteronomy would thus bear
with it a responsibility which is not comforted, nor limited, by the world’s hos-
pitality, nor by any given regime of its understanding: a feeling of connectedness
beyond correspondence that is, I believe, not merely an ethical instance, but,
more fundamentally, the unaviodable condition of the subject’s emancipation
and of its embodied and political presence in the world.
And still, heteronomy and homoness should not be seen to compete. If, for
Bersani, difference (which is, in this context, not really sexual difference but
rather the distance that separates one individual from another)377 becomes in
aesthetic experience the “unthreatening supplement of sameness,”378 from the
standpoint of heteronomy this difference is never neutralised, is never unthreat-
ening. But still, homoness remains to the heteronomous subject as something
like falling in love, and, possibly, as a drive toward the realisation of the mate-
rial conditions of the equality we desire. In this sense, heteronomy can be seen
as the complementary shadow of aesthetic illumination,379 the scene in which
we can imagine - rather than a world of immanent forms - the very “shape” of
377 Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43, 87.
378 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge and London: Harvard University
Press, 1990), 86, 100.
379 In the end, illumination still suggests a framing of the body, if not in terms of its visibility,
at least in terms of its visuality. Aesthetic illumination still relates to a body of form:
but what can it say about the non-visual body, the improper body, the body of the
entrails, which is at the same time the mortal body and the body of a more troubling and
unintelligible agency?
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the forms of being to falter and emerge.
Afterimages. So, in a way, we are back in the dark. This time, however, it is
a darkness that envelops and permeates the subject, one that does not allow to
distinguish it from other people and that at the same time connects everyone and
everything impersonally, beyond the performance and the discipline of identity.
This other regime of the spectator’s presence to the scene of film corresponds,
on one hand, to the extended space and the shared dimension of spectatorship
and theory that we have discussed. On the other hand, this other scene is
present, more materially, in the spectator’s memory. Beyond the conventional
text of the film, what remains of the cinematographic encounter in fact is the
imprint of the spectator’s subjective performance of the film (in a musical and
in a discursive sense), and the fleeting trace that the film has left in the subject’s
history: together, these two kinds of traces make up our embodied memory of
film.
How pale and uncertain these traces can seem, however, when compared
with a medium that has in its mastery over memory (even more, perhaps, than
in its mastery over contingency, although the two are clearly connected) one
of its defining features. Like the Freudian unconscious, film apparently never
forgets, and every projection seems to entail a repetition (even more drastically,
without the spectator’s contingent subjective illuminations we would have not
only one film in several copies but, so to speak, one projection “reappearing” in
time and space identical to itself). On the contrary, embodied human memory is
defined by its capacity for forgetfulness - which is not oblivion or a resurrection
of the past, but rather corresponds to the presence of the subject’s history in the
very act of perception. At the same time, the repetition that the technological
medium enshrines would correspond less to the return of something from the
past, than to the impossibility to deliver oneself from the past’s immobilizing
presence.
Forgetfulness, then, would name the contingency of embodied memory, a
form of aesthetic and non-objectual relation that is not really a relation to the
past, but rather to the passage of time, to our mortality, and to the mobility
of desire. Memory (mémoire), Pontalis thought, is something different than
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an archive of memories (souvenirs),380 it cannot be reduced to a collection of
items or translated into a string of data. Our embodied memory is rather like
a flux of associations and disassociations and it is only when this flux is frozen
that the souvenir appears - a Rosebud, an object of memory and a reification
of the dimension of the past. For Pontalis, to free associate is already to come
close to memory and its wavering.381 To speak freely might be our only way
to remember. That is, at least, what psychoanalysis has imagined: through a
speech that is free from the constraints of the secondary process and from the
fantasy of mastery - from the imaginary fixity of consensual meaning as well
as from the speaking subject’s own pretence of mastery over itself - one can
return memory to the flow of living and not so much revive the past as work
through its insistence in the present. The memory of a film would then be a flow
of free associations that traverses, and by this constitutes, the moving images
as well as those afterimages, thoughts, and sensations that linger on after the
projection and that have already become, in fact, integral part of the subject’s
capacity to experience. We can only find the memory of an image in another
image, in other words that we associate, in other people and other things in
the world. On the contrary, to remember a film in detail, or to entirely forget
about it, could be taken as a sign of resistance against the heteronomy of the
cinematic encounter and thus as a hint that this encounter has not really taken
place. In this sense, the spectator’s memory is the space in which the moving
image, as well as the spectator’s pleasure and fantasy, maintain their mobility
and exercise their agency and emancipation.
This space, both in the sense of the contingency of film experience and the
heteronomy of the spectator, and in the sense of the extended dimension of spec-
tatorship that these concepts imply, is the “subject matter” of Paul Auster’s
novel Man in the Dark. In the novel, we can see a comprehensive representation
of spectatorship that includes film watching, the sharing of this experience, and
the beginnings of the elaboration of a theory of film. A representation that
furthermore addresses the way all this is inevitably connected with the ungras-
pable contingencies of life and the inevitable subjectivity of lived-experience.
The novel presents a complete and quite realistic figure of the spectator, draw-
380 Pontalis, Fenêtres, 106.
381 Pontalis, Avant, 25.
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ing almost all of its possible relations with film, and showing how spectatorship
constructs film as a space of interpersonal relations, and the heteronomous
subject as an erratic, personal history of significant and signifying encounters.
In particular, as we will see, this representation takes the form of a felicitous
encounter of rememory and storytelling, of subjectivity and its fiction.
Man in the Dark.
In the desert of Vermont’s wilderness, during a long night of insomnia, the
narrator August Brill is making up in its mind a very roundabout story about
his suicide, involving a dystopic alternate reality in which 9/11 has not taken
place and the United States have fallen into civil war. The character of the
story imagined by Brill, Owen Brick, awakes into a pit in this other universe of
which he knows nothing and to which he has been “called” by an organisation
that is plotting for the murder of the sole individual responsible for the war:
none other than August Brill who is imagining the story. Brick is threatened
into accepting the mission to return back to the parent universe and kill the
man who is dangerously fantasizing about him in the obscurity of his house.
But we do not need to spoil the narrative line any further.
For Brill, making up this narrative is not only a means of coping with
the lack of sleep, but also a way of keeping at a distance the memories of a
series of mournful events in his life and in the lives of the close members of
his family. Brill’s wife died of cancer, leaving him ageing and alone. Their
first daughter, Miriam, divorced from her husband five years earlier and she is
now alone, too, and stuck while writing an academic book on Rose Hawthorn.
Miriam’s daughter Katya has lost her fiancé, Titus, in tragic circumstances: he
was beheaded by an unknown terrorist group while working as a contractor in
the Middle East. Brill himself crashed his car while driving to the house in
Vermont, was hospitalised for a long period, and is now facing partial paralysis
in his bed. Brill makes a constant effort, throughout the book and throughout
the night, not to think about all this, he tries to replace the thoughts and images
of his memory with other thoughts and other images. In particular, he tries to
erase the violent images of Titus’ death that the terrorists had recorded and
uploaded on the internet, where the family had been able to watch them:
“I think about Titus’ death often, the horrifying story of that
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death, the images of that death, the pulverizing consequences of that
death on my grieving granddaughter, but I don’t want to go there
now, I can’t go there now, I have to push it as far away from me as
possible [...]. That’s what I do when sleep refuses to come. I lie in
bed and tell myself stories. They might not add up to much, but as
long as I’m inside them, they prevent me from thinking about the
things I would prefer to forget.”382
In part, Brill tries to forget by “turning the world around,” as he calls the
imagining of his dystopian story. In part (which leads to us) by watching
films with his granddaughter Katya, who had been a film scholar in New York
before dropping out after Titus’s death. Brill and Katya watch films together,
compulsively, and then talk about them, discussing their views and making up
their own theories of film. In this, the two literally represent the permeability
of the space of spectatorship and theory as well as the minimal “coupling” that
defines film experience. The space of spectatorship, indeed, is not essentially,
or not just, the space between the spectator and the screen, but the space
between two subjects sharing their experience of film. Even in the case of a
single spectator watching a single film, I believe, it is this scene of sharing that is
re-evoked, and it is through this projection of a heteronomous subjectivity onto
the moving image that the film acquires its significance and that spectatorship
becomes an aesthetic experience.
In the discursivity and contingency of its encounter with film, the subject
evokes a history of its other encounters. Even if for Katya and Brill watching
films is an attempt to escape their reality and their traumatic memories, then,
as their dialogue unfolds they cannot avoid returning to the events of their life
- because their words and the moving images themselves are made of them. By
telling each other the story of the films that they have watched, at the same
time they are asking one another about their past, they are working through
it as they begin to question their present and their future. “She begins her
story,” Auster had written about Scheherazade in his first book, “and what she
tells is a story about storytelling, a story within which there are several stories,
each one, in itself, about storytelling - by means of which a man is saved from
382 Paul Auster, Man in the Dark (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 2.
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death.”383 Not from death, maybe, but surely from his obsession with it - the
story of storytelling appears to be essentially one of self-dissemination, working
against the anxiety of a paralysing and deadly identity. In Man in the Dark,
then, what is a theme of the novel and its structural cypher - a mise en abyme
storytelling and spectatorship and the mutual pervasion of life and fiction - is
further characterised in terms of free association and rememory.
Free association, Christopher Bollas writes, is always a compromise for-
mation between psychic truths and the self’s effort to avoid the pain of such
truths.384 Brill and Katya’s wished-for forgetfulness, in this sense, their warding
off of their memories of pain through film watching, their free-roaming conver-
sation (as well as the artificial “sleep” that Brill finds in his solitary fantasizing),
are all free associative activities. In this way, free association becomes a means
for the connection between the contingency of spectatorship and storytelling,
on one hand, and the heteronomy of the subject, on the other. The site of
this connection is the memory of the film, a space that is not irrepresentable
(on the contrary, like the dream, it is already in itself an act of signification),
but that nevertheless is not entirely intelligible: it can find a correspondence in
another subject, but it cannot be defined in terms of the sharing of a meaning.
Indeed, it is only by way of its associative connection that a memory becomes
significant - strictly speaking, that embodied memory can exist at all.385 But
more than this, it is only through an inter-personal sharing that memory itself
becomes significant. It is only by introjecting the scene of dialogue, that we
acquire a voice. The memory of film is at the same time the trace of film ex-
perience, it is almost the only form in which the contingent encounter between
spectator and film is accessible to the subject as a more or less distinct, but
still ungraspable, object (the other being, of course, the subect’s uninterrupted
lived-experience of the world). Returning to the memory of the film, would be
already to change it to a more or less evident, but always significant, extent.
There would be no “seeing” of this memory, and still, memory would not be
something irrepresentable: the only way in which it can exist, in fact, is to be
signified - that is, to be shared and, thus, to change.
383 Let’s not forget, though, that what Scheherazade sets out to stop is first of all a massacre
of women. Paul Auster, The Invention of Solitude (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 161.
384 Bollas, Free Association, 10.
385 Pontalis, Avant, 50-51.
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Theory as a form of forgetfulness. A long passage in the book is entirely
dedicated to a theory of film.386 Brill and Katya have just gone through roughly
six hours of screenings:
“Each time we finish a movie, we talk about it for a little while
before Katya puts on the next one. [...] Just tonight, however, after
we watched three consecutive foreign films - Grand Illusion, The
(16) Bicycle Thief , and The World of Apu, Katya delivered some
sharp and incisive comments, sketching out a theory of filmmaking
which impressed me with its originality and acumen.
Inanimate objects, she said.
What about them?, I asked.
Inanimate objects as a means of expressing human emotions.
That’s the language of film. Only good directors understand how
to do it, but Renoir, De Sica and Ray are three of the best, aren’t
they?”387
Maybe we could have expected something different from a film scholar, perhaps
something more, or maybe that is exactly what there is to be expected, for
Katya is actually making an aesthetic remark, and she is then proposing an
understanding of cinema which depends on her aesthetic feeling more than on
anything else. “Aesthetics of taste,” Christian Metz would have dismissively
commented.388 This taste is the driving force of both spectatorship and theory
- still, this is not the point of the passage. In the pages that follow, Katya
supports her theory with examples from the films that they have watched.
The first scene she picks is from Bicycle Thieves:389 when the unemployed
Antonio (Lamberto Maggiorani) returns home after he has been robbed of his
bicycle, he finds his wife Maria (Lianella Carell) carrying two buckets of water
into the house but, as Katya remarks, he only picks up one bucket to help her.
“Everything we need to know about their marriage,” Katya tells us, “is given
to us in these few seconds.”390 Moments after this scene, Maria goes to a pawn
386 Auster, Man in the Dark, 15-22.
387 Ibid., 15-16.
388 Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema, 10.
389 Vittorio de Sica, Ladri di Biciclette [Bicycle Thieves or, in the United States, The Bicycle
Thief] (ENIC, 1948). 35mm.
390 Auster, Man in the Dark, 16.
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shop to pawn the family bed sheets, wrapped into a bundle, in an effort to raise
the money to buy another bicycle, which her husband will need in order to look
for a job. The pawn shop is rendered by Katya on a grand scale: “[it] isn’t
a shop, really, but a huge place, a kind of warehouse for unwanted goods.”391
As the camera pulls back, she describes, the film reveals a ceiling-high shelf
full of similar bundles, suddenly universalising the scene into a representation
of the poverty of the entire country: “in one shot we’re given a picture of a
whole society living at the edge of disaster.”392 Which would be an engaging
interpretation, only the camera does not pull back at all. The scene is actually
shot from two alternating perspectives: one is Maria’s subjective, in which
we see a medium shot of the clerk, and the other is taken from behind the
back of the clerk, framing the wicket through which he and Maria are talking
from a one-hundred-and-twenty-degrees angle. The shelves full of bundles are
visible, out of focus, in the background from the woman’s point of view, but
no camera movement highlights them in any particular way. Similarly, the
shop proportions are not as epic as suggested, on the contrary, it is a rather
claustrophobic space, cut in two by a screen of glass panes. People are pushing
behind the counter and there is very little space on the side of the clerk too -
a similar set-up is used again later in the film for the bicycle shop, arguably
suggesting by connotation more the tightness of the economic situation, than
its scale.
We see here how Katya’s experience and her retelling of the film scene de-
formed (that is, informed), more or less intentionally, but still in a significant
manner, what can be regarded as the objective text of the film. The pas-
sage shows how the film which is experienced and remembered frequently and
substantially diverges from the conventional text of the film, suggesting the
subjective presence of the spectator within the images. Katya’s reading of the
film is in fact already a use of it and Auster, of course, is giving us, more or less
intentionally, but still in a significant way, a representation of this process. In
turn, my own reading cannot be but partial and oriented as well: for instance,
as I read again the lines that I have just written, the space behind the clerk




exaggerated the effect for the sake of my own argument. I can go back to the
film and, eventually, choose to correct my impressions: academic writing could
be distinguished by this return to the image, by a sharpening of our memory of
film until, in fact, what we have in us is almost no longer a memory, but merely
a souvenir - a readily intelligible but rather insignificant object. The hyper-
mnesia that all technologies of the images essentially perform and encourage,
the possibility they give to return to our experience of film as if it were made,
like the reel, of distinct immobile frames, goes at the expenses of our embodied
memory: by circumventing the forgetfulness of its experience, isn’t the pensive
spectator cutting itself off from its significance?
Katya is definitely using the film, but so far it is still not clear how this
use could be described in terms of a process of free association and remem-
ory. Katya, Brill, and Auster make it clearer with the next example. From
Renoir’s masterpiece La Grande Illusion,393 Katya selects what she calls the
“dishwashing scene”. The scene takes place toward the end of the film, when
Maréchal (Jean Gabin) and Rosenthal (Marcel Dalio), two French fugitives on
the run from the Germans, leave the house of Elsa (Dita Parlo), where they
have been hiding on their way to the Swiss border. As they leave, Maréchal
and Elsa - who, in their few days together, have fallen in love - know that they
will never meet again. Katya is describing the scene for her grandfather, and
for us readers:
“Renoir then cuts to Gabin and Dalio running through the woods,
and I’d bet every other director in the world would have stayed with
them until the end of the film. But not Renoir. He (18) has the
genius - and when I say genius, I mean the understanding, the depth
of heart, the compassion - to go back to the woman and her little
daughter, this young widow who has already lost her husband to
the madness of war, and what does she have to do? She has to
go back in the house and confront the dining table and the dirty
dishes from the meal they’ve just eaten. The men are gone now,
and because they’re gone, those dishes have been transformed into
a sign of their absence, the lonely suffering of women when men go
off to war, and one by one, without saying a word, she picks up
393 Jean Renoir, La Grande Illusion (RAC, 1937). 35mm.
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the dishes and clears the table. How long does the scene last? Ten
seconds? Fifteen seconds? No time at all, but it takes your breath
away, doesn’t it? It just knocks the stuffing out of you.
You’re a brave girl, I said, suddenly thinking about Titus”394.
The dishwashing scene that Katya so compellingly evokes lasts indeed no time
at all - it simply is not there. The rest of the scene, as well, is not exactly as
Katya recalls it. There is no cut to the two men running through the woods,
but only a shot of them going away from the front door and into the dark.
After that, there is a short pan following Elsa as she escorts her daughter to
the table and picks up the dishes. The meaning is there, suggested, but its full
expression is Katya’s doing. In the end, it would be our loss, and an act against
the spectator’s emancipation, to remove the dishwashing scene from the film, to
argue against its existence: after reading Auster, Renoir’s La Grande Illusion
should indeed be seen to be a few frames longer. It is this kind of fantasmatic
extension of the material film, and of the conventional film text, that makes of
spectatorship a form of theory and an aesthetic practice.
With this passage of Man in the Dark, we begin to see connections between
the spectator’s creative, forgetful, retelling of the film and its embodied sub-
jectivity. This connection acts associatively, and takes first of all the form of
a secondary identification.395 Katya is the one living the trauma of those un-
homely dishes turned into a symbol of death: at the same time that she projects
this association onto the character, she has to let Elsa remind her of Titus. It
is only in her dialogue with Brill, however, that this association is consciously
spoken. We can see here how using a film also entails a capacity of letting
oneself be used by it - to be illuminated and, often, even interpreted by it. As
Pontalis wrote, reading a book is to allow oneself to be read, which implies a
double movement of appropriation and estrangement.396
394 Auster, Man in the Dark, 17-18.
395 Secondary identification - identification of the spectator with some identifiable feature of
the characters on screen - clearly works in the other direction as well: in our experience and
memory of film, characters assume subjective features that only us, as specific spectators,
can project onto them. Semiological film studies clearly preferred to concentrate on the
first kind of movement of identification, and on the spectator’s primary identification with
the camera, arguably because they allow to downplay the permeability of the space of film
and to make film experience and the position of the spectator more intelligible.
396 Pontalis, Fenêtres, 110-111.
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Brill understands what Katya is hinting at with her associative construction
of the film scene. He gets it, unconsciously, and replies somewhat automatically,
abruptly associating the death of Katya’s husband. The association remains
unspoken (Brill merely tells her that she is a brave girl), but, as Katya replies
that she does not want to talk about “him”, it is clear that the death of Titus
has been suggested to both. Brill’s association has been understood and it has
not been harmless. Indeed, Katya immediately retorts with a joke. As Brill
tries to move on the conversation, proposing to “stick to the movies,” and says
that he liked the Indian film best, Katya replies ironically: “that’s because it’s
about a writer.”397 We can see how she is turning the previous situation on its
head: where a moment before Brill spoke the unwanted and painful memory
lying beneath Katya’s rendering of the scene, now she mocks his identification
with the character of another film, turning the very idea of identification into
something harmless and somewhat senile.
After having discussed all three films, Brill adds to Katya’s theory, returning
on the subject of his granddaughter’s personal life. Brill is saying:
“There’s another thing about those three scenes. I wasn’t aware
of it while we were watching the films, but listening to you describe
them now, it jumped right out at me.
What?
They are all about women. How women are the ones who carry
the world. They take care of the real business while their hapless
men stumble around making a hash of things. Or else (22) just lie
around just doing nothing. [...]
At last, Katya said, giving me a small poke in the ribs. A man
who gets it.
Let’s not exaggerate. I’m just adding a footnote to your theory.
Your very astute theory, I might add.
And what kind of husband were you, Grandpa?”398
Again, the free associative character of Brill’s words is made evident - “it jumped
right out at me” signals an instance of Einfall, and it is an expression that also
contains a potential element of threat. From here on, the subtle references
397 Auster, Man in the Dark, 118.
398 Ibid., 21-22.
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and cross-references between the story, the films, and the character’s lives will
continue to expand throughout the night, toward dawn and the symbolic writing
of Brill’s memoirs, toward the moment in which he and Katya, in the diegetic
reality of the novel, will finally talk openly about life and death - a process she
describes, with her characteristically crude expressiveness, as “Truth Night at
Castle Despair.”399
Halfway through the book, another film comes to Brill’s mind in support to
Katya’s theory:
“Thinking about films again, I realize that I have another exam-
ple to add to Katya’s list. I must remember to tell her first thing
tomorrow morning - in the dining room over breakfast - since it’s
bound to please her, and if I can manage to coax a smile out of that
glum face of hers, I’ll consider it a worthy accomplishment.”400
The film is Ozu’s Tokyo Story,401 that Auster/Brill narrates for the length of
seven pages.402 Brill can translate most of the situation he is living into the
film. Noriko (Setsuko Hara) is Katya, for she has lost her husband in the
war and she is also Miriam (Brill’s other daughter, whose part in the story
we cannot address) for she has chosen to take care of her lonesome father,
Brill himself, who acts as the old man in Ozu’s film (Chishû Ryû). What
can be easily recognised as an extensive structure of identifications between
Brill’s personal experience and the discourse of the film is in fact made up by
a myriad of small-scale associations, which are part of a greater net, including
the other films the film-watching couple have seen, the memories evoked by
them, and the discourses arising from them (Brill says that Noriko is Elsa in
Katya’s dishwashing scene, for instance).403 Tokyo Story is charged by Brill of
particular significance: not only has he watched the film twice, the first a long
time before, but he has asked Katya to play again the scene of the dialogue
between the old man and Noriko, a scene that is also a doubling of Brill and
Katya’s “scene”, their intimate film watching and the space of their dialogue.
399 Ibid., 153.
400 Ibid., 73.
401 Yasujirô Ozu, Tokyo Story (Shôchiku Eiga,1953). 35mm.
402 Auster, Man in the Dark, 73-79.
403 Ibid., 75.
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What comes out the most from the net of relationships and associations that
Brill finds in the film is the phrase (a wish): “I want you to be happy.”404 At this
point of the narrative, however, there is an abrupt change, for instead of going
on to address his relationship with Katya, Brill suddenly thinks of his sister
Betty: “impossible not to think of my sister now,”405 we are told. Auster/Brill
introduces then a new character and brings us, avoiding the closure of meaning,
through another wide, circular, associative gesture. Betty is another widow of
war, a fact which opens up a sequence of memories and stories about her and
her husband Gil, from a race riot in Newark to the eviction of Gil’s corpse from
the graveyard at the end of a “Balzacian inheritance war”406 and Betty dying
of a broken heart. As it is peculiar to memory and experiencing, meaning is
never final, but can only be scattered further, always remaining incomplete.
To add a further layer of complexity, we can also find various trespassing
of Brill’s life in the alternate universe he is imagining: for instance, the name
of Brill’s first love is the same as Brick’s, and at one point Brick himself starts
planning his suicide. Brill comments about his activity as a writer, in fact
describing the alternative between grounding aesthetic experience in memory
and subjective contingency, or not: “either I put myself in the story to make it
real, or else I become unreal, a figment of my imagination.”407 Either we accept
the living-ground of the spectator’s subjective experience, or else we cannot but
render the experience of the spectator unreal, turning it into a mere instance
of the text or of its consensual interpretation.
It takes two (to make less than one).
There is much more in the book than cannot be discussed here and, indeed,
much more that the readers may add on their own - we have to turn back to
film theory and, which is harder, approach the conclusion.
At a first glance, Auster manages to evoke through Brill the whole spectrum
of the spectator’s experience. Brill is the classic male, fetishistic, and partially






better redeem the wounded reality he feels he is forced to inhabit. He is that
“man among other men plunged into darkness for the time of a screening, living
the vision of his intimate memory in that intimate memory that the film offers
to him”408that Bellour sees at the cinema. He is a pensive spectator, and a
talkative one as well: not only does he watch films, but he is aware of his
position as a spectator and of the role spectatorship plays in his life. He makes
use of the films and he is able to use the passivity and the alterity that they
put him into. At the same time that Brill theorizes about cinema, and by the
same token, Auster is theorizing about spectatorship and film theory. All this,
moreover, is made with a light touch and a sensibility to the contingencies of
conversation and the nuances of writing that not all viewers, and surely not all
film theorists, can have. In this Vermontian night, in fact, everything is quite
brilliant: the fine grain of the dialogues is extremely convincing, the fiction is
sensational, the anecdotes are both incredible and life-like, the narrations of
the films are perfect in their imprecision - this is indeed how the novel becomes
relevant to this work, because it makes so many things so clearly and so perfectly
visible.
Still, what we are facing is not spectatorship, it is not free association, and
it is not really the heteronomy of the subject: it is, of course, only their rep-
resentation. As Brill represents an embodied spectator he is also inevitably, to
some degree, a mise en discours of its waywardness. Being a character - and
such an exceptionally well written one - he is deprived of a fundamental part
of the tension, of the indeterminacy, of the ambivalence and the mobility that
trouble the position of the real, ordinary, spectator - a tension we can only
find again in our embodied experience as troubled and ordinary readers. In
their intimate connection, literature (dialogue, film, any form of signification)
and lived-experience are animated by their incommensurability. Without this
tension, we might still indicate an object as art, but strictly speaking, no aes-
thetic experience would be possible. So as Auster signifies the faltering texture
of contingent experience he inevitably weaves it back together, and it is to the
reader to unweave it again.
Auster can be seen to treat language and dialogue themselves - a scene of
408 “Un homme parmi d’autres plongé le temps d’une séance dans le noir et vivant la vision
de sa mémoire intime dans celle que le film lui propose.” Raymond Bellour, Le Corps du
Cinéma: Hypnosis, Émotions, Animalités. (Paris: P.O.L., 2009), 17. Translation mine.
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speaking subjects - as the contingent “animal” of the two other stories that we
have discussed. To put it naively, we could say that the bat and the fly’s flight
become here like the flight of the signifier: fixed on the page but ever mobile
in its embodied contingency. Auster’s storytelling and spectatorship are not
reduced to narrative, but rather bound with narration: they circumvent the
Einfall precisely by performing and showing its incorporation and its inevitable
presence in every act of signification. The unexpected and the erratic of free
association is embroidered, so to speak, in Brill and Katya’s exchanges: after
a long period of silence in their life and against the stillness that defines the
insomniac, hyper-aware, subject, language is returned its mobility and, with it,
comes the presence of death. In order to really talk to each other, the two must
mourn. Still, this contingent and deathly beast is somewhat tamed. It disrupts
the conversation so that it can become more significant, and as it unsettles the
characters, it eventually soothes the reader.
A story is told about watching a film and the position of the spectator is
rescued from its melancholic oneness. A story is told about death and loss
and two people are rescued from the meaning of solitude. In a way, Man in
the Dark is a redemptive novel - or at least a novel about the redemptive
power of writing and spectatorship - in the sense that it represents aesthetic
experience and, more specifically, free associative film watching and storytelling,
as a remedial completion to a solitary vision of subjectivity and an essentially
wounded world.409 In the novel, trauma can indeed be seen to act, specifically in
relation to the significance of spectatorship, as the hypostasis of the dimension
of meaning: meaning-making itself is made meaningful not just in relation to
its incommensurability with lived-experience, but through a certain relation
with the inexpressible. In other words, the elusive flight of free association
and the chinese-box play of narration are eventually brought back to meaning
- or, better, they are sutured to a certain idea of meaningfulness - through a
background reference to the irrepresentable. In fact, they are made meaningful
through a reference to a particular, and particularised, irrepresentable: the
recording of Titus’ beheading (at the same time an unbearable film image and,
if we like, a metaphor for symbolic castration). To put it in another way, by
anchoring signification and its significance to the process of rememory of a
409 Bersani, Redemption, 10.
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quintessential trauma, the associativity of stories and the contingency of the
dialogue lose much of their dissensual disruptiveness, and rather become, when
confronted with the universality of death (but is death really universal, as long
as life remains unequal?) something essentially conciliatory. In this way, writing
and spectatorship themselves become less hospitable to the Einfall and are
rather transformed in a support for its inscription.
On one hand, then, Auster is illuminating the reader to itself: as a reader, as
a heteronomous subject, and as a mortal body. On the other hand, however, in
being mediated by the text, this heteronomy loses something of its essentially
troubling and dissensual nature - something that can only reemerge in the
contingency of the subject’s embodied experience. It is in this sense that the free
associative and dissensual nature of film spectatorship necessarily escapes the
forms that make it intelligible. Not just the authoritarian forms of pedagogical
film theory and the static forms of normative identity, but also, at least to some
extent, the very aesthetic forms that make it significant. Aesthetic experience is
traversed by the incommensurability, the heteronomy and the dissonance that at
the same time allow it to exist and make it ambiguous and potentially troubling.
Embodied experience and aesthetic use remain thus as external points of tension
in relation to signification, which is not irrepresentable but forever ungraspable
and always already traversing the subject positions it implies.
If we can grasp the contingency and embodiment of the heteronomous sub-
ject in Man in the Dark, in fact, it is not through Brill alone, but rather through
the relationship and the space that exist in-between Katya and him. The man
in the dark is only part of the picture: if Brill is a spectator, and a subject,
it is also Katya’s doing, for we can only address embodied experience through
contingent and interpersonal experience. We can say that one spectator is made
by more than one viewer, then, and that a viewer already is a contingent and
embodied history of spectators. The men and the women and the children in
the dark are a cluster of stories and positions: at the same time spectators,
filmmakers and theorists. The body itself is not whole, but it is rather made
of encounters, memory, and pleasures. What makes the couple of characters in
the novel interesting is that, together, they allow to imagine a spectator with
more than a metapsychological build, more than a mere ability to read, more
than an autonomous agency, and something else than a definite sense of self.
As I tried to argue, it is primarily by introjecting this scene of dialogue that
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film experience becomes aesthetic and that the subject becomes hospitable to
its own heteronomy and contingency, to the Einfall, and thus, to dissensus.
The spectator is always situated, associative, embodied, discursive: at the
same time, it is never entirely graspable and never entirely in control of itself.
It is always less than one subject and more than one viewer: One, No one, and
One Hundred Thousand, to borrow from Pirandello again. We are one, because
we are uniquely contingent, because there are limits to our embodied experience,
because our presence is finite in time and space, and because our connectedness
with the world is not necessarily comforted by a perfect correspondence. We
are no one, because we are not a unitary, identifiable and self-same subject - in
this we elude the grasp of normative discourse at the same time that we face
the lack in our own mastery and understanding. We are a hundred thousand,
finally, because in our situated and erratic encounters with the world we are
multiplied and disseminated. Film spectatorship returns the subject to this
heteronomy and radical contingency of being, to the estrangement of a child,
to the dissent of the infans, to the muteness of passion, and to the perversity of
theory, not, or not necessarily, to the state of need and dispossession through
which these very feelings are framed and interpreted from an authoritarian and
consensualstandpoint.
The wayward spectator is an emancipated spectator, then, historically, cul-
turally and subjectively contingent, situated and embodied and radically other
to itself. It inhabits the tension between these dimensions and the grasp that
would make them intrinsically intelligibile: not a tension between the irrepre-
sentable, or the misrepresented, and its true reality or mystified representation,
but rather the measure of the incommensurability of the forms of being and
signification to the principles that are supposed to order them. The experience
of the wayward spectator is not a form of objectifiable knowledge, but rather
a form of sharing and contact, it is not a self-affirmation, but rather a letting
go of the self, it is not a form of active agency, but rather a way of acknowl-
edging the power memory, objects and encounters have on us. It is precisely in
the failure of a masterful theory, then - taken as a mise en discours and as a
form of disciplinary self-observation - that spectatorship can exist as an eman-
cipated praxis. And it is precisely in its connectedness with this dimension of
spectatorship that film theory, in turn, becomes significant.
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